Selected Works of Joseph E. Stiglitz

Joseph E. Stiglitz was awarded the Nobel Prize in economics in 2001 and is University Professor at Columbia University where he founded the Initiative for Policy Dialogue in 2000. He was Chair of President Bill Clinton's Council of Economic Advisors from 1995-97 and Chief Economist and Senior Vice-President of the World Bank from 1997-2000. He is also chair of the University of Manchester's Brooks World Poverty Institute and is a member of the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences. His best known recent publications include 'Making Globalization Work' (2006), 'Fair Trade for All' (2005), 'Globalization and its Discontents' (2002) and 'The Roaring Nineties' (2003).

Preface to the Selected Works ; Introduction to Volume I ; I. PERSPECTIVES ON INFORMATION ANALYSIS ; 1. Information and Economic Analysis ; 2. Information and the Change in the Paradigm in Economics ; IIA. THE GENERAL THEORY OF SCREENING ; 3. The Theory of "Screening", Education and the Distribution of Income ; 4. A Model of Employment Outcome Illustrating the Effect of the Structure of Information on the Level and Distribution of Income ; IIB. THEORY OF SELF-SELECTION ; Introduction to Section IIB ; 5. Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information ; 6. Competition and Insurance Twenty Years Later ; 7. Monopoly, Non-Linear Pricing, and Imperfect Information: The Insurance Market ; 8. Prices and Queues as Screening Devices in Competitive Markets ; 9. Sorting Out the Differences Between Screening and Signaling Models ; IIC. THEORY OF ADVERSE SELECTION, EFFICIENCY WAGES, AND CREDIT RATIONING ; Introduction to Section IIC ; 10. Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information ; 11. Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device ; 12. The Causes and Consequences of the Dependence of Quality Prices ; III THEORY OF INCENTIVES AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION ; 13. Incentives and Risk Sharing in Sharecropping ; 14. Information, Competition, and Markets ; 15. Human Fallibility and Economic Organization ; 16. The Basic Analytics of Moral Hazard ; 17. Credit Markets and the Control of Capital ; 18. Peer Monitoring and Credit Markets ; IV. INFORMATION AND PRICES ; Introduction to Section IV ; 19. Information and Competitive Price Systems ; 20. Bargains and Ripoffs: A Model of Monopolistically Competitive Price Dispersion ; 21. On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets ; 22. A Nonconcavity in the Value of Information ; V. WELFARE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION ; Introduction to Section V ; 23. Externalities in Economies with Imperfect Information and Incomplete Markets ; 24. Moral Hazard and Nonmarket Institutions: Dysfunctional Crowding Out or Peer Monitoring ; VI. INFORMATION AND MACRO-ECONOMICS ; Introduction to Section VI ; 25. Informational Imperfections in the Capital Markets and Macroeconomic Fluctuations ; 26. Financial Market Imperfections and Business Cycles