Cooperative Sourcing (eBook)

Dr. Daniel Beimborn promovierte bei Prof. Dr. Wolfgang König am Institut für Wirtschaftsinformatik an der Universität Frankfurt am Main. Er ist als Wissenschaftlicher Assistent von Prof. Dr. Tim Weitzel an der Universität Bamberg tätig.

Foreword 6
Foreword 8
Preface 9
Table of Contents 11
Variables and Symbols 16
Abbreviations 21
1 Introduction 26
1.1 Cooperative Sourcing in the Banking Industry 28
1.2 Motivation and Research Questions 29
1.3 Theoretical Foundation and Methodology 33
1.4 Contribution and Main Findings 36
1.5 Basic Terms 42
1.5.1 Processes, Activities, Business Functions, and the Value Chain 42
1.5.2 Interorganizational Relationships 43
1.5.3 Outsourcing and Cooperative Sourcing 44
1.5.4 Financial Service Firms 47
1.6 Thesis Structure 50
2 Theoretical Foundation and Related Research 52
2.1 Theoretical Foundation for Cooperative Sourcing Research 52
2.1.1 Production Cost Economics 54
2.1.2 Transaction Cost Economics 62
2.1.3 Agency Theory 71
2.1.4 Theory of Incomplete Contracts 76
2.1.5 Porter’s Positioning Framework 79
2.1.6 Resource-Based View and Core Competence View 81
2.1.7 Resource Dependency Theory 88
2.1.8 Relationship Theories 90
2.1.9 Network Effect Theory 96
2.1.10 A Multi-Theoretical Perspective on Cooperative Sourcing 98
2.2 Outsourcing Research 105
2.2.1 Overview 105
2.2.2 Outsourcing Drivers and Inhibitors 107
2.2.3 Formal Models in the Context of Outsourcing 121
2.2.4 Summary 123
3 Cooperative Sourcing in the Banking Industry 124
3.1 Current Situation in the German Banking Industry 125
3.1.1 Structural Deficits in the German Banking Industry 125
3.1.2 Current Tendencies 132
3.2 Segmentation in the Banking Industry 137
3.2.1 Generic Value Chain of the Banking Industry 137
3.2.2 Segmentation Models 140
3.3 Credit Process as Application Domain 145
3.3.1 Overview of the Credit Market 146
3.3.2 Reference Processes for Process-Based Empirical Research 149
3.3.3 Credit Business Segmentation Model 156
3.4 Cooperative Sourcing in the German Banking Industry 162
3.4.1 General Trends 162
3.4.2 Outsourcing of Particular Business Processes 166
3.4.3 Outsourcing of Credit Processes 171
3.5 Regulatory Issues 177
3.5.1 General Requirements Related to BPO 177
3.5.2 Specific Requirements for Credit Process Outsourcing 183
3.6 Empirical Evidence in the German Credit Business 185
3.6.1 Demographics 187
3.6.2 Characteristics of the Credit Process 191
3.6.3 BPO Potential of the SME Credit Processes 225
3.7 Summary 244
4 Developing a Formal Model for Cooperative Sourcing 246
4.1 Justification of Model Development 246
4.2 Derivation of the Cooperative Sourcing Model ( CSM) 248
4.2.1 Actors and Business Functions 248
4.2.2 Business Neighborhood 252
4.2.3 Cooperative Sourcing 255
4.3 Centralized Model: Global Optimization 268
4.4 Decentralized Model: Autonomous Actor Decisions 272
4.5 Extending the Model by Legal and Regulatory Issues 278
4.6 Summary 280
5 Analytical and Simulative Studies 281
5.1 Game-Theoretical Analysis of Cooperative Sourcing 281
5.1.1 Basic Concepts from Cooperative Game Theory 282
5.1.2 Allocation Mechanisms 284
5.1.3 Model 285
5.1.4 Analysis 287
5.1.5 Experiment 295
5.1.6 Conclusion 299
5.2 A Genetic Algorithm for Solving the CSP 300
5.2.1 Basics 301
5.2.2 GA Design 302
5.2.3 Configuration 306
5.3 Simulation Studies 307
5.3.1 Agent-based Simulations as Research Approach 307
5.3.2 Simulation Procedure 310
5.3.3 Parameterization 314
5.3.4 Simulation Results 325
6 Conclusion 409
6.1 Summary of the Findings 409
6.2 Contributions 422
6.2.1 Implications for Theory 422
6.2.2 Managerial Implications 425
6.3 Validation of the Research Approach 428
6.4 Limitations 433
6.5 Further Research 437
References 442
Appendix 478
A1 – Performance Tests of the Genetic Algorithm 478
A2 – Parameterization of the Simulation Studies 482

2.1.3.2 Implications for the Sourcing (S. 49-50)

Decision Applying agency theory to the context of outsourcing requires the transformation of the principal/agent relationship to an outsourcer/sourcing provider relationship (Gellrich et al. 2005). From an AT perspective, the principal has to choose between an inter-firm and an intra-firm agency relationship. AT insights regarding the outsourcing relationship can be distinguished by the following perspectives: Ex ante (or: pre-outsourcing): The selection of an unsuitable vendor has to be avoided. Information about the vendor’s capabilities is only partially available to the potential outsourcer (hidden characteristics), provoking adverse selection (Akerlof 1970).

Ex post: After establishing the sourcing partnership, problems of hidden action or moral hazard and hold-up have to be prevented (Schott 1997). As pointed out earlier, the outsourcer has to choose between implementing an information system (monitoring) and outcome-based contracting (including positive and negative benefits) to insure incentive compatibility. Consequently, outsourcing a business function usually raises agency costs because, in most cases, it is easier to control efforts within the firm than to monitor autonomous business partners (Williamson 1990, 134), due to more easily implementable controlling and incentive instruments (Alchian and Demsetz 1972).

By contrast, sometimes measurement problems and opportunistic behavior exist within a firm, which actually leads to outsourcing (Wang 2002). The problem of hidden characteristics is generally insignificant because many specific investments are necessary in most cases and the market of sourcing providers in a wide range of fields is quite clearly set out (Schott 1997, 187). Investments in outsourcing relationships increase specificity and therefore include signal quality. If a service provider did not have the necessary clout and capability, it would be detrimental for him to undertake a too great business risk. Another way the sourcing provider can (help to) reduce the outsourcer’s risks resulting from hidden characteristics and hidden action is by taking over equity of the outsourcer (Cunningham and Fröschl 1995).

Or, often related to outsourcing deals in the banking industry, the sourcing provider places deposits in the customer bank (Schott 1997). Other bonding activities such as implementing one’s own control and logging systems or using standardized resources (to facilitate an exit option for the outsourcer) are also common in order to raise the outsourcer’s trust in the partnership. As already discussed in the section on TCE, the implementation of interorganizational information systems (IOS) leads to a reduction of coordination costs (p. 45). From an AT perspective, these IOS represent (at least partially) the implementation of monitoring capabilities which can reduce the risk of opportunistic behavior.

Furthermore, the problem of hidden action might be significantly less problematic in the context of cooperative sourcing. Since the insourcing firm provides the same services to the outsourcers as well as to itself, an inherent congruence of interests does already exist. Moreover, since the outsourcer in a cooperative sourcing scenario knows a lot about the outsourced business function, the level of uncertainty will be lower. The formal models based on PAT show that the less risk-averse entity has to bear the risk.