Personal Identity and the Self
Seiten
2024
Cambridge University Press (Verlag)
978-1-009-57052-7 (ISBN)
Cambridge University Press (Verlag)
978-1-009-57052-7 (ISBN)
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This Element raises the questions What are we? What owns our thoughts and experiences? Are we anything at all? It also assesses a 'no-bearer' theory of experience, discusses the challenge to animalism and surveys a 'thinking parts' problem.
What are we? What owns our thoughts and experiences? Are we anything at all? After an introduction, Section 2 assesses a 'no-bearer' theory of experience, and the 'no-self' contention that our self-representations are about no real entity, before introducing a positive hypothesis about the objects of our self-representations: the 'animalist' claim that we are biological organisms. Section 3 discusses the classic challenge to animalism that brain transplantation is a situation which we could survive but no animal could survive. The challenge serves to introduce some positive alternatives to animalism, as well as animalist responses, including a response which questions the assumption that psychology is irrelevant to organism persistence. Section 4 surveys a 'thinking parts' problem and cases of conjoined twinning and commisurotomy, also considered problematic for animalism. The interpretation of these cases revisits questions about bearers of experience, objects of self-representation, and the relation of biology and psychology.
What are we? What owns our thoughts and experiences? Are we anything at all? After an introduction, Section 2 assesses a 'no-bearer' theory of experience, and the 'no-self' contention that our self-representations are about no real entity, before introducing a positive hypothesis about the objects of our self-representations: the 'animalist' claim that we are biological organisms. Section 3 discusses the classic challenge to animalism that brain transplantation is a situation which we could survive but no animal could survive. The challenge serves to introduce some positive alternatives to animalism, as well as animalist responses, including a response which questions the assumption that psychology is irrelevant to organism persistence. Section 4 surveys a 'thinking parts' problem and cases of conjoined twinning and commisurotomy, also considered problematic for animalism. The interpretation of these cases revisits questions about bearers of experience, objects of self-representation, and the relation of biology and psychology.
1. Introduction; 2. Ownership and ourselves; 3. Persistence; 4. Multiplicity; References.
Erscheint lt. Verlag | 31.7.2024 |
---|---|
Reihe/Serie | Elements in Philosophy of Mind |
Zusatzinfo | Worked examples or Exercises |
Verlagsort | Cambridge |
Sprache | englisch |
Themenwelt | Geisteswissenschaften ► Philosophie ► Metaphysik / Ontologie |
Geisteswissenschaften ► Psychologie ► Psychoanalyse / Tiefenpsychologie | |
ISBN-10 | 1-009-57052-8 / 1009570528 |
ISBN-13 | 978-1-009-57052-7 / 9781009570527 |
Zustand | Neuware |
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