Two Logics

Henry Veatch (1911 – 1999) obtained his Ph.D. from Harvard University in 1937 and spent his career at Indiana University (1937–1965), Northwestern University (1965–1973), and Georgetown University (1973–1983) where he was Philosophy Department Chair from 1973 to 1976. He also had visiting professorships at Colby College, Haverford College and St. Thomas University. He served as president of the Metaphysical Society of America in 1961. In 1970–71 he served as president of the Western Division of the American Philosophical Association. He published 15 books and many articles mainly in the fields of metaphysics and ethics.

Introduction: the battle of the books renewed -- A logic that can't say what anything is -- Alternative logics: a what-logic and a relating-logic -- The what-statements of a what-logic: why they are not analytic truths -- The what-statements of a what-logic: why they are not synthetic truths -- The disabilities of a relating-logic: the fallacy of inverted intentionality -- The world as seen through a relating-logic -- A what-logic and its supposed commitment to essences and substantial forms -- Induction as conceived by a relating-logic and a what-logic -- The picture of the world derived from the inductions in a relating-logic -- Deductive explanation: a likely case study in surrealism? -- From deductive explanation in general to historical explanation in particular -- A short digression from history into ethics -- Conclusion: epilogue or epitaph?