Essays and Miscellanies (eBook)

SENTIMENTS CONCERNING NATURE WITH WHICH PHILOSOPHERS WERE DELIGHTED

BOOK I.

 It being our determination to discourse of Natural Philosophy, we judge it necessary, in the first place and chiefly, to divide the body of philosophy into its proper members, so that we may know what is that which is called philosophy, and what part of it is physical, or the explanation of natural things.  The Stoics affirm that wisdom is the knowledge of things human and divine; that philosophy is the pursuit of that art which is convenient to this knowledge; that virtue is the sole and sovereign art which is thus convenient; and this distributes itself into three general parts--natural, moral, and logical. By which just reason (they say) philosophy is tripartite; of which one natural, the other moral, the third logical.  The natural when our inquiries are concerning the world and all things contained in it; the ethical is the employment of our minds in those things which concern the manners of man's life; the logical (which they also call dialectical) regulates our conversation with others in speaking.  Aristotle, Theophrastus, and after them almost all the Peripatetics give the same division of philosophy.  It is absolutely requisite that the complete person he contemplator of things which have a being, and the practiser of those thing which are decent; and this easily appears by the following instances.  If the question be proposed, whether the sun, which is so conspicuous to us, be informed of a soul or inanimate, he that makes this disquisition is the thinking man; for he proceeds no farther than to consider the nature of that thing which is proposed.  Likewise, if the question be propounded, whether the world be infinite, or whether beyond the  system of this world there is any real being, all these things are  the objects about which the understanding of man is conversant.   But if these be the questions,--what measures must be taken to  compose the well-ordered life of man, what are the best methods to  govern and educate children, or what are the exact rules whereby sovereigns may command and establish laws,--all these queries are proposed for the sole end of action, and the man skilled therein is the moral and practical man.

CHAPTER I.

WHAT IS NATURE?

Since we have undertaken to make a diligent search into Nature, I cannot but conclude it necessary to declare what Nature is.  It is very absurd to attempt a discourse of the essence of natural things, and not to understand what is the power and sphere of Nature.  If Aristotle be credited, Nature is the principle of motion and rest, in that thing in which it exists as a principle and not by accident.  For all things that are conspicuous to our eyes, which are neither fortuitous nor necessary, nor have a divine original, nor acknowledge any such like cause, are called natural and enjoy their proper nature.  Of this sort are earth, fire, water, air, plants, animals; to these may be added all things produced from them, such as showers, hail, thunders, hurricanes, and winds.  All these confess they had a beginning, none of these were from eternity, but had something as the origin of them; and likewise animals and plants have a principle whence they are produced.  But Nature, which in all these things hath the priority, is not only the principle of motion but of repose; whatsoever enjoys the principle of motion, the same has a possibility to find a dissolution.  Therefore on this account it is that Nature is the principle of motion and rest.

 CHAPTER II.

WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A PRINCIPLE AND AN ELEMENT?

The followers of Aristotle and Plato conclude that elements are  discriminated from principles.  Thales the Milesian supposeth that  a principle and the elements are one and the same thing, but it is evident that they vastly differ one from another.  For the  elements are things compounded; but we do pronounce that  principles admit not of a composition, nor are the effects of any  other being.  Those which we call elements are earth, water, air,  and fire.  But we call those principles which have nothing prior  to them out of which they are produced; for otherwise not these  themselves, but rather those things whereof they are produced,  would be the principles.  Now there are some things which have a  pre-existence to earth and water, from which they are begotten; to wit, matter, which is without form or shape; then form, which we  call [Greek omitted] (actuality); and lastly, privation. Thales therefore is most in error, by affirming that water is both an element and a principle.

CHAPTER III.

WHAT ARE PRINCIPLES?

Thales the Milesian doth affirm that water is the principle from  whence all things in the universe spring.  This person appears to  be the first of philosophers; from him the Ionic sect took its  denomination, for there are many families and successions amongst  philosophers.  After he had professed philosophy in Egypt, when he  was very old, he returned to Miletus.  He pronounced, that all  things had their original from water, and into water all things  are resolved.  His first ground was, that whatsoever was the  prolific seed of all animals was a principle, and that is moist;  so that it is probable that all things receive their original from  humidity.  His second reason was, that all plants are nourished  and fructified by that thing which is moist, of which being  deprived they wither away.  Thirdly, that that fire of which the  sun and stars are made is nourished by watery exhalations,--yea,  and the world itself; which moved Homer to sing that the  generation of it was from water:--

    The ocean is

Of all things the kind genesis.

(Iliad, xiv. 246.)

Anaximander, who himself was a Milesian, assigns the principle of all things to the Infinite, from whence all things flow, and into the same are corrupted; hence it is that infinite worlds are framed, and those dissolve again into that whence they have their origin.  And thus he farther proceeds, For what other reason is there of an Infinite but this, that there may be nothing deficient as to the generation or subsistence of what is in Nature?  There is his error, that he doth not acquaint us what this Infinite is, whether it be air, or water, or earth, or any other such like body.  Besides he is mistaken, in that, giving us the material cause, he is silent as to the efficient cause of beings; for this  thing which he makes his Infinite can be nothing but matter; but operation cannot come about in the sphere of matter, except an  efficient cause be annexed.   Anaximenes his fellow-citizen pronounceth, that air is the principle of all beings; from it all receive their original, and into it all return.  He affirms that our soul is nothing but air; it is that which constitutes and preserves; the whole world is invested with spirit and air.  For spirit and air are synonymous. This person is in this deficient, in that he concludes that of pure air, which is a simple body and is made of one only form, all animals are composed.  It is not possible to think that a single principle should be the matter of all things, from whence they receive their subsistence; besides this there must be an operating cause.  Silver (for example) is not of itself sufficient to frame a drinking cup; an operator also is required, which is the silversmith.  The like may be applied to vessels made of wood, brass, or any other material.

Anaxagoras the Clazomenian asserted Homoeomeries (or parts similar or homogeneous) to be the original cause of all beings; it seemed to him impossible that anything could arise of nothing or be dissolved into nothing.  Let us therefore instance in nourishment, which appears simple and uniform, such as bread which we owe to Ceres and water which we drink.  Of this very nutriment, our hair, our veins, our arteries, nerves, bones, and all our other parts are nourished.  These things thus being performed, it must be granted that the nourishment which is received by us contains all those things by which these of us are produced.  In it there are those particles which are producers of blood, bones, nerves, and all other parts; these particles (he thought) reason discovers for us.  For it is not necessary that we should reduce all things under the objects of sense; for bread and water are fitted to the senses, yet in them there are those particles latent which are discoverable only by reason.  It being therefore plain that there are particles in the nourishment similar to what is produced by  it, he terms these homogeneous parts, averring that they are the principles of beings.  Matter is according to him these similar parts, and the efficient cause is a Mind, which orders all things that have an existence.  Thus he begins his discourse: "All things were confused one among another; but Mind divided and brought them to order."  In this he is to be commended, that he yokes together matter and an intellectual agent.

Archelaus the son of Apollodorus, the Athenian, pronounceth, that the principles of all things have their origin from an infinite air...