Supply Chain Coordination Mechanisms (eBook)

Supply ChainCoordination Mechanisms 2
1 Introduction 20
1.1 Motivation and Goals of This Work 20
1.2 Methodology 21
1.3 Outline 21
2 Supply Chain Planning and Coordination 23
2.1 Supply Chain Planning 23
2.1.1 Definitions and Overview 23
2.1.2 Master Planning 26
2.2 Model Formulations for Master Planning 27
2.2.1 Generic Master Planning Model 28
2.2.2 Extension to Lot-Sizing 30
2.2.2.1 Basic Models 30
2.2.2.2 Extension to Campaign Planning 32
2.3 Decentralized Planning and Coordination 38
2.3.1 Basic Definitions 38
2.3.2 Decentralized Supply Chain Planning 42
2.3.2.1 Models for Decentralized Planning 42
2.3.2.2 Drivers for Suboptimality of Decentralized Planning 44
2.3.3 Upstream Vs. Collaborative Planning 48
3 Coordination Mechanisms for Supply Chain Planning 53
3.1 Symmetric Information 53
3.1.1 Non-cooperative Game Theory 54
3.1.1.1 Coordination on Quantities and Time 55
3.1.1.2 Coordination of Lot Cycles 58
3.1.2 Cooperative Game Theory 59
3.2 One-Sided Information Asymmetry 61
3.2.1 Signaling 61
3.2.2 Screening 63
3.3 Multilateral Information Asymmetry 66
3.3.1 Auctions and Their Application to Supply Chain Coordination 66
3.3.2 Mechanisms with Focus on Proposal Generation 69
3.3.2.1 Outline of Dual Decomposition 70
3.3.2.2 Literature 73
3.3.2.3 Discussion and Conclusions 78
4 New Coordination Schemes 80
4.1 Generic Scheme for Linear Programming and Analytical Results 81
4.1.1 Version with Iterative, Unilateral Exchange of Cost Information 81
4.1.2 Version with One-Shot Exchange of Cost Information 97
4.2 Scheme for Uncapacitated Dynamic Lot-Sizing and Analytical Results 99
4.3 Application to Master Planning 116
4.3.1 Linearization 116
4.3.2 Adaptation to Master Planning 120
4.3.3 Generic Modifications 128
4.3.4 Modifications for Master Planning 131
4.4 Customizations 137
4.4.1 Master Planning with Lot-Sizing 137
4.4.2 Voluntary Compliance 139
4.4.3 Lost Sales 140
4.4.4 Multiple Suppliers 143
5 New Coordination Mechanisms 145
5.1 Surplus Sharing Determined by the Informed Party 146
5.2 Surplus Sharing Determined by Lump-Sum Payments 149
5.3 Surplus Sharing by a Double Auction 157
5.4 Comparison of Mechanisms and Discussion 165
5.5 Application with Rolling Schedules 167
6 Computational Tests of Coordination Schemes 171
6.1 General Master Planning Model 171
6.1.1 Generation of Test Instances and Performance Indicators 171
6.1.2 Analysis of Solutions for the Generic Scheme 178
6.1.3 Analysis of Solutions for the Modified Scheme 180
6.2 Uncapacitated Lot-Sizing Problem 185
6.2.1 Generation of Test Instances 185
6.2.2 Analysis of Solutions 187
6.3 Multi-level Capacitated Lot-Sizing Problem 190
6.4 Models for Campaign Planning 195
6.4.1 Generation of Test Instances 195
6.4.2 Analysis of Solutions 196
6.5 Real-World Supply Chain Planning Problems 200
6.5.1 Planning Problems and Model Formulation 201
6.5.2 Analysis of Solutions 208
7 Summary and Outlook 213
References 216