Topics in Microeconomics
Industrial Organization, Auctions, and Incentives
Seiten
1999
Cambridge University Press (Verlag)
978-0-521-64534-8 (ISBN)
Cambridge University Press (Verlag)
978-0-521-64534-8 (ISBN)
This text in microeconomics focuses on the strategic analysis of markets under imperfect competition, incomplete information, and incentives. Each chapter introduces the core issues in an accessible yet rigorous fashion, and then investigates specialized themes. Each also offers self-contained explanations and proofs.
This text in microeconomics focuses on the strategic analysis of markets under imperfect competition, incomplete information, and incentives. Part I of the book covers imperfect competition, from monopoly and regulation to the strategic analysis of oligopolistic markets. Part II explains the analytics of risk, stochastic dominance, and risk aversion, supplemented with a variety of applications from different areas in economics. Part III focuses on markets and incentives under incomplete information, including a comprehensive introduction to the theory of auctions, which plays an important role in modern economics. Each chapter introduces the core issues in an accessible yet rigorous fashion, and then investigates specialized themes. Each also offers self-contained explanations and proofs. The only prerequisites are a basic knowledge of calculus and probability, and familiarity with intermediate undergraduate microeconomics. The text can be used as a textbook in different courses for senior undergraduate or first-year graduate students.
This text in microeconomics focuses on the strategic analysis of markets under imperfect competition, incomplete information, and incentives. Part I of the book covers imperfect competition, from monopoly and regulation to the strategic analysis of oligopolistic markets. Part II explains the analytics of risk, stochastic dominance, and risk aversion, supplemented with a variety of applications from different areas in economics. Part III focuses on markets and incentives under incomplete information, including a comprehensive introduction to the theory of auctions, which plays an important role in modern economics. Each chapter introduces the core issues in an accessible yet rigorous fashion, and then investigates specialized themes. Each also offers self-contained explanations and proofs. The only prerequisites are a basic knowledge of calculus and probability, and familiarity with intermediate undergraduate microeconomics. The text can be used as a textbook in different courses for senior undergraduate or first-year graduate students.
Part I. Imperfect Competition: 1. Monopoly; 2. Regulation of monopoly; 3. Oligopoly and industrial organization; Part II. Risk, Stochastic Dominance and Risk Aversion: 4. Stochastic dominance: theory; 5. Stochastic dominance: applications; 6. Risk aversion; Part III. Incomplete Information and Incentives: 7. Matching: the marriage problem; 8. Auctions; 9. Hidden information and adverse selection; 10. Hidden information and signaling; 11. Hidden action and moral hazard; 12. Rank-order tournaments; Part IV. Technical Supplements: A. Nonlinear optimization: the classical approach; B. Inequality Constrained optimization; C. Convexity and generalizations; D. From expected values to order statistics.
Erscheint lt. Verlag | 28.10.1999 |
---|---|
Zusatzinfo | 12 Tables, unspecified; 53 Line drawings, unspecified |
Verlagsort | Cambridge |
Sprache | englisch |
Maße | 189 x 246 mm |
Gewicht | 700 g |
Themenwelt | Wirtschaft ► Volkswirtschaftslehre ► Mikroökonomie |
ISBN-10 | 0-521-64534-4 / 0521645344 |
ISBN-13 | 978-0-521-64534-8 / 9780521645348 |
Zustand | Neuware |
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