Microeconomic Theory - James Bergin

Microeconomic Theory

A Concise Course

(Autor)

Buch | Hardcover
384 Seiten
2005
Oxford University Press (Verlag)
978-0-19-928029-2 (ISBN)
113,45 inkl. MwSt
Microeconomic Theory provides a detailed discussion of the subject matter appearing in graduate courses in microeconomic theory. The presentation is self-contained and provides key foundational insights on each topic covered. This book will be of use to graduate students of microeconomics and more generally to those who need a brief modern account of the various areas of microeconomic theory.
Microeconomic Theory is based on lecture notes for a graduate course in microeconomic theory. It covers a broad range of topics, and to some extent the lecture structure is retained in the style of the book. The author provides a clear account of the main ideas in each area concisely, and in some depth of detail. The presentation is at an advanced level and provides succinct coverage of the material in a self contained discussion.

Chapters are organized and written independently making it possible to read any chapter without having read earlier material. Each chaper is written on the presumption that the reader has some familiarity with the topics or issues under discussion but would value further discussion, or a second point of view . While much of the material is mainstream, a substantial portion is not available in existing textbooks. The book covers a range of topics appearing in advanced courses in microeconomic theory. Coverage includes such topics as decision theory, strategic and extensive form games, auctions, bargaining, information models, principal- agent problems, signalling and screening games, cooperative games and models of learning.

James Bergin is Professor of Economics at Queen's University and Canada Research Chair Holder. James holds degrees from Princeton, London School of Economics and the National University of Ireland. His research interests include mechanism design, learning and evolutionary game theory, and anonymous games.

1. Decision Theory ; 2. Preferences, Risk, and Stochastic Dominance ; 3. Strategic Form Games ; 4. Nash Equilibrium- Existence and Refinements ; 5. Mechanism Design ; 6. Auctions I: Independent Values ; 7. Auctions II: Dependent Values ; 8. Extensive Form Games ; 9. Equilibrium in Extensive Game Forms ; 10. Repeated Games ; 11. Bargaining ; 12. Information ; 13. The Principal-Agent Problem ; 14. Signaling ; 15. Screening ; 16. Common Knowledge ; 17. Mechanism Design: Complete and Incomplete Information ; 18. Cooperative Outcomes ; 19. Large Games ; 20. Evolution and Learning

Erscheint lt. Verlag 19.5.2005
Zusatzinfo numerous mathematical examples and line drawings
Verlagsort Oxford
Sprache englisch
Maße 177 x 254 mm
Gewicht 808 g
Themenwelt Wirtschaft Allgemeines / Lexika
Wirtschaft Volkswirtschaftslehre Mikroökonomie
ISBN-10 0-19-928029-0 / 0199280290
ISBN-13 978-0-19-928029-2 / 9780199280292
Zustand Neuware
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