Advice, Social Learning and the Evolution of Conventions

Introduces advice into economic analysis and explores its impact on decision-making and the evolution of conventions of behavior. The investigation of conventions of behavior and the norms is of interest to a wide variety of academic disciplines ranging from economics to psychology, to sociology, and also philosophy.

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As societies progress, old generations of social agents die and are replaced by new ones. This book explores what happens in this transition as the old guard instructs the new arrivals about the wisdom of their ways. Do new entrants listen and follow the advice of their elders or dismiss it? Is intergenerational advice welfare improving or can it be destructive? Does such advice enhance the stability of social conventions or disrupt it? Using the concept of an Intergenerational Game and the tools of game theory and experimental economics, this study delves into the process of social leaning created by intergenerational advice passed from generation to generation. This book presents a unique theoretical and empirical study of the dynamics of social conventions not offered elsewhere.