Introduction

If there was ever a country for which nuclear energy seemed ideal, Sweden was the one. It has high standards of living, energy intensive industries, advanced technology in many fields, strong tradition of electrification and a competent utility organization, abundant reserves of (admittedly low grade) uranium, low population density and a large number of suitable reactor sites. Moreover Sweden has no fossil fuels at all. All those factors made nuclear power the obvious choice for the future during the 50’s, when the first crucial decisions were taken. In the beginning of the 70’s nuclear energy seemed well established with a Swedish reactor industry, in fact the only light water reactor-design outside the communist countries developed without U.S. licenses. The utilities were firmly committed and there were advanced plans of heating the major metropolitan areas in Stockholm, Gothenburg and Malmo by district heating supplied from nuclear heat and power plants. The Swedish plans for nuclear generation of electricity were the most ambitious in the world, on a basis of installed capacity per capita. All decisions had been taken with large majorities in the Parliament, and gradually a more powerful nuclear establishment was built up.

Then the roof fell in. A heated debate erupted in 1974 and can be traced back to 1972. By the end of 1978 two governments had been brought down on the issue of nuclear power. This is not the place for explaining the process of politicization of nuclear power, only to state what now is a fact. Nuclear power is viewed by large parts of the public as something much more than just “another way of boiling water”. Concern for the economy or the environment, although important, cannot fully explain the degree of controversy. In my mind it is obvious that nuclear energy - deservedly or not - has become a symbol for something more profound than economic growth or environmental decay, the social impact on society or super-high and rapidly changing technology.

The nuclear controversy can thus be seen as a controversy as much over the distribution of power over technological choice in general as over a particular technology. Elites of all nations do not readily accept challenges to their power. All the more noteworthy, therefore, is the initiative of the Swedish government in 1973 to establish a secretariat for futures studies.

This secretariat was given the explicit role to study independently the long-term implications of present decisions as well as alternative development options. Needless to say such an initiative has not been uncontroversial - there are many inside the government machinery who have seen the work of the secretariat as a thorn-in-the-flesh, an undeserved nuisance.

This book “Sweden beyond oil - nuclear commitments and solar options” brings out some of the more important challenges of the nuclear contoversy, namely an analysis of the mechanisms of technological choice and the role of industry, agencies and other groups of special interests and roles vis-a-vis, the democratically elected and appointed bodies in local and central governments.

It is my personal view that the width of this work presented here by contrast demonstrates rather vividly the narrowness of most academic disciplines. Knowledge of technical characteristics wedded to organizational sociology, some economics and a dose of political science goes a long way in creating a framework for understanding the politics of technical change that I myself think is needed in many other areas.

Four aspects are worth mentioning in this work. Firstly the need for an historical perspective. It takes decades to develop new technology, and the institutions that today shape the technologies of tomorrow have themselves evolved during several decades. In the Swedish case the institutional framework for electricity can only be understood by looking at Sweden from the beginning of this century.

Secondly the need for detached attitudes to forecasts. It is quite obvious from past experiences that the time horizon over which it is meaningful to make forecasts on the demand for energy is conspiciously shorter that the lead times necessary for introducing and developing new technologies. This is a dilemma which cannot be solved through more ingenious forecasting methods - in my view the problem of projecting GNP over say three to four decades is not only unsolved but also unsolvable. The meaning of say a 3% growth rate from the level of GNP existing e.g. in the U.S. or Sweden is open to such devastating objections that other attempts seem necessary.

The approach used in this work does offer some points of departure. Instead of making elaborate forecasts a minimum choice of assumptions are made. These comprise possible rates of change in the productivity of energy and labour, size of the total labour force etc. together with the need for labour in building up different new energy systems. Thus not a forecast but merely a check of consistency is made, saying in effect nothing more than whether and how the energy systems studies are compatible with a further increase in economic well-being.

What will actually happen is another matter. The aim has been to decide whether solar or nuclear energy can replace imported oil, given the knowledge we have today. The answer is for the two alternatives a, very tentative, yes. There are, however, important areas of uncertainty regarding the long term potential and impacts of the two paths studied here. Needless to say there are other combinations than these. Technological development may bring forward new options and more experience may show some others to have less potential than previously thought. This, however, just underlines the central point in the argument - what is needed is not long term commitments but flexibility and the capacity to adaption and adjustment.

Thirdly this work brings, in my mind rightly, the explicit recognition that powerful vested interests always exist around any one already established technology. The main short-term political advantage of nuclear energy over solar energy is just that. While the latter is nothing but a R&D scheme and a number of loosely coordinated projects in a frequently fragmented (but innovative) industry the former is represented by a coordinated, almost army-like, set of institutions centred around the electric utilities, the electric supply industry, the nuclear reactor industry, and the construction industry. Moreover the nuclear development is stabilized and facilitated by a whole set of rules, regulations and laws, some explicitly designed for this purpose but most of them just being there for other reasons. The advantage of nuclear energy has to no small degree been just that its entrepreneurs have been skillful enough both to use the existing legal and institutional framework and at times powerful enough to change and adjust it when the obstacles have been too great.

As the more detailed analysis shows, the framework that is beneficial to nuclear energy frequently puts solar energy (and to some extent conservation) at a disadvantage. Hence the fourth aspect to be stressed is, as I see it, the analysis of how the institutional framework has to be changed in order to open up the potential for the solar industries. As is shown, this institutional rearrangement is no small endeavour- many areas have to be dealt with, and strong interests can and will be marshalled against it. To establish a solar industry - which is necessary if we are to learn the true potential of this supply alternative - therefore requires that a market is opened up. Entrepreneurial interests have to be stimulated by the government and given enough stability so that the inherent risks of technological development can be reduced to manageable proportions. The fact that those measures at the same time tend to destabilize the market conditions for the nuclear industry makes the need for public involvement and governmental planning all the more obvious.

I am convinced that the line of argument here can be generalized to other techno-industrial complexes. The military industry, the automobile industry, telecommunications industry, perhaps pharmaceutical industry, all thrive in a setting in which the national government is at the same time guardian and prisoner of the techno-complex.

The analysis in this book - which obviously can be carried further and made more precise - illustrates the need for thinking about institutions rather than abstract economic models.

While this exercise has a Swedish focus there is no doubt in my mind that many of the main conclusions are valid also in other countries and in an international context.

Perhaps the most interesting question is whether the economic conclusions hold also for other countries. When the cost estimations of nuclear and solar energy that existed at the end of 1977 are used the two alternatives are found to be economically roughly equivalent. When the admittedly large uncertainties for the future surrounding both advanced nuclear technologies (particularly the plutonium cycle) and solar technologies are taken into account a more reasonable conclusion seems to be that it is yet too early to say which alternative is less costly than the other. One needs time to find out, hence the need for a flexible and adjustable energy policy.

This conclusion is, however, itself surprising. The conventional wisdom has always had it that nuclear energy is much less costly than solar energy. And here it is shown that even in a country on the same...