Handbook of Social Economics -

Handbook of Social Economics (eBook)

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2010 | 1. Auflage
568 Seiten
Elsevier Science (Verlag)
978-0-444-53715-7 (ISBN)
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How do economists understand and measure normal social phenomena? 

Identifying economic strains in activities such as learning, group formation, discrimination, and peer dynamics requires sophisticated data and tools as well as a grasp of prior scholarship.  In this volume leading economists provide an authoritative summary of social choice economics, from norms and conventions to the exchange of discrete resources. Including both theoretical and empirical perspectives, their work provides the basis for models that can offer new insights in applied economic analyses. 

  • Reviews the recent approaches that enable economists to separate influences of culture from those caused by economic and institutional environments
  • Explores the recent willingness among economists to consider new arguments in the utility function
  • Presumes that these investigations can eventually be translated into policies

How do economists understand and measure normal social phenomena? Identifying economic strains in activities such as learning, group formation, discrimination, and peer dynamics requires sophisticated data and tools as well as a grasp of prior scholarship. In this volume leading economists provide an authoritative summary of social choice economics, from norms and conventions to the exchange of discrete resources. Including both theoretical and empirical perspectives, their work provides the basis for models that can offer new insights in applied economic analyses. Reviews the recent approaches that enable economists to separate influences of culture from those caused by economic and institutional environments Explores the recent willingness among economists to consider new arguments in the utility function Presumes that these investigations can eventually be translated into policies

Front Cover 1
Handbook of Social Economics 4
Copyright 5
Contents-Volume 1A 6
Contents-Volume 1B 12
Contributors 16
Part Three: Peer and NeighborhoodEffects 18
Chapter 18: Identification of Social Interactions 20
1. Introduction 22
2. Decision Making in Group Contexts 24
3. Linear Models of Social Interaction 30
4. Social Networks and Spatial Models of Social Interactions 53
5. Discrete Choice Models of Social Interactions 71
6. Experimental Approaches 89
7. Suggestions for Future Directions 101
8. Conclusions 109
A1. Derivation and Analysis of Equilibria in the Linear in Means Model 111
A2. Proof of Theorems 3, 4, 5 and 7 on Social Networks 114
A3. Equilibrium Properties of Discrete Choice Models with Social Interactions 121
References 125
Chapter 19: Econometric Methods for the Analysis of Assignment Problems in the Presence of Complementarity an 132
1. Introduction 134
2. An overview of empirical matching models 136
3. Identification and estimation of one-to-one matching models when match output is observed 141
4. Identification and estimation of one-to-one matching models when match output is unobserved: equilibrium approaches 174
5. Segregation in the presence of social spillovers 196
6. Treatment response with spillovers 211
7. Areas for further research 213
References 214
Chapter 20: Peer Effects in Education: A Survey of the Theory and Evidence 220
1. Introduction 221
2. Theory 222
3. Econometric Issues 260
4. Empirical Evidence: Peer Effects 277
5. Concluding Remarks 323
References 327
Further Reading 330
Chapter 21: The Importance of Segregation, Discrimination, Peer Dynamics, and Identity in Explaining Trends i 332
1. Trends in the Racial Achievement Gap 333
2. Segregation 334
3. Information-Based Models of Discrimination 340
4. Peer Dynamics 344
5. Identity 353
6. Conclusion 356
References 356
Chapter 22: Labor Markets and Referrals 360
1. Introduction 361
2. The Theoretical Literature 362
3. Direct Evidence on Usage of Informal Search Methods 365
4. Labor Market Referrals and Neighborhood Effects 373
5. Randomized and Natural Experiments 379
6. Directions for Future Research 383
References 384
Chapter 23: Labor and Credit Networks in Developing Economies 390
1. Introduction 391
2. Identification and Estimation of Network Effects 393
3. Networks, Growth, and Efficiency 408
4. Conclusion 420
References 420
Chapter 24: Risk Sharing Between Households 422
1. Introduction 423
2. Efficient risk sharing 424
3. Forms of risk sharing 426
4. The motives for risk sharing 428
5. Risk sharing groups and networks 437
6. Conclusion 442
References 442
Chapter 25: Neighborhood Effects And Housing 448
1. Introduction 450
2. Spatial Models of Location with Social Interactions 454
3. Endogenous Neighborhood and Contextual Effects in Housing Markets 471
4. Neighborhood Effects and the Geometry of the Canonical Urban Model 485
5. Hierarchical Models of Location with Social Interactions 494
6. Conclusion 503
References 504
Index-Volume 1A 508
Index-Volume 1B 548

vii Social networks with unknown network structure 42


All the results in this section so far have taken the social network matrix A as known. This severely restricts the domain of applicability of existing identification results on social networks. We finish this section by considering how identification may proceed when this matrix is unknown. In order to do this, we believe it is necessary to consider the full implications of the interpretation of linear social interactions models as simultaneous equations systems. While this interpretation is given in studies like Bramoullé et al., the full implications of this equivalence have not been explored. This is evident if one observes that the matrix form of the general social networks model may be written as

I−JA )ω=( cI+dA )x+ε

  (54)

where for expositional purposes, the constant term is ignored. From this vantage point, it is evident that social networks models are special cases of the general linear simultaneous equations system of the form

ω=Βx+ε.

  (55)

Systems of this type, of course, are the focus of the classical identification in econometrics, epitomized in Fisher (1966) and comprehensively summarized in Hsiao (1983). One can go further and observe that the assumption that the same network weights apply to both contextual and endogenous social interactions is not well motivated by theory, and regard equation (55) as the general specification of a linear social networks model where the normalization Γii = 1 for all i is imposed. From this vantage point it is evident that the distinction between J and A is of interest only when A is known a priori, as is the case both for the linear in means model and the more general social networks framework.

Following the classical literature, one can then think of the presence or absence of identification in terms of whether particular sets of restrictions on (55) produce identification. All previous results in this section are examples of this perspective but rely on the very strong assumption of a particular way of imposing these restrictions, i.e., Γ = IJA and B = cI + dA for known A. Note that the results we have described do not employ information on the variance covariance matrix of the reduced form error structure, which is one source of identifying information and the basis for Graham’s (2008) results. The simultaneous equations perspective makes clear that the existing results on identification in linear social networks models can be extended to much richer frameworks. We consider two classes of models in which we interpret all agents i = 1,…, nV as arrayed on a circle. We do this so that agents 1 and nV are immediate neighbors of one another, thereby allowing us to work with symmetric interaction structures.

First, assume that each agent only reacts to the average behaviors and characteristics of his two nearest neighbors, but is unaffected by anyone else. This is a linear variation of the model studied in Blume (1993). In terms of the matrices Γ and B, one way to model this is to assume that, preserving our earlier normalization, Γii = 1 and Γii−1 Γii+1 = γ1 for all i, Γij = 0 otherwise; Bii = b0, Bii − 1 = Bii+1 = b1 for all i, and Bij = 0 otherwise, where here (and for the remainder of this discussion), all indices are mod nV. The model is identified under theorem 5 since the nearest neighbor model may be interpreted via the original social networks model via restrictions on A. For our purposes, what is of interest is that identification will still hold if one relaxes the symmetry assumptions so that Γii−1 = γi−1, Γii+1 = γi1, Bii−1 = bi−1 and Bii+1 = bi1. If these coefficients are nonzero, then the matrices Γ and B fulfill the classical rank conditions for identification, cf. Hsiao (1983, theorem 3.3.1) and one does not need to invoke theorem 4 at all. Notice that it is not necessary for the interactions parameters to be the same across agents in different positions in the network. Relative to Bramoullé et al., what this example indicates is that prior knowledge of A can take the form of the classical exclusion restrictions of simultaneous equations theory. From the vantage point of the classical theory, there is no need to impose equal coefficients across interactions as those authors do. Imposition of assumptions such as equal coefficients may be needed to account for aspects of the data, e.g., an absence of repeated observations of individuals. But if so, then the specification of the available data moments should be explicitly integrated into the identification analysis, something which has yet to be done. Further, data sets such as Add Health, which produce answers to binary questions concerning friends, are best interpreted as providing 0 values for a general A matrix, but nothing more in terms of substantive information.

This example may be extended as follows. Suppose that one is not sure whether or not the social network structure involves connections between agents that are displaced by 2 on the circle, i.e., one wishes to relax the assumption that interactions between agents who are not nearest neighbors are 0. In other words, we modify the example so that for all i, Γii = 1, Γii−1 = Γii−1, Γii−2 = γi−2, Γii+2 = γi2, Γij = 0 otherwise, Bii= bi0, Bii−1 = bi−1, Bii+1 = bi1, Bii−2 = bi−2, Bii+2 = bi2, and Bij = 0 otherwise. If the nearest neighbor coefficients are nonzero, then by Hsiao’s theorem 3.3.1 the coefficients in this model are also identified regardless of the values of the coefficients that link non-nearest neighbors. This is an example in which aspects of the network structure are testable, so that relative to Bramoullé et al. one does need to exactly know A in advance in order to estimate social structure. The intuition is straightforward, the presence of overlapping network structures between nearest neighbors renders the system overidentified: so that the presence of some other forms of social network structure can be evaluated relative to it. This form of argument seems important as it suggests ways of uncovering social network structure when individual data are available, and again has yet to be explored. Of course, not all social network structures are identified for the same reason that without restrictions, the general linear simultaneous equations model is unidentified. What our argument here suggests is that there is much to do in terms of uncovering classes of identified social networks models that are more general than those that have so far been studied.

For a second example, we consider a variation of the model studied by Bramoullé et al., which involves geometric weighting of all individuals according to their distance; as before we drop the constant term for expositional purposes. Specifically, we consider a social networks model

i =c x i +d ∑ j≠i a ij( γ ) x j +J ∑ j≠i a ij ( γ ) ω j + ε i .

The idea is that the weights assigned to the behaviors of others are functions of an underlying parameter γ. In vector form, the model is

=cx+dA( γ )x+JA( γ )ω+ε,

  (56)

where

( γ )=( 0 γ γ2 … γ0γγ γ 2… γ k γ k γ k−1…… γ k γ k γ k−1⋮ γ 2…γγ γ 20 )

  (57)

Following Bramoullé et al., x is a scalar characteristic. The parameter space for this model is P = {(c, d, J, γ) ∈ R2 × R+ × [0, 1)}. The reduced form for this model is

= ( I−JA(γ) ) −1 ( cI+dA(γ ) )x+ ( I−JA(γ) ) −1 ε.

Denote by F : Pnv2 the map

( c,d,J,γ )= ( I−JA(γ) ) −1 ( cI+dA(γ ) ).

  (58)

The function F characterizes the mapping of structural model parameters (c, d, J, γ) to reduced form parameters. We will establish what Fisher (1959) calls complete identifia- bility of the structural...

Erscheint lt. Verlag 26.11.2010
Sprache englisch
Themenwelt Sozialwissenschaften Soziologie
Wirtschaft Volkswirtschaftslehre Ökonometrie
Wirtschaft Volkswirtschaftslehre Wirtschaftspolitik
ISBN-10 0-444-53715-5 / 0444537155
ISBN-13 978-0-444-53715-7 / 9780444537157
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