The Allocation of Limited Entrepreneurial Attention

1 The Entrepreneur in Economic Theory.- A Brief History.- Entrepreneurial Limitations.- Implications of Limited Entrepreneurial Attention.- Conclusion.- References.- 2 Limited Attention.- Limited Attention in Organizations.- Limited Attention in Economic Models.- Conclusion.- References.- 3 Allocating Limited Entrepreneurial Attention.- The Basic Model.- The Optimal Policy.- General Results.- Variations on the Basic Model.- Conclusion.- References.- 4 Innovation, Firm Size And Growth.- Related Literature.- The Schumpeterian Hypothesis.- Optimal R&D.- Extensions.- Conclusion.- References.- 5 Career Choice.- The Implications of the Model.- Conclusion.- References.- 6 Optimally Incomplete Contracts.- Related Literature.- Incomplete Contracts.- Conclusion.- References.- 7 The Internalization Of Transactions.- Related Literature.- Internal versus Market Transactions.- Asset Specificity and Opportunism.- Transaction Costs and Firm Size.- Endogenous Transaction Costs.- Evolution to Market Transactions.- Conclusion.- References.- 8 The Role Of The Venture Capitalist.- Related Literature.- The Venture Capitalist’s Optimal Allocation.- Entry of Venture Capitalists.- General Partner and Limited Partners.- Investments in Later Stage Ventures.- Socially Optimal Consultation.- Empirical Evidence.- Alternative Formulations.- Conclusion.- References.- 9 Independent Contractors.- Bilateral P-A and Common Agency Models.- The Entrepreneurial Agent.- Conclusion.- References.- 10 Conclusion.- Further Applications.- Extensions.- References.- References.- Name Index.