Nuclear Safeguards, Security and Nonproliferation (eBook)

Front Cover 1
Nuclear Safeguards, Security, and Nonproliferation 4
Copyright Page 5
Contents 8
Foreword 12
Preface 14
Acknowledgments 16
Contributors 18
Chapter 1. Introduction: Nuclear Security in the Twenty-First Century 24
Objectives for This Book 24
Nuclear Security in the Twenty-First Century 26
Preventing Nuclear Proliferation 29
Summary 36
Part I: Technologies and Processes for the Protection, Control, and Accounting of Nuclear Material 38
Chapter 2. Nuclear Safeguards and the Security of Nuclear Materials 40
Introduction 40
International Control or Secrecy and Denial: From 1945 to Atoms for Peace 40
International Collaboration and Technology Sharing: Atoms for Peace to the Late 1960s 42
Efforts to Stem Nuclear Proliferation: The 1970s Through the 1980s 44
Cheaters, Rogue States, and Terrorists: The Early 1990s to 2006 47
More Wake-Up Calls for Nuclear Security 48
The Continuing Evolution of IAEA Safeguards 50
The Future of Domestic and International Safeguards 52
Summary 52
Further Readings 53
Chapter 3A. Nuclear Material Measurement Technologies 54
Introduction 54
Destructive Analysis 54
Nondestructive Assay (NDA) 56
Calorimetry 75
Handheld Gamma-Ray Instruments 80
Summary 83
Chapter 3B. Irradiated Fuel Measurements 86
Introduction 86
Nuclear Reactor Designs 87
Irradiated Fuel Characteristics 89
Radiological Characteristics 89
Plutonium Production 90
Spent Fuel Storage 91
Spent Fuel Safeguards 92
U.S. Domestic Safeguards 92
IAEA Safeguards 92
Nondestructive Assay Measurement Techniques 93
Cerenkov Radiation 93
Passive Gamma-Ray and Neutron Total Counting 94
Passive Neutron Coincidence Counting 95
Gamma-Ray Spectroscopy 95
High-Energy Gamma Tomography 96
Active Neutron Interrogation 97
Active Neutron Coincidence Counting 97
Shufflers 98
Summary 98
Chapter 3C. Measurement of Nuclear Material Process Holdup 100
Introduction 100
Gamma-Ray Signatures and Equipment 101
Generalized Geometry Holdup (GGH) Assay Method 102
Calibration 103
Performing the GGH Measurement and Assay 103
Holdup Measurement System Examples 104
Neutron Holdup Measurements 106
Accuracy of Gamma-Ray and Neutron Holdup Measurements 108
Chapter 4. Physical Protection 110
Introduction 110
Process Overview 111
Physical Protection System Design 114
Physical Protection System Design and the Relationship to Risk 117
Summary 118
Further Readings 119
Chapter 5. International Safeguards Inspection: An Inside Look at the Process 120
Introduction 120
The Concept of Significant Quantities of Nuclear Material and Timeliness of Detection 121
Facilities in the IAEA Context 122
Basic Goals of IAEA Safeguards at LWRs 124
The MBA and KMP Safeguards Concepts Applied to LWRs 125
Inspection Frequency at LWRs 128
LWR PIV Inspection 129
Review of Safeguards at an LWR: Generic PWR 135
Summary 135
Chapter 6. International Atomic Energy Agency Unattended Monitoring Systems 136
Introduction 136
Background 136
What is an Unattended Monitoring System? 137
Why Does the International Atomic Energy Agency Use UMS? 138
A Balanced Approach to IAEA Safeguards Compliance 138
Cost Advantages of UMS 138
Worldwide Deployment of UMS 139
Key Characteristics of UMS 139
UMS Design Considerations 139
Authentication 141
Tamper-Indicating Features 142
Security Solution: Virtual Private Network 143
Wireless Solution 144
Position Review Module 146
Integrated Review Module 146
Hardware Standards 146
System Components 146
Surveillance Data Generator 147
Radiation Data Generators 148
Dedicated Simple Systems 149
Advanced Thermohydraulic Power Monitor 151
Dedicated Complex Systems 153
Pre-Field Installation Testing 155
Summary 156
Chapter 7. Evaluating International Safeguards Systems 158
Introduction 158
The Need for Evaluation 158
Evolving Safeguards Objectives 159
Performance Objectives: Verification, Deterrence, and Assurance 160
Proliferation Pathways 162
Defining a State-Level Safeguards Approach 163
Proliferation Actions to Be Detected 165
Estimating Detection Capability 167
Producing Pathway-Level Results 171
Evaluating State-Level Safeguards System Performance 172
Chapter 8. Statistical Methods in Nuclear Nonproliferation Activities at Declared Facilities 174
Introduction 174
Background 175
Review of Relevant Statistical Topics 176
Measurement Error Models 177
Propagation of Variance 179
Sequential Testing 179
Verifying Declarations 181
Difficulties with ID Evaluation 184
Related Topics 184
Summary 187
Chapter 9. Case Study: Safeguards Implementation at the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant 188
Introduction 188
International Safeguards 190
Reprocessing and Safeguards 192
Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant: Safeguards Technologies 197
Summary 201
Chapter 10. Case Study: Nonproliferation Activities at the BN-350 Reactor, Kazakhstan 202
Introduction 202
Overview of Safeguards History and Approach at the BN-350 204
Summary 216
Part II: Detecting Nuclear Proliferation and Verifying the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons Programs 218
Chapter 11. Using Open Sources for Proliferation Analysis 220
Introduction 220
Open-Source Analysis 220
Search Strategies 223
Sources for Data Collection 228
Analyzing S& T Capabilities
Assessing Military R& D Capabilities
Additional Open-Source Analysis Software Tools 240
Summary 243
Acknowledgments 243
Chapter 12. Commercial Satellite Imagery: Another Tool in the Nonproliferation Verification and Monitoring Toolkit 244
Introduction 244
Commercial Satellite Imagery: A New Basis for Modern Geospatial Awareness and Global Transparency 245
Imagery Analysis: The Process 250
The Utility of Commercial Satellite Imagery for the Detection of Clandestine Nuclear Facilities 254
Summary 270
Epilogue 271
Chapter 13. Nuclear Test Monitoring 274
Introduction 274
History 274
Verification 276
Seismic Monitoring 277
Hydroacoustic Monitoring 279
Infrasound Monitoring 280
Atmospheric Radionuclide Monitoring 280
International Data Center 281
Communications 281
Confidence-Building Measures 282
Consultation and Clarification 282
Onsite Inspections 282
Summary 283
Further Readings 283
Chapter 14. Evaluating Nonproliferation Bona Fides 286
Introduction 286
Peaceful Use vs. Peaceful Purpose 287
Indicators of Peaceful Uses 288
Fulfillment of NPT Article III (Safeguards) Obligations 296
Coherence of a State’s Nuclear Energy Program 298
Geopolitical Cooperation 302
Analysis of Case Studies: Brazil and Iran 303
Summary 304
Chapter 15. Dismantling Nuclear Weapons Activities: Politics and Technology 306
Introduction 306
Chapter 16. South Africa 312
Introduction 312
Why Did South Africa Pursue the Bomb? 312
Nuclear Weapons 315
Uranium Enrichment and Plutonium 316
Peaceful Nuclear Explosives 316
Testing Infrastructure 317
Research, Development, and Weaponization 317
How Did South Africa Eliminate Its Weapons Program? 318
IAEA Involvement 319
The IAEA Unravels the Scope of South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Program 319
The IAEA Verifies South Africa’s Dismantlement 320
Implementation of the Dismantlement Plans 322
Why Did South Africa Give Up the Bomb? 323
Security Concerns 323
Domestic Politics 324
International Politics and Economics 325
Aftermath: Impact of the Dismantlement on South Africa’s Politics, Development, and Economy 327
Remaining Proliferation Concerns 327
Can South Africa Serve as a Nuclear Rollback Model to North Korea and Iran? 328
Summary 329
Chapter 17. Argentina and Brazil 330
Introduction 330
Motivations for Acquiring the Capability to Build Nuclear Weapon 331
Reservations and Constraints 333
Pursuit of a Nuclear Weapons Option 334
Domestic Determinants of the Rollback Decisions 337
International Factors Influencing the Argentine and Brazilian Rollback Decisions 344
Summary 351
Chapter 18. Libya 354
Introduction 354
Nuclear Intentions, 1969–2003 354
Nuclear Capability: 1970s and 1980s 356
Nuclear Capability: The 1990s and Beyond 360
Giving Up the Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons 366
Intelligence 370
Dismantlement and Verification 371
Summary 374
Chapter 19. Elimination of Excess Fissile Material 376
Introduction 376
Weapons-Usable Materials and Their Availability 376
Efforts to Control and Eliminate Fissile Materials 378
Transforming Fissile Materials into Forms Not Usable for Weapons 379
HEU Disposition Efforts 379
Plutonium Disposition Efforts 386
Implementation Challenges of the PMDA 392
Summary 398
Chapter 20. Case Study: Dismantlement and Radioactive Waste Management of DPRK Plutonium Facilities 400
Introduction 400
Background 400
Objectives of Dismantlement 401
Consequences of Dismantlement 402
Need for Technical Work in Advance 402
Scope and Limitations 402
Plutonium-Relevant Nuclear Facilities 403
The 5 MWe Nuclear Reactor 403
Radiochemical Laboratory 405
Decommissioning the Facilities 407
Decommissioning Options 407
Decommissioning the 5 MWe Reactor 408
Decommissioning of Key Elements 408
Decommissioning the Radiochemical Laboratory 412
Basic Schemes for Decommissioning 414
Spent Fuel and the 5 MWe Reactor 414
Liquid HLW, Chemical Decladding Waste, and the Radiochemical Laboratory 414
Facilities Required for Waste Management in the DPRK 416
Summary 421
Part III: Preventing Nuclear Terrorism and Illicit Nuclear Trade 424
Chapter 21. Why We Need a Comprehensive Safeguards System to Keep Fissile Materials Out of the Hands of Terrorists 426
Introduction 426
Improvised Nuclear Devices from Inadequately Secured Fissile Materials 427
Five Characteristics of Fissile Materials 430
Toward a Comprehensive Safeguards System 432
Other Vulnerabilities 434
Today’s Greatest Threats 435
Chapter 22. Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear and Radiological Materials 438
Introduction 438
Background: Post-9/11 Environment Highlights the Threat of Illicit Trafficking and Nuclear Terrorism 438
Materials: Today’s Concern Is Not Only for Direct Weapons Material But for Radioactive Sources as Well 439
International Monitoring of Nuclear Trafficking 441
Combating Nuclear Trafficking: Building an Integrated and International Response 450
Summary 453
Further Readings 454
Chapter 23. Nuclear Terrorism and Improvised Nuclear Devices 456
Introduction 456
The Chain of Nuclear Terror 456
Terrorist Groups with Motivation to Build and Use an IND 457
Types and Availability of Weapons-Usable Fissile Material 458
Acquisition of Fissile Material 459
Financial Resources and Technical Skills Needed to Make an IND 461
Manufacture of an Improvised Nuclear Device 461
Transporting the IND (or Its Components) to the Target Site 465
Detonation of the IND 465
Nuclear Materials Security at the State Level 465
Russian HEU and Plutonium 466
Summary 474
Chapter 24. Radiological Dispersal Devices 476
Introduction 476
Overview of Nuclear and Radiological Materials 477
Sources Used to Alter or Kill Living Cells 478
Sources Used to Provide Power 482
Sources Used for Imaging and Measuring 483
Radiological Source Producers and Suppliers Worldwide 484
Life Cycle of Radiological Sources 485
Options for Reducing Radiological Source Concerns 488
Prioritizing Alternate Technology Options 493
Summary 494
Chapter 25. Responding to Radiological Threats 496
Introduction 496
The Evolution of a Threat 496
Evaluating the Threat 498
Risk Assessment 504
Reflection on the Radiological Threat 505
Reducing the Threat 506
Recovery and Removal 506
Issues and Obstacles 510
Summary 511
Chapter 26. Field Detection of Nuclear Materials 512
Introduction 512
Passive Gamma Detection 513
Commonly Encountered Radioactive Materials 516
Gamma Detection Fundamentals 519
Passive Neutron Detection 527
Neutron Detection Fundamentals 529
Radiography 533
Active Interrogation 534
Chapter 27. A Model for Attribution of Terrorist Nuclear Attacks 538
Introduction 538
Forward and Inverse Models for Material Attribution 539
Spent Fuel RDD Attribution 540
HEU IND Attribution 547
Triage and ReachBack 552
Summary 553
Chapter 28. Nonproliferation Export Controls 554
Introduction 554
Reasons for Control 555
History of International Nuclear Export Controls 555
Special Issues Associated with Technology Controls 558
Reasons for Denial of a Nuclear Export 560
Additional Factors to Be Considered in Reviewing an Export Application 565
The U.S. System of Nuclear Export Controls 566
Summary 568
Chapter 29. The Growing Role of Customs Organizations in International Strategic Trade Controls 572
Introduction 572
The Evolving Threat and the International Response 573
Implementation of the Export Control Enforcement Mission 574
Future Challenges and Opportunities 580
Chapter 30. Case Study: The Khan Network 584
Introduction 584
Insight into the Khan Network 584
Pakistan’s Imports 591
The A.Q. Khan Network Exposed 591
Khan’s Public Admission 592
Challenges That Lie Ahead 594
Summary 596
Subject Index 598
A 598
B 599
C 599
D 600
E 601
F 601
G 602
H 602
I 603
J 605
K 605
L 605
M 606
N 606
O 609
P 609
Q 610
R 610
S 612
T 613
U 613
V 614
W 614
X 615
Y 615
Z 615