Handbook on Experimental Economics and the Environment

Edited by John A. List, Kenneth C. Griffin Distinguished Service Professor of Economics and Chairman of the Economics Department, University of Chicago, US and Michael K. Price, Department of Economics, Georgia State University and the NBER, US

Contents:

Introduction
John A. List and Michael K. Price

PART I: ECONOMETRIC APPROACHES FOR EXPERIMENTAL DATA
1. Quasi-Experiments and Hedonic Property Value Methods
Christopher F. Parmeter and Jaren C. Pope

2. Institutional Heterogeneity in Social Dilemma Games: A Bayesian Examination
Klaus Moeltner, James J. Murphy, John K. Stranlund and Maria Alejandra Velez

3. Analyzing Repeated-Game Economics Experiments: Robust Standard Errors for Panel Data with Serial Correlation
Christian A. Vossler

PART II: NON-MARKET VALUATION
4. Behavioral Foundations of Environmental Economics and Valuation
John K. Horowitz, Kenneth E. McConnell and James J. Murphy

5. Values of Gains and Losses: Reference States and Choice of Measure
Jack L. Knetsch

6. Value and Outcome Uncertainty as Explanations for the WTA vs WTP Disparity
William S. Neilson, Michael McKee and Robert P. Berrens

PART III: EMISSIONS TRADING AND AMBIENT TAXES
7. Regulatory Instruments for Monitoring Ambient Pollution
Gaston Giordana and Marc Willinger

8. Investment Decisions and Emissions Reductions: Results from Experiments in Emissions Trading
Lata Gangadharan, Rachel Croson and Alex Farrell

9. Imperfect Enforcement of Emissions Trading and Industry Welfare: A Laboratory Investigation
John K. Stranlund, James J. Murphy and John M. Spraggon

PART IV: COMMON POOL RESOURCE GAMES
10. A Tale of Two Carrots: The Effectiveness of Multiple Reward Stages in a Common Pool Resource Game
Jan T.R. Stoop, Daan P. van Soest and Jana Vyrastekova

11. Dynamics of Rules and Resources: Three New Field Experiments on Water, Forests, and Fisheries
Juan-Camilo Cardenas, Marco Janssen and Francois Bousquet

12. Does Government Regulation Complement Existing Community Efforts to Support Cooperation? Evidence from Field Experiments in Columbia
Maria Claudia Lopez, James J. Murphy, John M. Spraggon and John K. Stranlund

13. Fixed Instruments to Cope with Stock Externalities: An Experimental Evaluation
Gaston Giordana and Marc Willinger

PART V: VOTING AND PUBLIC GOODS
14. Water Managers are Selfish Like Us
David Zetland

15. Incentive Compatible Mechanisms for Providing Environmental Public Goods
Katherine Silz Carson

16. The Prisoner’s Dilemma as Intergroup Game: An Experimental Investigation
Stephan Kroll, John A. List and Charles F. Mason

Index