Efficient Auction Games (eBook)

This book focuses on the design of efficient & dynamic methods to allocate divisible resources under various auction mechanisms, discussing their applications in power & microgrid systems and the V2G & EV charging coordination problems in smart grids. It describes the design of dynamic methods for single-sided and double-sided auction games and presents a number of simulation cases verifying the performances of the proposed algorithms in terms of efficiency, convergence and computational complexity. Further, it explores the performances of certain auction mechanisms in a hierarchical structure and with large-scale agents, as well as the auction mechanisms for the efficient allocation of multi-type resources. Lastly, it generalizes the main and demonstrates their application in smart grids.  

This book is a valuable resource for researchers, engineers, and graduate students in the fields of optimization, game theory, auction mechanisms and smart grids interested in designing dynamic auction mechanisms to implement optimal allocation of divisible resources, especially electricity and other types of energy in smart grids.

Zhongjing Ma received his B.Eng. degree in Automatic Control from Nankai University, Tianjin, China, in 1997, and M. Eng. and Ph.D. degrees from McGill University, Montreal, QC, Canada, in 2005 and 2009, respectively. From January 2009 to September 2010, he was a Postdoctoral Research Fellow under Prof. Duncan Callaway and Prof. Ian Hiskens at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. He then joined the School of Automation at the University of Beijing Institute of Technology, China, in September 2010, as an Associate Professor. He is currently the Director of the Institute of Electrical Engineering. He is an IEEE senior member. His research interests include optimal control, optimization, auction mechanism design, game theory, decentralized optimization of large-scale systems, and their applications in electrical power systems. He has published more than 50 technical articles in journals such as IEEE Trans. on Automatic Control, Automatica; IEEE Trans. on Control Systems Technology; IEEE Trans. on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics: Systems; Control Engineering Practice; IET Generation, Transmission & Distribution; International Journal of Control; International Journal of Systems Science; and IEEE CDC.

Suli Zou received her B.S. degree in Electrical Engineering and Automation and her Ph.D. degree in Control Theory and Control Engineering from the Beijing Institute of Technology, China, in 2011 and 2017, respectively. She is currently a Postdoctoral Researcher at the Automatic Control Lab, ETH Zürich, Switzerland. From September 2019, she joins BIT as an Associate Professor. Her current research interests include decentralized optimization, game theory and auction mechanism design, particularly their applications to smart grids, demand response and charging coordination of electric vehicles, dynamic and stochastic games, distributed optimization in distribution systems with high penetration of renewables, and learning methods for grid power management. She has published more than 30 technical articles in journals such as IEEE Trans. on Automatic Control, Automatica; IEEE Trans. on Control Systems Technology; IEEE Trans. on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics: Systems; Control Engineering Practice; IET Generation, Transmission & Distribution; International Journal of Control; International Journal of Systems Science; and IEEE CDC.

---

This book focuses on the design of efficient & dynamic methods to allocate divisible resources under various auction mechanisms, discussing their applications in power & microgrid systems and the V2G & EV charging coordination problems in smart grids. It describes the design of dynamic methods for single-sided and double-sided auction games and presents a number of simulation cases verifying the performances of the proposed algorithms in terms of efficiency, convergence and computational complexity. Further, it explores the performances of certain auction mechanisms in a hierarchical structure and with large-scale agents, as well as the auction mechanisms for the efficient allocation of multi-type resources. Lastly, it generalizes the main and demonstrates their application in smart grids.  This book is a valuable resource for researchers, engineers, and graduate students in the fields of optimization, game theory, auction mechanisms and smart grids interested indesigning dynamic auction mechanisms to implement optimal allocation of divisible resources, especially electricity and other types of energy in smart grids.