Borrowing Constitutional Designs
Constitutional Law in Weimar Germany and the French Fifth Republic
Seiten
2005
Princeton University Press (Verlag)
978-0-691-12345-5 (ISBN)
Princeton University Press (Verlag)
978-0-691-12345-5 (ISBN)
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Questions the hasty adoption of semi-presidentialism by several democracies. Drawing on case studies of two countries for European politics in the twentieth century - Weimar Germany and the French Fifth Republic - this book offers a theoretically focused, and historically grounded, analysis of semi-presidentialism and democracy.
After the collapse of communism, some thirty countries scrambled to craft democratic constitutions. Surprisingly, the constitutional model they most often chose was neither the pure parliamentary model found in most of Western Europe at the time, nor the presidential model of the Americas. Rather, it was semi-presidentialism--a rare model known more generally as the "French type." This constitutional model melded elements of pure presidentialism with those of pure parliamentarism. Specifically, semi-presidentialism combined a popularly elected head of state with a head of government responsible to a legislature. Borrowing Constitutional Designs questions the hasty adoption of semi-presidentialism by new democracies. Drawing on rich case studies of two of the most important countries for European politics in the twentieth century--Weimar Germany and the French Fifth Republic--Cindy Skach offers the first theoretically focused, and historically grounded, analysis of semi-presidentialism and democracy.
She demonstrates that constitutional choice matters, because under certain conditions, semi-presidentialism structures incentives that make democratic consolidation difficult or that actually contribute to democratic collapse. She offers a new theory of constitutional design, integrating insights from law and the social sciences. In doing so, Skach challenges both democratic theory and democratic practice. This book will be welcomed not only by scholars and practitioners of constitutional law but also by those in fields such as comparative politics, European politics and history, and international and public affairs.
After the collapse of communism, some thirty countries scrambled to craft democratic constitutions. Surprisingly, the constitutional model they most often chose was neither the pure parliamentary model found in most of Western Europe at the time, nor the presidential model of the Americas. Rather, it was semi-presidentialism--a rare model known more generally as the "French type." This constitutional model melded elements of pure presidentialism with those of pure parliamentarism. Specifically, semi-presidentialism combined a popularly elected head of state with a head of government responsible to a legislature. Borrowing Constitutional Designs questions the hasty adoption of semi-presidentialism by new democracies. Drawing on rich case studies of two of the most important countries for European politics in the twentieth century--Weimar Germany and the French Fifth Republic--Cindy Skach offers the first theoretically focused, and historically grounded, analysis of semi-presidentialism and democracy.
She demonstrates that constitutional choice matters, because under certain conditions, semi-presidentialism structures incentives that make democratic consolidation difficult or that actually contribute to democratic collapse. She offers a new theory of constitutional design, integrating insights from law and the social sciences. In doing so, Skach challenges both democratic theory and democratic practice. This book will be welcomed not only by scholars and practitioners of constitutional law but also by those in fields such as comparative politics, European politics and history, and international and public affairs.
Cindy Skach is Associate Professor of Government at Harvard University, where she is also Faculty Associate of the Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies, the Davis Center for Russian Studies, and the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs.
Tables and Figures ix Preface xi INTRODUCTION 1 CHAPTER 1: Constitutional Frameworks and Constitutional Law 12 CHAPTER 2: Parties,Leaders,and Constitutional Law in Ebert's Republic 30 CHAPTER 3: Divided Minorities and Constitutional Dictatorship in Weimar Germany 49 CHAPTER 4: Parties,Leaders,and Constitutional Law in de Gaulle's Republic 71 CHAPTER 5: Consolidated Majorities and Constitutional Democracy in the French Fifth Republic 93 CONCLUSION 118 Bibliography 129 Index 145
Erscheint lt. Verlag | 30.10.2005 |
---|---|
Zusatzinfo | 15 line illus. 4 tables. |
Verlagsort | New Jersey |
Sprache | englisch |
Maße | 152 x 235 mm |
Gewicht | 397 g |
Themenwelt | Recht / Steuern ► EU / Internationales Recht |
Recht / Steuern ► Öffentliches Recht | |
Recht / Steuern ► Rechtsgeschichte | |
Sozialwissenschaften ► Politik / Verwaltung ► Staat / Verwaltung | |
Sozialwissenschaften ► Politik / Verwaltung ► Vergleichende Politikwissenschaften | |
ISBN-10 | 0-691-12345-4 / 0691123454 |
ISBN-13 | 978-0-691-12345-5 / 9780691123455 |
Zustand | Neuware |
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