Human Rights After Deleuze

Christos Marneros is Lecturer in Law at the University of Lincoln, UK, and Visiting Docent in Legal Philosophy at Riga Graduate School of Law, Latvia.

PART I
DELEUZE’S CRITICAL REMARKS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
Introduction
I. Human Rights: ‘A Flashing Light’ of Resistance, or ‘The Blinding Light’ of Authoritarian Tendencies and ‘The Death’ of Every Potentiality?
II. Why Deleuze?
III. A Note on Method as Problematisation: What is the Problem with the Problem? Or How Does the Examination Proceed?
1. Deleuze on Human Rights
Prologue
I. Human Rights Through Deleuze’s Eyes: Does the Philosopher Add Something New to the Multiple Critiques of Human Rights?
II. Immanence vs Transcendence and Becoming vs Being: An Introductory Note
III. Commentators on Deleuze’s Critique of Human Rights: The Cases of Alexandre Lefebvre and Paul Patton

PART II
HUMAN RIGHTS, IMMANENCE, TRANSENDENCE AND THE DISTINCTION OF ETHICS AND MORALITY
2. The Question of Immanence
Prologue
I. Immanence vs Transcendence: The Case of Spinoza
II. A Definition in Constant Flux: The (Immanent Mode of) Deleuzian Immanence, or How is Immanence?
III. Where to after the Affirmation of Immanence?
3. Immanent Ethics and Transcendent Morality: Deleuze’s An-Archic Ethos
Prologue
I. ‘To Have Done with the Judgment of God’
II. Human Rights in a State of Abeyance(?)

PART III
THE SUBJECT OF RIGHTS AND THE QUESTION OF BECOMING
4. Questioning the Subject of Human Rights, or How is a Becoming?
Prologue
I. How Did We Become Subjects of the Subject?
II. The Human Rights of an Alienated Subject and the Subject of Alienating Human Rights
III. The Ways of Becoming

PART IV
BEYOND HUMAN RIGHTS: TOWARDS AN AN-ARCHIC JURISPRUDENCE
5. Deleuze’s Jurisprudence: Is there Phronesis Beyond Human Rights?
Prologue
I. Which Jurisprudence? – A Multiplicity of Meanings
II. A Deleuzian Jurisprudence: Restoring the phronesis and ethos of ius
6. Apodosis: Towards an An-archic Jurisprudence
Prologue
I. Institutions against the Law
II. ‘It is a nomos Very Different from the “Law”’
III. (In)Conclusions