CHAPTER 1
GOVERNING IN A POLARIZED SOCIETY

Outline

• The Chapters to Come
• Glossary

Hatred, anger, and violence can destroy us: the politics of polarization is dangerous.

RAHUL GANDHI, MEMBER OF THE INDIAN PARLIAMENT

Since the publication of the last edition of this book the United States has been through the four extraordinary years of the Trump presidency, marked first by a dramatic move to the right in almost all aspects of government policy, then a world pandemic that took more than 600 000 American lives and culminated in a violent assault on the Capitol building by Trump supporters intent on stopping the certification of what they falsely saw as a rigged election. These events occurred in the context of growing income and wealth inequality in the United States. Nobel laureate Paul Krugman has shown how this growing inequality is in stark contrast to the middle years of the twentieth century when America experienced what has been called a ‘Great Compression’ or income and wealth becoming more equally distributed. Since then, however, the rich have increased their share of income and wealth substantially, while the real incomes of poorer Americans have stagnated or even fallen. In addition, beginning in the 1980s and accelerating since the late 1990s, American politics has been increasingly characterized by ideological polarization on a wide range of non-economic issues ranging from race relations, immigration and the environment to moral issues such as abortion, gun rights, public order and sexual minorities’ rights. Today, the Republicans are consistently on the right on these issues while the Democrats are (slightly less consistently) on the left. The upshot has been the emergence of a much more confrontational and abrasive style of politics centred on the proper role of government in society. Interestingly these differences do not easily align with the ‘traditional’ position of Democrats and Republicans on the role of government. In particular, categorizing the Republican Party as the ‘hands off’ party is difficult to reconcile with the extraordinary appeal of Donald Trump, who tried to implement a range of populist and authoritarian policies ranging from immigration to ‘law and order’ and the undemocratic control of elections. In addition he was no fiscal conservative and, along with many Congressional Republicans, seemed indifferent to the ballooning federal deficit. Meanwhile the Democrats remain active supporters of increased equality, big government in social policy, protecting the environment and many aspects of the economy and civil rights. There is, in fact, a deep paradox here, because for much of the history of the Republic, Americans have been suspicious of big government both in terms of its role in domestic affairs and in terms of its role in the wider world. Unlike the citizens of most West European states – and indeed of America’s immediate neighbours, Mexico and Canada – Americans have always mistrusted the very idea of big government. Low taxes and limited public spending have been populist rallying cries since the beginning of the Republic. Today, however, the US has, in absolute terms, the largest government of any western country, which provides for a vast array of social and economic programmes as well as military forces and commitments with global reach.

At the inception of the Republic, no question aroused as much passion as did the proper scope of the federal government in society. What the Founding Fathers decided on was an institutional structure that required the assent of several diverse constituencies (those electing the House, Senate and president) before a bill was passed. The presidential power of veto provided an additional check on government, as did the institution of federalism, which served further to fragment government in the new republic. These institutional features were both a product of and reinforced by a public philosophy of limited government. From the very beginning Americans accepted that government was a necessary evil and that essential services such as law and order, sanitation and education should be provided by state and local rather than the federal government. The first 10 amendments to the Constitution (the Bill of Rights) provided citizens with legal protection from a potentially intrusive central government. In particular, the First Amendment rights of freedom of speech, assembly and religion were designed to act as bulwarks against the power of the state. Americans also mistrusted standing armies. Instead they placed their faith in a people’s militia or, later, in armies and navies that would be largely disbanded once a national emergency had passed.

What is remarkable about the ensuing 150 years of American history is just how powerful an influence this public philosophy was. For it was not until the 1930s and the 1940s that the federal government assumed a permanent and extensive role in social policy and defence. But many Americans remain deeply ambivalent about these new functions. Support for the particular benefits provided by a range of social programmes such as Medicare and social security is high, but, as the battles over federally mandated health care show, antipathy to the general notion of the federal government supporting those in need remains. Politicians preach the virtues of less government and lower taxes while promising to defend existing programmes. A similar tension exists in a range of conscience issues. Those who want to protect ‘family values’ are usually opponents of big government, yet the advance of their agenda would require government action to curb individual choice in such areas as abortion, stem cell research and the rights of sexual minorities. Politicians known to be tough on crime support an extension of the powers of government, including those of federal agencies such as the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). But these very same politicians often preach the virtues of limited government.

Nowhere is this tension more obvious than in foreign and defence policy. Public support for a major world role waxes and wanes according to the historical circumstances. It was high during and immediately after the Second World War, but fell dramatically in the aftermath of defeat in Vietnam. Even so, the need to balance the power of the Soviet Union required the Americans to retain large armed forces, including the nuclear deterrent, whether they liked it or not. With the demise of the old communist enemy most commentators expected the US to take on a different role aimed at least in part towards advancing a humanitarian agenda, as the interventions in Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo showed. After 9/11 all this was to change. US interventions abroad became justified as part of the war on terrorism. By definition, this involved the sort of military role associated with big government and strong states. Following the difficulties involved in the interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan the tide turned once again, but, as far as those on the political right were concerned, not against a strong American role over such issues as nuclear weapons in Iran and North Korea, so much as against messy, expensive – and ultimately unwinnable – ground wars in distant lands fighting elusive enemies such as the Islamic State (ISIS). These sentiments were given a major fillip by Donald Trump who railed against the use of American troops abroad while remaining convinced that World problems could be solved through the striking of bilateral ‘deals’ with foreign dictators such Kim Jong-un of North Korea.

Of course, the balance between limited government and an expanded federal role ebbs and flows as historical events such as recessions and wars change values and interests, but never has it taken on the form it has today, with both Democrats and Republicans deeply divided on the role of government and with Republicans in particular unable to reconcile their traditional antipathy to government with the need for decisive federal government intervention in such areas as immigration, health care, trade policy and tax reform.

For an introductory textbook, ideological conflict in the context of deep ambiguity on the proper role of government provides a useful theme. It helps international comparison. In few countries has ideological polarization actually increased in recent years. On the contrary, in many comparable countries, including Japan, Germany and Spain, the mainstream political parties have been growing closer together, not further apart – although often at the expense of allowing extremist parties of the right and left to increase their voter appeal. Nor do these countries display the same level of uncertainty about the role of government or the ‘state’ as do Americans. Most citizens of France and Germany are perfectly happy to see the government provide for a wide range of services in welfare, transport, economic development and mobilizing to combat a global pandemic. Americans, by way of contrast, often seem to resent the role of the government in these areas while at the same time expecting the government to play a prominent role, especially during times of emergency or economic dislocation. American Politics and Society constantly makes comparisons of this sort, so educating students on the importance of a set of uniquely American beliefs and values.

These values are, of course, articulated in the context of the institutional structure of American politics. This structure has been the subject of much criticism in recent years. Critiques have been based in part on specific...