Market Design Powers of the European Commission? (eBook)

Preface 6
Contents 7
Chapter 1: Introduction 18
1.1 Delimitation of the Subject Matter 19
1.1.1 Distinction from Other Means to Enforce Articles 101 and 102 TFEU 22
1.1.2 Distinction from Similar Powers in the Fields of Anti-dumping, State Aid and Article 106 TFEU 22
1.1.3 Distinction from Merger Remedies 24
1.1.4 No Comparative Study 25
1.1.5 No Study of General Usefulness of Remedies, nor of Political or Economic Expediency 26
1.2 Terminology 26
1.2.1 Remedy 27
1.2.2 Structural and Behavioural Remedies 27
1.3 The Importance of Soft-Law 28
1.4 Outline 29
Bibliography 30
Chapter 2: Prolegomena 32
2.1 Fundamentals Regarding Article 7 and Article 9 as Legal Bases for the Adoption of a Remedy 32
2.1.1 Article 7 32
2.1.2 Article 9 33
2.1.3 Distinction of the Article 9 Procedure from the Settlement Procedure in Cartel Cases 34
2.2 The Alrosa Case and Its Criticism 34
2.2.1 The Case 35
2.2.1.1 The Facts 35
2.2.1.2 The Judgment of the General Court 36
2.2.1.2.1 Violation of Article 9 and the Principle of Proportionality 36
2.2.1.2.2 Violation of Alrosa´s Rights of Defence 37
2.2.1.3 The Opinion of Advocate General Kokott 38
2.2.1.3.1 Violation of Article 9 and of the Principle of Proportionality 38
2.2.1.3.1.1 Too Strict Proportionality Test 38
2.2.1.3.1.2 Excess of the Limits of Judicial Review 39
2.2.1.3.2 Violation of Alrosa´s Rights of Defence 40
2.2.1.4 The Judgment of the Court of Justice 41
2.2.1.4.1 Violation of Article 9 and of the Principle of Proportionality 41
2.2.1.4.1.1 Too Strict Proportionality Test 41
2.2.1.4.1.2 Excess of the Limits of Judicial Review 41
2.2.1.4.2 Violation of Alrosa´s Rights of Defence 42
2.2.2 Essential Criticism and Preliminary Comment 42
2.2.2.1 Summary of the Criticism Regarding the Modified Proportionality Test 43
2.2.2.2 Comment 45
2.2.2.2.1 The Judgment Is Generalisable Only to a Limited Extent 45
2.2.2.2.2 The Modification of the Proportionality Test Applied by the Court Raises at Most Limited Concerns Regarding the Inte... 47
2.2.2.2.2.1 Interests of Concerned Undertakings 48
2.2.2.2.2.2 Interests of Third Parties 49
2.2.2.2.2.3 Interest of the General Public in the Protection of the Competitive Process 51
2.2.2.2.3 Intermediate Conclusion on the Modification of the Proportionality Test in the Alrosa Judgment 52
2.3 The Broader Context: The Development of the Commission´s Practice and the Explanations for the Frequent Occurrence of Comm... 54
2.3.1 Development of the Practice: A Shift Towards a ``Culture of Consent´´? 56
2.3.1.1 Empirical Observations 57
2.3.1.1.1 Regarding Commission Decisions 57
2.3.1.1.2 Regarding Court Procedures 59
2.3.1.2 A Change of Paradigm? 60
2.3.2 Explanations for the Frequent Occurrence of Commitment Decisions 64
2.3.2.1 Incentives and Disincentives for a Commitment Decision 65
2.3.2.1.1 Incentives 65
2.3.2.1.1.1 Commitments Are Speedier and Less Costly Than Infringement Decisions 65
2.3.2.1.1.2 Commitments Are More Effective Than Infringement Decisions 68
2.3.2.1.2 Disincentives 69
2.3.2.1.3 Intermediate Conclusion 71
2.3.2.2 Replacement of Exemption Decisions That Existed Under Regulation 17/62 72
2.3.2.3 The Impact of the More Economic Approach 73
2.3.3 Conclusion 74
Bibliography 75
Chapter 3: The Relaxation of the Link Between Harm and Remedy 80
3.1 Introduction 80
3.1.1 The Importance of the Link Between Harm and Remedy in the Context of Article 7: A Barrier Against the Blurring of the Bo... 80
3.1.1.1 The ``General Clause´´ Character of Article 7 and the Difficulties of Defining Limits for the Content of an Article 7 ... 81
3.1.1.2 The Link Between Harm and Remedy As a Barrier Against the Blurring of the Boundaries Between Competition Law and Regul... 82
3.1.2 The Criticism Regarding the Relaxation of the Link Between Harm and Remedy in the Context of the Article 9 Procedure: A ... 86
3.1.2.1 Abstract Risk of Enforcement Errors 86
3.1.2.2 Abstract Risk of Abuse of Commitments for Regulatory Purposes 88
3.1.2.3 The Materialisation of the Risks of Enforcement Errors and Instrumentalisation of the Commitment Procedure for Regulat... 89
3.1.3 Preliminary Comment and Outline of the Remainder of the Present Chapter 90
3.1.3.1 Article 9 Only Increases the Abstract Risk of Over-Enforcement 90
3.1.3.1.1 No Increase in Risk of Under-Enforcement 91
3.1.3.1.1.1 The Interests of Third Parties Who Are Capable of Ensuring Their Rights Themselves 91
3.1.3.1.1.2 The Interest of the General Public in the Protection of the Competitive Process 92
3.1.3.1.2 There Is an Increase in Risk of Over-Enforcement 93
3.1.3.2 Development of a Research Agenda 96
3.1.3.2.1 Importance of Clarifying the Boundaries of Article 7 96
3.1.3.2.2 The Commission´s Use of Novel Theories of Harm or the Pursuit of Regulatory Objectives Prove As Such Neither Over-En... 98
3.1.3.2.3 Limitations and Outline of the Following Analysis 100
3.1.3.2.3.1 Limitations 100
3.1.3.2.3.2 Outline 102
3.2 General Remarks on Proportionality 104
3.2.1 In the Context of Article 7 105
3.2.1.1 The Structure of the Test: Two or Three Steps? 105
3.2.1.2 Relation Between the Intrusiveness of a Remedy and Its Effectiveness 106
3.2.1.3 Importance of Monitoring Costs 107
3.2.1.4 Remedies Addressing a Market or Conduct That Is Not Covered by the Found Infringement 108
3.2.2 In the Context of Article 9 109
3.2.2.1 General Observations 109
3.2.2.2 Coca-Cola 109
3.2.2.2.1 The Case 110
3.2.2.2.2 The Criticism 111
3.2.2.2.3 Comment 111
3.3 The Link Between Harm and Remedy Under Article 7 and Article 9 in General 114
3.3.1 Terminating On-Going Anticompetitive Conduct 115
3.3.1.1 Abstract Cease and Desist Orders 115
3.3.1.2 Concrete Negative Orders 116
3.3.1.3 Similar Conduct 116
3.3.1.3.1 Abstract Like Effects Orders 117
3.3.1.3.2 Concrete Obligations That Aim at Preventing Similar Conduct 117
3.3.1.3.2.1 Exchange of Information 117
3.3.1.3.2.2 Microsoft Tying 119
3.3.1.3.2.3 Single Branding Obligations 120
3.3.1.3.2.3.1 In the Context of Article 7 Regulation 1/03 120
3.3.1.3.2.3.1 Langnese 120
3.3.1.3.2.3.1 Langfristige Gaslieferverträge 121
3.3.1.3.2.3.1 Discussion 122
3.3.1.3.2.3.2 In the Context of Article 9 Regulation 1/03 129
3.3.1.3.2.3.2 Distrigaz and Long-Term Electricity Contracts in France 129
3.3.1.3.2.3.2 Repsol 133
3.3.1.4 Positive Orders and the Freedom of Choice of the Concerned Undertakings 135
3.3.1.4.1 In the Context of Article 7 Regulation 1/03 135
3.3.1.4.1.1 Positive Orders for Infringements of Article 101 TFEU 136
3.3.1.4.1.1.1 Case Law 137
3.3.1.4.1.1.1 Ford I 137
3.3.1.4.1.1.1 Peugeot 138
3.3.1.4.1.1.1 Automec 139
3.3.1.4.1.1.1 Depotkosmetik 141
3.3.1.4.1.1.2 Discussion 141
3.3.1.4.1.1.2 The Potential Field of Application of Positive Orders for Infringements of Article 101 TFEU: Constellations in W... 142
3.3.1.4.1.1.2 The Compatibility of Positive Orders with the Freedom of Choice of the Concerned Undertakings 143
3.3.1.4.1.1.2 Positive Orders to Eliminate the Subsisting Effects of an Infringement of Article 101 TFEU 149
3.3.1.4.1.1.2 Conclusion: A Look Back at Selective Distribution Systems 150
3.3.1.4.1.2 Positive Orders for Infringements of Article 102 TFEU 151
3.3.1.4.1.2.1 Orders Requiring Positive Action Where There Are Several Ways to Put the Abuse to an End 152
3.3.1.4.1.2.2 Orders Requiring Positive Action Where the Latter Constitutes the Only Way to Put the Abuse to an End: The Typic... 153
3.3.1.4.1.2.2 The Commission Must Respect the Parties´ Freedom of Choice As Regards the Implementation of an Obligation to Deal 155
3.3.1.4.1.2.2 A Distinction Between Rupture of On-Going Supply and Refusal to Supply a New Customer? 158
3.3.1.4.1.2.2 Scope for Specific Orders Regarding the Implementation of a Positive Obligation 159
3.3.1.4.2 In the Context of Article 9 Regulation 1/03 160
3.3.1.5 The Scope of Remedies and Article 101(3) TFEU 162
3.3.1.5.1 In the Context of Article 7 162
3.3.1.5.1.1 MIFs and the Remedy Imposed in Mastercard 162
3.3.1.5.1.1.1 General Remarks Regarding the Treatment of MIFs Under EU Competition Law 162
3.3.1.5.1.1.2 The Remedy Imposed in Mastercard 164
3.3.1.5.1.2 The Remedy Imposed in Cartes Bancaires 165
3.3.1.5.1.3 Discussion 166
3.3.1.5.1.3.1 Comparison of the Mastercard and the Cartes Bancaires Judgments 166
3.3.1.5.1.3.2 Can the Commission Prohibit Practices for Which It Has Not Yet Been Clarified Whether They Meet the Requirements... 167
3.3.1.5.2 In the Context of Article 9 Regulation 1/03 169
3.3.1.5.2.1 General Observations 169
3.3.1.5.2.2 The Premier League Commitment and the ``No-Single Buyer´´ Rule 169
3.3.1.5.2.2.1 The Case 169
3.3.1.5.2.2.2 Discussion of Criticism 170
3.3.1.6 Remedies with Respect to Prices 171
3.3.1.6.1 Exclusionary Pricing Practices 172
3.3.1.6.1.1 In the Context of Article 7 Regulation 1/03 172
3.3.1.6.1.1.1 Predatory Pricing 172
3.3.1.6.1.1.1 The Prohibition of Predatory Pricing 173
3.3.1.6.1.1.1 The Remedies Side: Fixing a Minimum Price 174
3.3.1.6.1.1.1 ``Germania´´ As an Atypical Example 175
3.3.1.6.1.1.1 The Lufthansa/Austrian Airlines Cooperation Agreement 177
3.3.1.6.1.1.2 Rebates 178
3.3.1.6.1.1.2 Tetra Pak II 178
3.3.1.6.1.1.2 Irish Sugar 180
3.3.1.6.1.1.2 Comment 180
3.3.1.6.1.1.3 Margin Squeeze 181
3.3.1.6.1.1.3 The Prohibition 181
3.3.1.6.1.1.3 The Remedies Side 182
3.3.1.6.1.2 In the Context of Article 9 184
3.3.1.6.2 Exploitative Pricing Practices 184
3.3.1.6.2.1 In the Context of Article 7 184
3.3.1.6.2.2 In the Context of Article 9 188
3.3.1.6.2.2.1 Rambus 189
3.3.1.6.2.2.1 The Case 189
3.3.1.6.2.2.1 Discussion of Criticism 190
3.3.1.6.2.2.2 Standard and Poor´s 193
3.3.1.6.2.2.2 The Case 193
3.3.1.6.2.2.2 Discussion of Criticism 194
3.3.1.6.2.2.3 Gazprom 194
3.3.1.7 Microsoft Tying: An Unbundling Remedy Under Article 7 vs a Must Carry Remedy Under Article 9 196
3.3.1.7.1 The Theory of Harm 199
3.3.1.7.2 The Remedies 202
3.3.2 Addressing Imminent Anticompetitive Conduct 206
3.3.3 Eliminating the Causes of Future Anticompetitive Conduct 208
3.3.4 Eliminating the Subsisting Effects of Past Anticompetitive Conduct 208
3.3.4.1 In the Context of Article 7 209
3.3.4.1.1 General Remarks 209
3.3.4.1.1.1 Akzo 209
3.3.4.1.1.2 Ufex 211
3.3.4.1.1.3 Generalisation of Akzo and Ufex 213
3.3.4.1.1.3.1 Further Examples of Remedies That Aim at the Elimination of Subsisting Effects 213
3.3.4.1.1.3.2 The Boundaries of the Commission´s Power: Required Proof of Causality Between Infringement, Actual Harm and Reme... 214
3.3.4.1.2 Follow-On Contracts 217
3.3.4.1.3 Disgorgement, Restitution and Compensation 221
3.3.4.2 In the Context of Article 9 Regulation 1/03 227
3.3.4.2.1 The ``Competitive Reset´´ in E-Books 227
3.3.4.2.1.1 The Case 227
3.3.4.2.1.2 Discussion 227
3.3.4.2.2 Disgorgement, Restitution and Compensation in the Context of Article 9 229
3.4 In Particular: So Called Structural Remedies 230
3.4.1 The Irrelevance of the Distinction in the Context of Article 7 230
3.4.1.1 The Impossibility to Distinguish Between Structural and Behavioural Remedies 233
3.4.1.1.1 Doctrine 233
3.4.1.1.2 Position of Commission 236
3.4.1.1.3 Position of EU Courts 238
3.4.1.1.4 Comment 239
3.4.1.2 The Lack of Necessity of a Distinction: No General Subsidiarity of Structural Measures 245
3.4.1.2.1 Subsidiarity of Structural Remedies and the Principles of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU 246
3.4.1.2.1.1 Anticompetitive Conduct Consists of a Change to the Structure of the Undertaking 248
3.4.1.2.1.2 Structure of Undertaking Is a Cause for Anticompetitive Conduct 249
3.4.1.2.1.2.1 The Conditions for the Compatibility of a Structural Remedy That Aims at the Causes of Abusive Conduct with the ... 249
3.4.1.2.1.2.2 Consequences for the Subsidiarity Hypotheses 253
3.4.1.2.1.2.2 Separate Accounts As a Remedy for a Margin Squeeze 254
3.4.1.2.1.2.2 IP Licenses As a Remedy for Excessive Pricing 254
3.4.1.2.1.3 Structure of Undertaking Constitutes the Consequence of Anticompetitive Conduct 255
3.4.1.2.1.4 Conclusion 258
3.4.1.2.2 Subsidiarity of Structural Remedies and Proportionality 259
3.4.1.2.2.1 Are Generalised Assumptions About the Intrusiveness and Effectiveness of Structural and Behavioural Remedies Possi... 261
3.4.1.2.2.1.1 Can Structural Remedies Be Considered As Generally More Burdensome? 261
3.4.1.2.2.1.2 Can Structural Remedies Be considered to Be Generally More Effective? 263
3.4.1.2.2.2 Can the Advantages of a More Burdensome Structural Remedy in Terms of Effectiveness Justify Its Imposition Despite... 267
3.4.1.2.3 Concluding Example: Nord KS/Xella 268
3.4.2 Evaluation of the Criticism Regarding Structural Remedies Under Article 9 269
3.4.2.1 Energy Sector 269
3.4.2.1.1 Vertical Unbundling Through Divestiture of Transmission Grids 269
3.4.2.1.1.1 The Three Commitments and Their Criticism 270
3.4.2.1.1.1.1 E.On 270
3.4.2.1.1.1.1 The Case 270
3.4.2.1.1.1.1 Discussion of Criticism 271
3.4.2.1.1.1.2 RWE 274
3.4.2.1.1.1.2 The Case 274
3.4.2.1.1.1.2 Discussion of Criticism 275
3.4.2.1.1.1.3 ENI 277
3.4.2.1.1.1.3 The Case 277
3.4.2.1.1.1.3 Discussion of Criticism 277
3.4.2.1.1.2 Overall Comment on the Divestiture of Transmission Grids 278
3.4.2.1.2 Horizontal Unbundling 280
3.4.2.1.2.1 E.On 280
3.4.2.1.2.1.1 The Case 280
3.4.2.1.2.1.2 Discussion of Criticism 281
3.4.2.1.2.1.2 Sadowska´s Criticism of the Commission´s Theory of Harm 282
3.4.2.1.2.1.2 Criticism Regarding the Link Between Harm and Remedy 285
3.4.2.1.2.2 E.On Gas and GDF 290
3.4.2.1.2.2.1 The Cases 290
3.4.2.1.2.2.2 Discussion of Criticism 291
3.4.2.1.2.3 CEZ 293
3.4.2.1.2.3.1 The Case 293
3.4.2.1.2.3.2 Discussion of Criticism 293
3.4.2.1.3 Swedish Interconnectors 294
3.4.2.1.3.1 The Case 294
3.4.2.1.3.2 Discussion of Criticism 296
3.4.2.1.4 Conclusion Regarding the ``Structural´´ Remedies in the Energy Sector 299
3.4.2.2 Aviation Sector 300
3.4.2.2.1 Limited Value of Contrasting ``Structural Control´´ and ``Behavioural Control´´ 301
3.4.2.2.2 No Doubts As Regards the Fundamental Possibility to Impose Slot Releases Under Article 7 302
3.4.2.3 Deutsche Bahn 303
3.4.2.3.1 The Case 303
3.4.2.3.2 Discussion of Criticism 305
3.5 Ancillary Remedies 309
3.5.1 Information of Customers 309
3.5.2 Reporting to the Commission 310
3.5.3 Delegation of the Implementation of a Remedy 310
3.5.3.1 The Practice of the Commission 311
3.5.3.1.1 Trustees 311
3.5.3.1.1.1 Tasks and Powers of Trustees 313
3.5.3.1.1.1.1 General Tasks and Powers 313
3.5.3.1.1.1.2 Specific Tasks and Powers 314
3.5.3.1.1.1.2 Divestiture 315
3.5.3.1.1.1.2 Non-divestiture 316
3.5.3.1.1.1.3 Overall Development of the Tasks and Powers Conferred on Trustees in the Commission´s Practice 317
3.5.3.1.1.2 Appointment, Qualifications, Remuneration and Discharge 317
3.5.3.1.1.3 Relations with Market Participants and the Commission 318
3.5.3.1.1.3.1 The Trustee´s Independence from Market Participants 318
3.5.3.1.1.3.1 Independence from the Addressee of the Remedy 318
3.5.3.1.1.3.1 Independence from Other Market Participants and Consequences of a Lack of Independence 319
3.5.3.1.1.3.2 The Trustee´s Submission Under the Influence of the Commission 321
3.5.3.1.2 ADR 321
3.5.3.1.2.1 Main Types of ADR Mechanisms Used for the Implementation of Remedies 323
3.5.3.1.2.1.1 Mediation 323
3.5.3.1.2.1.2 Arbitration 324
3.5.3.1.2.1.3 Expert Determination 324
3.5.3.1.2.2 Role of the Commission in Arbitration Procedures 325
3.5.3.1.2.2.1 Information of the Commission About Arbitration Procedures 325
3.5.3.1.2.2.2 Possibilities for the Commission to Participate in the Arbitration Procedures 326
3.5.3.1.2.2.3 Relation Between the Commission´s Own Enforcement Powers and the Arbitral Procedure 326
3.5.3.2 The Microsoft I Judgment and Its Implications 327
3.5.3.2.1 The Case 328
3.5.3.2.2 Discussion 329
3.5.3.2.2.1 The Trustee´s Investigative Powers and His Independence from the Commission 330
3.5.3.2.2.1.1 Conflict with the Meroni Doctrine 331
3.5.3.2.2.1.2 Conflict with Protection of Individual Rights 332
3.5.3.2.2.2 The Allocation of Costs 334
3.5.3.2.2.2.1 Conflict with the Public Interest in an Effective Enforcement of Competition Law 335
3.5.3.2.2.2.2 Conflict with the Interest of the Undertaking That Has to Bear the Costs 335
3.5.3.2.2.3 Conclusion 336
3.6 Fundamental Rights and the Scope of EU Law As Further Limitations to the Commission´s Powers 338
3.6.1 Fundamental Rights 338
3.6.1.1 The Right to Property and the Requirement of Compensation 339
3.6.1.2 Fundamental Rights and the Consensual Nature of Article 9 Decisions 341
3.6.2 Scope of EU Law 341
3.6.2.1 The Internal Perspective: Appreciable Effect on Competition and on Trade Between Member States 341
3.6.2.2 The External Perspective: The International Dimension of Competition Law 342
3.6.2.2.1 The International Dimension of a Case As a Limit for the Commission´s Remedial Power 342
3.6.2.2.1.1 Jurisdiction 343
3.6.2.2.1.1.1 Subject Matter Jurisdiction 343
3.6.2.2.1.1.1 In General 343
3.6.2.2.1.1.1 Regarding Remedies 344
3.6.2.2.1.1.2 The Enforcement Problem 346
3.6.2.2.1.2 Lack of Necessity of a Domestic Remedy Due to an Existing Foreign Remedy 347
3.6.2.2.2 International Cooperation 348
3.6.2.2.3 Does the Commission Use the Article 9 Procedure to Extract Remedies That Reach Beyond Its Jurisdiction? 349
3.7 Duration and Modification 350
3.7.1 Ex Ante Limitation of the Effects of a Remedy 350
3.7.1.1 In the Context of Article 7 350
3.7.1.2 In the Context of Article 9 351
3.7.2 Ex Post Amendment of Remedies 352
3.7.2.1 The Legal Bases for the Ex Post Amendment of Remedies 353
3.7.2.1.1 In the Context of Article 7: The General Principles of EU Administrative Law 353
3.7.2.1.1.1 Acts That Were Unlawfully Adopted 355
3.7.2.1.1.2 Acts That Were Lawfully Adopted 355
3.7.2.1.2 Article 9(2) 356
3.7.2.1.2.1 Exhaustiveness? 356
3.7.2.1.2.1.1 Article 9(2) Is More Restrictive Than the General Principles of EU Administrative Law 356
3.7.2.1.2.1.2 Article 9(2) Is Not Exhaustive 357
3.7.2.1.2.2 Not Only Power to Reopen, but Also Power to Modify 359
3.7.2.1.2.2.1 No Amendment of a Commitment Without the Consent of the Company That Offered It 359
3.7.2.1.2.2.2 Ex Nunc or Ex Tunc Revocation 360
3.7.2.2 Common Questions Regarding Articles 7 and 9 360
3.7.2.2.1 Discretion vs Obligation to Reopen the Procedure 360
3.7.2.2.1.1 Obligation to Withdraw or Amend an Unlawfully Adopted, Burdensome Remedy if There Are No Opposing Legitimate Expec... 361
3.7.2.2.1.2 Obligation to Revoke or Amend a Remedy in Favour of the Addressee Despite Favourable Effects for Third Parties 363
3.7.2.2.1.3 Obligation to Revoke or Amend a Remedy to the Detriment of the Addressee 364
3.7.2.2.2 Importance of the Change of Circumstances Required 365
3.7.2.2.3 Review Provisions 367
3.8 Conclusion on the Relaxation of the Link Between Harm and Remedy 368
Bibliography 368
Chapter 4: The Relaxation of Procedural Safeguards 382
4.1 Procedural Safeguards During the Administrative Procedure 382
4.1.1 Concerned Undertakings 383
4.1.1.1 In the Context of Article 7 383
4.1.1.1.1 General Presentation of the Rights of Defence of the Concerned Undertakings 383
4.1.1.1.2 Transatlantic Container Line 384
4.1.1.2 In the Context of Article 9 384
4.1.1.2.1 In Cases with a Statement of Objections 385
4.1.1.2.2 In Cases Without a Statement of Objections 385
4.1.1.2.2.1 Preliminary Assessment 385
4.1.1.2.2.2 Access to the File 386
4.1.1.2.2.2.1 Summary of the Controversy 386
4.1.1.2.2.2.2 Comment 388
4.1.1.2.2.2.2 Existence of a Right to Access to the File 388
4.1.1.2.2.2.2 Possibility for Concerned Undertakings to Waive Their Right to Access to the File 391
4.1.1.2.2.3 Hearing 392
4.1.1.2.2.4 Information About Outcome of the Market Test 393
4.1.2 Complainants 394
4.1.2.1 In the Context of Article 7 394
4.1.2.2 In the Context of Article 9 395
4.1.3 Other Natural or Legal Persons 399
4.1.3.1 Grundig and Consten 399
4.1.3.2 Procedural Rights During the Administrative Procedure Under Regulations 1/03 and 773/2004 de lege lata 400
4.1.3.2.1 In the Context of Article 7 400
4.1.3.2.2 In the Context of Article 9 401
4.1.3.2.2.1 The Right of Interested Third Parties to Be Heard on a Given Commitment 402
4.1.3.2.2.2 The Right of Interested Third Parties to Be Heard on a Revised Commitment 403
4.1.3.2.2.2.1 Alrosa 403
4.1.3.2.2.2.2 The Best Practices and the Manual of Procedures 404
4.1.3.2.2.2.3 Intermediate Conclusion 405
4.1.3.3 De lege ferenda: A Need for Market Testing Article 7 Remedies? 406
4.1.3.4 Necessity to Carry Out a Market Test for the Ex Post Revocation or Amendment of an Article 9 Remedy 408
4.1.4 The Role of the Hearing Officer 409
4.1.5 Conclusion on the Administrative Procedure 410
4.2 Judicial Review 411
4.2.1 Admissibility 411
4.2.1.1 Concerned Undertakings 411
4.2.1.1.1 In the Context of Article 7 411
4.2.1.1.2 In the Context of Article 9 412
4.2.1.1.2.1 Actions Directed Against Commitments Made Binding by the Commission 412
4.2.1.1.2.1.1 Reviewable Act? 412
4.2.1.1.2.1.2 Lack of Legal Interest in a Challenge Due to Consent? 413
4.2.1.1.2.2 Actions Directed Against the Commission´s Refusal to Accept a Commitment 415
4.2.1.2 Complainants 416
4.2.1.2.1 In the Context of Article 7 416
4.2.1.2.2 In the Context of Article 9 417
4.2.1.3 Other Third Parties 417
4.2.1.3.1 Is the Exercise of a Procedural Right During the Administrative Procedure a Necessary Condition for Individual Conce... 418
4.2.1.3.1.1 The Development of the Case Law 419
4.2.1.3.1.1.1 Case Law Prior to the Kruidvat Case 419
4.2.1.3.1.1.2 Kruidvat and Its Potential Scope of Application 419
4.2.1.3.1.1.2 The Case 419
4.2.1.3.1.1.2 The Potential Scope of Application 420
4.2.1.3.1.1.3 Case Law Following the Kruidvat Case 421
4.2.1.3.1.1.3 State Aid: Sniace 421
4.2.1.3.1.1.3 Merger Control: ASBL 421
4.2.1.3.1.2 Conclusion 422
4.2.1.3.2 Is the Participation in the Administrative Procedure or a Right to Participate Sufficient to Establish Individual Co... 423
4.2.1.3.2.1 Participation As Such Not Sufficient 423
4.2.1.3.2.2 Existence of Participatory Right Sufficient 423
4.2.1.3.3 Individual Concern Irrespective of Procedural Rights 424
4.2.2 Scope of Review 425
4.2.2.1 General Observations 425
4.2.2.1.1 The Right to Effective Legal Protection Pursuant to Article 6(1) ECHR and Article 47 Charter 425
4.2.2.1.1.1 General Remarks 426
4.2.2.1.1.1.1 ``Full Jurisdiction´´ Under the Civil Head of Article 6(1) 428
4.2.2.1.1.1.2 ``Full Jurisdiction´´ Under the ``Soft´´ Criminal Head of Article 6(1) 428
4.2.2.1.1.1.3 What Matters Is the Actual Exercise of ``Full Jurisdiction´´ 429
4.2.2.1.1.2 Applied to Competition Law Remedies 429
4.2.2.1.2 The Current Practice of the EU Courts 431
4.2.2.1.2.1 General Remarks 431
4.2.2.1.2.1.1 Legality Review 432
4.2.2.1.2.1.2 Unlimited Jurisdiction 433
4.2.2.1.2.1.3 In Particular: The Commission´s Margin of Discretion Under the Standard of Legality Control 435
4.2.2.1.2.1.3 General Remarks 435
4.2.2.1.2.1.3 The Intensity of Limited Review in the Words of the EU Courts and Its Meaning 437
4.2.2.1.2.2 Applied to Remedies 442
4.2.2.1.2.2.1 Only Review of Legality 442
4.2.2.1.2.2.2 No Power to Reform a Remedy 442
4.2.2.1.2.2.3 Facts Posterior to the Adoption of the Decision Cannot Be Taken into Account 442
4.2.2.1.2.2.4 The Commission´s Margin of Discretion 444
4.2.2.1.2.2.4 A Particular Justification of Discretion: The Prospective Nature of Remedies 444
4.2.2.1.2.2.4 The Test Applied 447
4.2.2.2 Particularities Regarding the Review of Article 9 Decisions 448
4.2.3 Conclusion on Judicial Review 451
4.3 Conclusion on the Relaxation of Procedural Safeguards 452
Bibliography 452
Chapter 5: The Impact of Commitments on Legal Certainty 457
5.1 Disadvantages of Commitments in Terms of Legal Certainty 458
5.1.1 Lack of Clear Criteria When the Article 9 Procedure Applies 458
5.1.1.1 The Last Sentence of Recital 13 Regulation 1/03 458
5.1.1.2 Guidance Provided by the Best Practices and the Manual of Procedures 460
5.1.1.3 The Commission´s Practice and Its Criticism: Should the Scope of Application of the Article 9 Procedure Be Further Res... 461
5.1.1.4 Manifest Error in Choosing the Article 9 Procedure As a Ground for Judicial Review 466
5.1.2 No Right to a Commitment Decision? 467
5.1.2.1 Position of the Commission and the EU Courts 468
5.1.2.2 Doctrine 468
5.1.2.3 Comment 469
5.1.3 Remedies and the Commission´s Power to Prioritise Cases 471
5.1.3.1 Enlargement of the Commission´s Discretion 472
5.1.3.2 A Limit to the Commission´s Powers 474
5.1.3.3 Article 9 Does Not Increase the Commission´s Power to Prioritise Cases 475
5.1.4 Effects on Competition Authorities and Courts of the Member States 476
5.1.4.1 Effects on Power to Find an Infringement and Impose a Fine 477
5.1.4.1.1 Article 7 Decisions 477
5.1.4.1.2 Article 9 Decisions 478
5.1.4.1.3 De Facto Effects of Commission Decisions 482
5.1.4.2 Effects on Power to Adopt Further Injunctions or Commitments 482
5.1.4.3 Effects on Private Damages Actions 483
5.1.4.3.1 Article 7 Decisions 483
5.1.4.3.2 Article 9 Decisions 483
5.1.4.4 Can Decisions Be Enforced by National Courts or by National Competition Authorities? 484
5.1.4.4.1 Enforcement of Article 7 and Article 9 Decisions by National Courts 484
5.1.4.4.1.1 Preparatory Works of Regulation 1/03 484
5.1.4.4.1.2 Overview Over Opinions 485
5.1.4.4.1.3 Comment 487
5.1.4.4.1.3.1 Binding Nature of the Remedy 487
5.1.4.4.1.3.2 Enforcement in National Courts Contributes to the Effectiveness of EU Law (Effet Utile) 488
5.1.4.4.1.3.3 Unconditionality and Sufficient Precision 489
5.1.4.4.1.3.4 Creation of Rights in Favour of Third Parties 490
5.1.4.4.2 Enforcement of Article 7 and Article 9 Decisions by National Competition Authorities 492
5.1.4.4.2.1 Preparatory Works of Regulation 1/03 492
5.1.4.4.2.2 Overview Over Opinions 493
5.1.4.4.2.3 Comment 494
5.1.4.5 Intermediate Conclusion: Comparison of Article 7 and Article 9 Decisions and Comment 495
5.1.4.5.1 Uncertainty Regarding the Imposition of a Fine for Conduct That Predates the Commitment Decision 496
5.1.4.5.2 Reduced Facilitation of Follow on Action 496
5.1.5 Loss of the Positive Externalities of Adjudication 497
5.1.5.1 The Criticism 499
5.1.5.2 Comment 500
5.2 Advantage: Precise and Enforceable Obligations 503
5.2.1 The Problematic Precision of Injunctions Adopted on the Basis of Article 7 503
5.2.1.1 The EU Case Law 505
5.2.1.1.1 Cease and Desist Orders 505
5.2.1.1.1.1 Grundig and Consten 505
5.2.1.1.1.2 Aéroports de Paris 506
5.2.1.1.1.3 Microsoft II: Sufficient Precision of an Obligation to Grant Access on ``Reasonable Terms´´ 506
5.2.1.1.1.3.1 The Case 506
5.2.1.1.1.3.2 Preliminary Comment 508
5.2.1.1.1.4 Excursus: Langnese 509
5.2.1.1.2 Abstract Like Effects Orders 510
5.2.1.1.2.1 Purely Declaratory Value 510
5.2.1.1.2.2 Restrictive Interpretation 510
5.2.1.2 The Stricter Standards Under German Law: Fährhafen Puttgarden 511
5.2.1.3 Discussion 513
5.2.1.3.1 Imprecise Orders to Put an Infringement to an End Do Not Produce Any Discrete Legal Effects 513
5.2.1.3.2 How to Assess Whether a Remedy Is Sufficiently Precise in Order to Serve As the Basis for the Imposition of Periodic... 516
5.2.1.3.2.1 Periodic Penalties Require a More Precise Basis Than Fines 516
5.2.1.3.2.2 The Freedom of Choice of the Concerned Undertakings Cannot Justify the Use of Imprecise Orders As the Basis for Pe... 519
5.2.1.3.3 Restrictive Interpretation or Annulment? 522
5.2.1.3.4 Concluding Example: Google Search 524
5.2.2 Precision in the Context of Article 9 525
5.3 Conclusion on the Impact of Commitments on Legal Certainty 526
Bibliography 526
Chapter 6: Outlook: Discussion of Reform Proposals 533
6.1 Reform Proposals Relating to Article 9 Decisions 534
6.1.1 Limiting the Scope of Application of Article 9 535
6.1.2 Access to the File 535
6.1.3 Participatory Rights of Complainants 535
6.1.4 Judicial Control 536
6.1.4.1 More Detailed Reasoning and More Comprehensive Analysis by the Commission 536
6.1.4.2 Subjection of Commitment Decisions to Prior Approval by the EU Courts 538
6.1.4.2.1 Judicial Control of Consent Decrees Under the US Tunney Act 538
6.1.4.2.2 A Model for the EU? 540
6.1.4.2.2.1 The US Standard of Review of Consent Decrees Is Not Stricter Than the EU Standard of Review of Commitment Decisions 541
6.1.4.2.2.2 The Introduction of a More Rigid Public Interest Control of Commitment Decisions in the EU Would Not Fit the Insti... 542
6.1.4.2.3 Exclusion of the Right of Complainants to Appeal Commitment Decisions 545
6.2 Reform Proposals Relating to Article 7 Decisions 546
6.2.1 Market Test 546
6.2.2 Increasing the Commission´s Flexibility? 546
6.2.3 Relationship Between Commitment Procedures and Fines 548
6.2.3.1 Extending the Settlement Procedure to Non-cartel Cases? 548
6.2.3.1.1 The Reasons for the Restriction of the Scope of Application of the Settlement Procedure 548
6.2.3.1.2 Different Objectives of the Commitment Procedure and the Settlement Procedure 550
6.2.3.1.3 No Significant Mitigation of the Disadvantages of the Commitment Procedure 551
6.2.3.1.4 No Necessity to Extend the Scope of the Settlement Procedure Given the Existence of Other Means to Combine an Infrin... 552
6.2.3.2 Revision of Fining Guidelines to Take Cooperation of Undertakings into Account? 553
6.2.3.3 Prohibition to Impose a Fine Subsequent to the Issuance of a Preliminary Assessment? 554
6.2.4 Reform of the Procedure Before the EU Courts 557
6.2.4.1 Increased Judicial Review of Infringement Decisions and Fines? 557
6.2.4.2 Speeding Up Court Procedures? 559
6.3 Miscellaneous 561
6.3.1 Increased Use of Informal Closure of Procedures? 561
6.3.2 Increased Use of Interim Measures? 563
6.3.3 Strengthening the Independence of the Administrative Decision Making Process? 565
6.3.4 Strengthening Private Enforcement? 568
6.4 Conclusion on Reform Proposals 570
Bibliography 571
Chapter 7: Summary of Key Findings 576