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The Political Economy of Stalinism
Evidence from the Soviet Secret Archives
Seiten
2003
Cambridge University Press (Verlag)
978-0-521-82628-0 (ISBN)
Cambridge University Press (Verlag)
978-0-521-82628-0 (ISBN)
This book uses the formerly secret Soviet state and Communist Party archives to describe the creation and operations of the Soviet administrative command system. This study pinpoints the reasons for the failure of the system - poor planning, unreliable supplies and the preferential treatment of indigenous enterprises.
This book uses the formerly secret Soviet state and Communist Party archives to describe the creation and operations of the Soviet administrative command system. It concludes that the system failed not because of the 'jockey'(i.e. Stalin and later leaders) but because of the 'horse' (the economic system). Although Stalin was the system's prime architect, the system was managed by thousands of 'Stalins' in a nested dictatorship. The core values of the Bolshevik Party dictated the choice of the administrative command system, and the system dictated the political victory of a Stalin-like figure. This study pinpoints the reasons for the failure of the system - poor planning, unreliable supplies, the preferential treatment of indigenous enterprises, the lack of knowledge of planners, etc. - but also focuses on the basic principal-agent conflict between planners and producers, which created a sixty-year reform stalemate.
This book uses the formerly secret Soviet state and Communist Party archives to describe the creation and operations of the Soviet administrative command system. It concludes that the system failed not because of the 'jockey'(i.e. Stalin and later leaders) but because of the 'horse' (the economic system). Although Stalin was the system's prime architect, the system was managed by thousands of 'Stalins' in a nested dictatorship. The core values of the Bolshevik Party dictated the choice of the administrative command system, and the system dictated the political victory of a Stalin-like figure. This study pinpoints the reasons for the failure of the system - poor planning, unreliable supplies, the preferential treatment of indigenous enterprises, the lack of knowledge of planners, etc. - but also focuses on the basic principal-agent conflict between planners and producers, which created a sixty-year reform stalemate.
1. The jockey or the horse?; 2. Collectivization, accumulation, and power; 3. The principles of governance; 4. Investment, wages, and fairness; 5. Visions and control figures; 6. Planners versus producers; 7. Creating Soviet industry; 8. Operational planning; 9. Ruble control: money, prices, and budgets; 10. The destruction of the Soviet administrative command economy.
Erscheint lt. Verlag | 27.10.2003 |
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Zusatzinfo | 29 Tables, unspecified; 22 Line drawings, unspecified |
Verlagsort | Cambridge |
Sprache | englisch |
Maße | 158 x 237 mm |
Gewicht | 542 g |
Themenwelt | Sozialwissenschaften ► Politik / Verwaltung ► Politische Systeme |
Sozialwissenschaften ► Politik / Verwaltung ► Politische Theorie | |
Sozialwissenschaften ► Soziologie | |
Wirtschaft ► Volkswirtschaftslehre ► Wirtschaftspolitik | |
ISBN-10 | 0-521-82628-4 / 0521826284 |
ISBN-13 | 978-0-521-82628-0 / 9780521826280 |
Zustand | Neuware |
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