Anatomy of Victory (eBook)

John D. Caldwell retired in 2007 after a fifty-year career in defense think tanks and aerospace companies. Trained as a political scientist with a PhD from the University of California, Santa Barbara, he was first posted to Saigon in 1968 as part of a classified research project for the Department of Defense’s Advanced Research Projects Agency. Caldwell joined TRW Space & Defense in 1982 to work on major defense, NASA, and intelligence community programs. He remains an active consultant at Northrop Grumman Aerospace Systems, which acquired TRW in 2002. He lives in Santa Barbara with his wife, Karen, and their dog Daisy, cat Mr. Bingley, and Martha, a desert tortoise.

Maps, Figures, and Table Preface Acknowledgments PART I: STRATEGIC ARCHITECTURES: INTRODUCTION PART II: WORLD WAR II 1 Battle of Britain: Winning by Not Losing 2 Battle of the Atlantic: Protecting the Maritime Lifeline 3 Invasion of Russia: Hitler’s Strategic Mistake 4 Battle of El Alamein and Operation Torch: Cracking German Invincibility 5 Battles of Midway and Guadalcanal: Regaining Initiative in the Pacific 6 Strategic Bombing Offensive: Breaking German Airpower 7 Invasion of Italy: Deciding to Fight Somewhere in Europe in 1943 8 D-Day and the Battle for Normandy: Retaking the Continent 9 Battle for the Rhine: Attacking Germany’s Vitals10 Battle of Okinawa and the Bombing of Japan: Ending the War 11 The Strategic Architectures of World War II PART III: THE KOREAN WAR 12 Battle of the Pusan Perimeter: Getting the Most Out of a Bad Situation 13 Inchon—Operation Chromite: MacArthur’s Masterstroke 14 Crossing the 38th Parallel and Driving North to the Yalu: The Risks of Overreaching 15 Operations Ripper and Killer: Recovery and Frustration 16 The Strategic Architectures of the Korean War PART IV: THE VIETNAM WAR 17 Battle of the Ia Drang Valley: Not Fighting the Decisive Battle 18 Bombing Campaign and High-Tech Initiatives: Operations Rolling Thunder and Igloo White Airpower and Technology Indecisive 19 The Pacification Program (1967–1968): Failing to Change Behavior 20 The Tet Offensive (1968): Strategic Disaster 21 Vietnamization: Never a Winning Strategy 22 The Final Years (1969–1975): The Losing Path 23 The Strategic Architectures of the Vietnam War PART V: THE IRAQI WARS 24 Iraqi War I, Persian Gulf War: Defeating Saddam, Losing Politically 25 Iraqi War II, Thirteen-Year Air Conflict: The Limits of Airpower 26 Iraqi War III, Invasion of Iraq: Winning without an Endgame 27 Iraqi War IV, the Insurgency and the Surge (2007–2008): Relearning Counterinsurgency 28 Iraqi War V, the Rise of ISIS: A New, More Violent Enemy 29 The Strategic Architectures of the Iraqi WarsPART VI: STRATEGIC ARCHITECTURES: THE ENDGAME Acronyms and Selected Glossary Notes Selected Bibliography Index