Approval Voting (eBook)

Preface to the First Edition 11
Footnotes to Preface 13
List of Tables 16
List of Figures 17
Chapter 1 Introduction: Overview of the Problem and Its Solution 18
1.1. The Multicandidate Problem 18
1.2. A Solution: Approval Voting 20
1.3. What's Wrong with Approval Voting? 27
1.4. An Illustration of the Effects of Different Rules: The 1980 New Hampshire Primaries under Approval Voting 28
1.5. Prospects for Adoption 29
Footnotes to Chapter 1 30
Chapter 2 Sincerity and Strategy- Proofness: Which System Is Most Honest? 32
2.1. Introduction 32
2.2. Voter Preferences and Dominance 33
2.3. Dominance between Strategies 36
2.4. Admissible Strategies 39
2.5. Sincere Voting and Strategy- Proofness 45
2.6. Conclusions 49
Footnotes to Chapter 2 50
Chapter 3 The Condorcet Criterion: Which System Best Finds the Majority Candidate? 52
3.1. Introduction 52
3.2. Dichotomous Preferences 54
3.3. Runoff Systems 57
3.4. Dominance, Admissibility, Sincerity, and Strategy- Proofness of Runoff Systems 59
3.5. Condorcet Possibility Theorems 64
3.6. Condorcet Election Guarantees 69
3.7. Conclusions 71
Footnotes to Chapter 3 73
Chapter 4 The Reconstruction of an Election under Alternative Rules 76
4.1. Introduction 76
4.2. Background on the 1976 House Majority Leader Election 77
4.3. Best/ Worst Analysis: A Preliminary Appraisal 78
4.4. Single- Peaked Preferences 80
4.5. Different Voting Systems 83
4.6. Conclusions 86
Footnotes to Chapter 4 88
Chapter 5 Power and Equity: Which System Is Fairest? 90
5.1. Introduction 90
5.2. Efficacy 91
5.3. Situation- Specific Effects and Power 95
5.4. Power and Equity for Dichotomous Voters 98
5.5. Optimal Voting Strategies 101
5.6. An Asymmetric Example 105
5.7. Conclusions 107
Footnotes to Chapter 5 107
Chapter 6 Deducing Condorcet Candidates from Election Data 110
6.1. Introduction 110
6.2. Deductions from Election Totals 111
6.3. Results for Three and Four Candidates 112
6.4. Modified Assumptions and Disaggregated Data 115
6.5. Analysis of Approval Voting Ballot Data^ 116
6.6. An Empirical Example and Probabilistic Analysis 120
6.7. Conclusions 123
Footnotes to Chapter 6 124
Chapter 7 Polls and the Problem of Strategic Information in Elections 125
7.1. Introduction 125
7.2. Concerns about Public Opinion Polling 126
7.3. Plurality Voting 128
7.4. Approval Voting 131
7.5. Runoff Systems and an Empirical Example 137
7.6. Conclusions 139
Footnotes to Chapter 7 140
Chapter 8 Recent Empirical Examples and Theoretical Extensions 142
8.1. Introduction 142
8.2. The 1980 New York Senate Race: A Reprise of 1970? 142
8.3. Approval Voting and Presidential Elections 144
8.4. The Sensitivity of Voting Systems to Numbers of Candidates 150
8.5, Approval Voting and Game Theory 153
8.6. The Monotonicity Paradox 156
8.7. Conclusions 160
Footnotes to Chapter 8 161
Chapter 9 Deducing Preferences and Choices in the 1980 Presidential Election 165
9.1. Introduction 165
9.2. Preferences and Voter Behavior 167
9.3. Analysis of Anderson Supporters ( but Not Voters) 171
9.4. Inferences from Voter Percentages 177
9.5. Conclusions 181
Footnotes to Chapter 9 182
Chapter 10 Epilogue 184
Glossary 187
Bibliography 191
Index 201