Approaches to Legal Rationality (eBook)

Introduction 6
Contents 8
Contributors 10
Part I The Specificity of Legal Reasoning 11
1 Aristotle on the Ways and Means of Rhetoric 12
Bibliography 33
2 Cicero on Conditional Right 34
2.1 The Preferable and the Rupture with Indifference 35
2.2 The Probable and the Dilemma 40
2.3 Sceptical Right 45
2.4 The Cause as a Condition 50
3 Inductive Topics and Reorganization of a Classification 57
Bibliography 79
4 Formal and Informal in Legal Logic 80
Bibliography 92
Part II Legal Reasoning and Public Reason 94
5 Public Reason and Constitutional Interpretation 95
6 Democracy and Compromise 103
6.1 Different Types of Compromise 104
6.2 Democracy and Compromise-Making 110
6.2.1 The Ideal-Type of Constitutional Democracies 110
6.2.2 Political Discussion in Contemporary Democracies 112
6.2.3 The Normative Structure of Rational and Reasonable Compromises 118
7 Reasons for Reasons 125
7.1 Giving Reasons and Respecting 128
7.1.1 Giving Reasons and Ordering 128
7.1.2 Giving Reasons and Autonomy 129
7.1.3 Giving Reasons and Criticism 131
7.1.4 Individualized Reasons? 132
7.2 Giving Reasons and Trusting 134
7.2.1 The Paradox of Trust 134
7.2.2 Giving Reasons and Accountability 135
7.2.3 Giving Reasons and Personal Trust 137
7.3 Giving Reasons and Reaching Agreement 139
7.3.1 Giving Reasons and Legitimacy 140
7.3.2 Giving Reasons and Disagreement 141
7.4 Giving Reasons and Guidance 143
7.4.1 Outcomes Are Insufficient to Guide When Unsupported by Reasons 144
7.4.2 Reasons, Not Outcomes, Enable Decisions to Guide Over Time 146
7.5 Conclusion 148
8 Argumentation and Legitimation of Judicial Decisions 150
8.1 Legitimacy Sought in Consensus 153
8.1.1 Adhesion Based on Consensus 153
8.1.2 Recourse to Consensual Premises 155
8.2 Legitimacy Based on Effectiveness 159
8.2.1 The Instrumentalisation of the Judicial Decision 159
8.2.2 The Assessment of Effectiveness of the Judicial Decision 163
Bibliography 165
Part III Logic and Law 168
9 Logic and the Law: Crossing the Lines of Discipline 169
9.1 Part I: The Possibility of Rapprochment 169
9.1 A Lapsed Alliance 169
9.2 The Integrity of Disciplines 170
9.3 Interdisciplinary Skepticism 172
9.4 Answering the Skeptics 176
9.4.1 Apples-and-Oranges 176
9.4.2 Inertia 178
9.4.3 Tacitness 178
9.4.4 Fallibilism 180
9.5 Part II Commonality of Concepts 180
9.5 Logically Salient Concepts of Law 180
9.6 Part III: A Sketch of a Logic of Abduction 186
9.6 Ignorance Problems 186
9.7 Abduction Problems 189
9.8 Avoiding a Confusion 189
9.9 Abductive Schematics 190
9.9.1 The Reach of Abduction 191
9.9.2 The Cut-Down Problem 192
9.10 Grounds of Action 193
9.11 Part IV: The Criminal Proof Standard 194
9.11 Reasonable Doubt 194
9.12 Hypothesis-Discharge 196
9.13 Proof Standards 197
9.14 The Probativity Question 199
9.15 Part V: Concluding Remarks 199
Bibliography 201
10 Epistemic and Practical Aspects of Conditionals in Leibniz's Legal Theory of Conditions 206
10.1 Introduction: Targets to be Met by a Legal Theory of Conditions 206
10.2 From Conditions to Conditionals: Leibniz's Legal Theory of Conditions 208
10.3 The Epistemic Nature of Moral Conditionals 211
10.4 An Agenda Relevance Condition on Moral Conditionals 214
10.5 Conclusion 217
Bibliography 218
11 Abduction and Proof: A Criminal Paradox 219
11.1 Verdicts as Abductive 219
11.2 Ignorance-Problems 220
11.3 A Schema for Abduction 221
11.4 Its Bearing on Theories of the Evidence 223
11.5 The Hypothesis-Activation Problem 225
11.6 Reasonable Doubt 226
11.7 The Reasonable Man 228
11.8 The Abductive Character of Verdicts 232
11.9 Rational Adequacy 233
11.10 A Hopeful Equivalence 237
Bibliography 239
12 Relevance in the Law 241
12.1 Two Solitudes 241
12.2 Relevance 243
12.3 Materiality 246
12.4 Targets for a Logic of Relevance in the Law 247
12.5 Dialectical Relevance 248
12.6 Relevance and Probability 251
12.7 Theory-Drag 254
12.8 Materiality and Probativity 256
12.9 Best Explanations 257
12.10 Legal Relevance 258
12.11 Character 261
Bibliography 261
Part IV New Formal Approaches to Legal Reasoning 264
13 The Logical Structure of Legal Justification: Dialogue or "Trialogue"? 265
13.1 Introduction 265
13.2 Legal Justification and Its Dialogical Modeling 266
13.3 The Absent Arbiter? 271
13.4 Justification, Dialogue and Procedure 273
13.5 Conclusion 278
Bibliography 279
14 Explanation and Production: Two Ways of Using and Constructing Legal Argumentation 281
14.1 A General Law Is Not a "General Law" 282
14.2 A Simple Classification of Legal Arguments in a Positivist Framework 286
14.3 Changing Legal Frames by s-Arguments 290
15 The Law of Evidence and Labelled Deduction: A Position Paper 294
15.1 Background: Logic and Law 294
15.2 Legal Theory of Evidence and the New Logics 297
15.2.1 Some Labelled Logic 297
15.2.2 What Some Books on Evidence Say 299
15.3 Case Study: Hearsay Case, Myers v DPP 303
15.3.1 Structure of Lord Reid's argument 307
15.4 Value-Based Argument Framework 310
15.4.1 The Framework 310
15.4.2 Moral Debate Example 315
15.4.3 Bayesian aspects of the moral debate example 318
15.4.4 Neural Representation of Argumentation Frameworks 322
15.4.5 Self-Fibring of Argumentation Networks 326
References 328
Part V Logic in the Law 331
16 How Logic Is Spoken of at the European Court of Justice: A Preliminary Exploration 332
16.1 Introductory Remarks on Method 332
16.1.1 Limiting the Analysis to Explicit References to Logic 332
16.1.2 No Synthesis 333
16.1.2.1 The Problem 333
16.1.2.2 Normative Reading 333
16.1.2.3 Empirical Reading 333
16.1.2.4 The Method Followed in This Study: Empirical Reconstruction and Critical Analysis 333
16.2 "Logic", "Logical" and "Logically": The Surface 334
16.2.1 Logic: A Word with Positive Connotations 334
16.2.2 Logic as An Instrument of Critique in ''Separate Opinions'' 335
16.3 Characteristic Aspects of Logic 335
16.3.1 Relation to the System 335
16.3.2 The ''Judicial Syllogism'' 336
16.3.3 Consistent Argumentation 339
16.3.4 Drawing Consequences from Definitions 340
16.4 Logic and the Analysis of Non-sequitur in "GOLDER v. THE UNITED KINGDOM" 341
16.4.1 The Initial Question: Does Article 6 Para. 1 of the Convention Contain a''Right to Access''? 341
16.4.2 The Arguments of Majority Opinion for a ''Right to Access'' 341
16.4.2.1 The Argument from the French Version of the Convention 341
16.4.2.2 The Argument of Non-exclusion 342
16.4.2.3 The ''Inconceivable'' Argument 343
16.4.3 The Minority Opinion of Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice Against a ''Right to Access'' 343
16.4.3.1 The Starting Point 343
16.4.3.2 The ''King of France Paradox'' 345
16.4.3.3 The ''Non-exclusion/Inclusion Fallacy'' 347
16.5 The "reductio ad absurdum" Argument in "PRETTY v. THE UNITED KINGDOM" 347
16.6 Complainant's Duty to Draw Logical Conclusions 350
16.7 A Logic-Oriented Critique of the Judgment in "PRODAN v. MOLDOVA" 352
16.7.1 Logical Argument No. 1: Differentiating ''Fact'' and ''Supposition'' 352
16.7.2 Logical Argument No. 2: Lack of Intention to Deposit Money 353
16.7.3 Logical Argument No. 3: Error in Precedence-Related Transformation 354
16.8 Concluding Thoughts 356
16.9 Annexe 357
Index 414