Feminist Metaphysics (eBook)

Charlotte Witt is Professor of Philosophy and Humanities at the University of New Hampshire. Her research interests include ancient philosophy and feminist theory. Witt is author of "Aristotle on Substance and Essence" (Cornell University Press) and "Ways of Being in Aristotle" (Cornell University Press) and co-editor of five collected volumes including "A Mind of One's Own: Feminist Essays on Reason and Objectivity." She is a recipient of grants and fellowships from the American Council of Learned Societies and the National Endowment for the Humanities.

Acknowledgements 6
Contents 7
Contributors 9
About the Author 10
1 Introduction 13
Works Cited 19
Part I The Ontology of Sex and Gender 20
2 What Is Gender Essentialism 21
A Brief Taxonomy of Essentialisms 23
Uniessentialism and Gender 28
Identity Essentialism and Gender 31
Nominal and Real Essences 33
Works Cited 34
3 Different Women. Gender and the Realism-Nominalism Debate 36
Introduction 36
The Argument from Social Construction 39
The Argument from Diversity 41
The role of definitions 42
Haslanger's methodology 43
Diversity and Haslanger's Account 45
The Argument from Nonseparability 45
The Argument from Particularity 47
The Argument from Complexity 49
Conclusion 52
Works Cited 54
4 The Metaphysics of Sex and Gender 56
Introduction 56
Judith Butlers Account of Sex and Gender: An Interpretation 57
The Legacy of Simone de Beauvoir 57
Butler Distinguished from a Radical Linguistic Constructivist 60
The Elements of Butler's View 61
Butler's Proposal: Life Is a Gender Game 65
Critique 66
Conferralism About Sex and Gender 67
Conferralism About Gender 69
Conferralism About Sex 71
Conclusion 73
Works Cited 74
5 Ontological Commitments, Sex and Gender 75
Introduction 75
Haslanger on Gender: An Example 78
Problems with the Conventionalist and Abolitionist Implications 80
The Conventionalist View Is Unintuitive 80
The Abolitionist Implication Is Undesirable 82
The Trait/Norm Covariance Model 84
Ontological Commitments and the Trait/Norm Covarience Model 88
Concluding Remarks 90
Works Cited 91
6 Metaphors of Being a F 92
Works Cited 102
Part II Persons and Subjectivity 103
7 The Metaphysics of Relational Autonomy 104
Introduction 104
Two Debates 105
The Relational Debate 106
Three Relational Views 107
Relational Conditions for Autonomous Agency 107
Relational Conditions for Autonomous Action 108
Relational Conditions for Autonomous Choice 110
The Metaphysical Debate 111
Ability to Do Otherwise 111
Argument 1 111
Causally Deterministic Histories 112
Argument 2 113
Positions in the Metaphysical Debate 113
The Metaphysics of Relational Autonomy 114
Agency: Relational Autonomy Vs. Hard Determinism 114
Action: Relational Autonomy Vs. Libertarianism 116
Choice: Relational Autonomy Vs. Incompatibilism 117
Conclusions 119
Works Cited 120
8 Beauvoir on the Allure of Self-Objectification 121
Works Cited 133
9 A Phenomenology of Sexual Difference: Types, Styles and Persons 134
What Is Phenomenology 138
Perceiving Women 141
Personal Styles: Understanding Oneself and Others 148
A Methodological Conclusion 152
Works Cited 154
Part III Power, Ideology and Reality 159
10 The Politics and the Metaphysics of Experience 160
Introduction 160
Anti-foundationalism, Feminism and the Escape from the Model of Mind as Mirror 165
Impersonal and First-Person Perspectives: Critical Positions Versus Avowals 169
Agency and Models of the Mind 172
Conclusion 177
Work Cited 178
11 Ideology, Generics, and Common Ground 180
Introduction 180
Ideology 181
Generics, Semantics and Pragmatics 183
Generics 184
Essences, Natures, and Coincidences 187
Common Ground 188
Generics and Implication 190
Structures, Schemas, and Resources 194
“Looping” and Social Kinds 197
Critique 199
Refusing to Accept the Common Ground 199
Critique? 203
Works Cited 206
12 Experience and Knowledge: The Case of Sexual Abuse Memories 209
Introduction 209
I 212
II 214
III 217
Conclusion 220
Work Cited 223
Index 224