Procedural Semantics for Hyperintensional Logic (eBook)

Doc. RNDr. Marie Duží, CSc., is Associate Professor at VSB-Technical University Ostrava, Czech Republic. Her research interests include philosophical and mathematical logic, conceptual modelling, computer science (theory of information). In 2001 she was one of the invited lecturers in a seminar on Transparent Intensional Logic, University of Leiden, the Netherlands. In 2008 the Rector of VSB-Technical University Ostrava awarded her for the greatest contribution to the scientific and research progress of the entire university.Dr Bjørn Jespersen, PhD., is currently Visiting Researcher at the Section of Philosophy, Faculty of Technology, Policy and Management, Delft University of Technology. Since the late 1990s Jespersen published forty research papers, frequently co-authored with Marie Duží or Pavel Materna, on Transparent Intensional Logic, as well as covering other issues in natural-language semantics, epistemology, and epistemic logic. He co-edited, together with V. Svoboda and C. Cheyne, the 900-page collection of Tichý’s collected papers, published in 2004. PhDr. Pavel Materna, CSc, is Professor of Logic at Masaryk University (Brno), and senior researcher at the Institute of Philosophy of the Czech Academy of Sciences (Prague). Materna is a member of the editorial board of the philosophical journals Filosofický casopis (Philosophical journal) and Organon F, member of the Internationale Bernard-Bolzano Gesellschaft, Salzburg, Austria, and Chairman of the National Committee for Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science.

Preface 7
Acknowledgments 9
Contents 11
1 A programme of general semantics 14
1.1 The programme in outline 14
1.1.1 Semantic schemas 28
1.2 The top-down vs. bottom-up approach to logical semantics 36
1.2.1 The bottom-up approach 36
1.2.2 The top-down approach 48
1.3 Foundations of TIL 50
1.3.1 Functional approach 50
1.3.2 Constructions and types 55
1.4 Possible-world intensions vs. extensions 69
1.4.1 Epistemic framework 69
1.4.2 Intensions and extensions 74
1.4.2.1 Classification of empirical properties 77
1.4.2.2 The part-whole relation 85
1.4.2.3 The top-down approach to semantics revisited 90
1.4.3 Logical objects 97
1.5 Constructions as structured meanings 108
1.5.1 Structured meanings 108
1.5.1.1 Analytic vs. logical 116
1.5.2 Supposition de dicto and de re vs. reference shift 123
1.5.2.1 Two principles de re 131
1.5.2.2 Interplay between de dicto and de re 138
1.5.3 Important entities and notational conventions: summary 144
2 Foundations of semantic analysis 146
2.1 A logical method of semantic analysis 146
2.1.1 The Parmenides principle 146
2.1.2 The compositionality constraint 150
2.1.3 Better and worse analyses 154
2.2 Concepts as procedural meanings 161
2.2.1 Concepts and synonymy 161
2.2.2 Concepts and definitions 176
2.2.2.1 Ontological definition 176
2.2.2.2 Equational verbal definition 177
2.2.3 Conceptual system 179
2.3 Empirical and mathematical existence 183
2.3.1 Existence and extensions 184
2.3.2 Existence and intensions 187
2.4 Explicit intensionalization and temporalization 191
2.4.1 Anti-actualism 191
2.4.2 Predication as functional application 203
2.4.3 Montague’s implicit intensionalization 213
2.5 Modal and temporal interplay 218
2.5.1 Supposition de dicto with respect to temporal parameters 220
2.5.2 Tenses and truth-conditions 225
2.5.2.1 Simple past 228
2.5.2.2 Present perfect 234
2.5.2.3 Temporal de dicto vs. de re 236
2.5.2.4 Future tenses 239
2.6 Three kinds of context 241
2.6.1 Using and mentioning constructions 247
2.6.2 Intensional and extensional occurrence of constituents 256
2.7 TIL as a hyperintensional, partial, typed lambda-calculus 273
2.7.1 Substitution and Leibniz’s Law 285
3 Singular reference and pragmaticallyincomplete meaning 292
3.1 Definite descriptions 292
3.2 Proper names 297
3.2.1 Mathematical constants 301
3.3 Identities involving descriptions and names 309
3.3.1 Hesperus is Phosphorus: co-occupation of individual offices 314
3.4 Pragmatically incomplete meanings 324
3.4.1 Indexicals 327
3.4.2 Indefinite descriptions 332
3.5 Anaphora and meaning 336
3.5.1 Semantic pre-processing of anaphora 338
3.5.2 Donkey sentences 349
3.5.3 Dynamic discourse 359
3.6 Questions and answers 364
4 Requisites: the logic of intensions 372
4.1 Requisites defined 373
4.2 Intensional essentialism 380
4.2.1 Quine’s mathematical cyclist 397
4.3 Requisites and substitution in simple sentences 398
4.4 Property modification and pseudo-detachment 408
4.4.1 Malfunction: subsective vs. privative modification 419
4.5 Nomological necessity 424
4.6 Counterfactuals 427
5 Attitudes and information 433
5.1 Propositional attitudes 437
5.1.1 Three puzzles and a non-puzzle 439
5.1.2 Propositional attitudes de dicto vs. de re 445
5.1.2.1 Intensional propositional attitudes de dicto and de re 448
5.1.2.2 Hyperintensional propositional attitudes de dicto and de re 453
5.1.2.3 Summary of attitudes 459
5.1.3 Inconsistent belief 463
5.1.4 Knowing whether 465
5.1.5 Epistemic closure and inferable knowledge 470
5.1.6 Factivity and epistemic shift 481
5.2 Notional attitudes 483
5.2.1 Wishing and wanting to 487
5.2.2 Seeking, finding and looking for 497
5.3 Quantifying in 507
5.4 Information and inference 518
5.4.1 Empirical semantic information and ‘the scandal ofdeduction’ 523
5.4.2 Empirical content of sentences 527
5.4.3 Analytical content of sentences 528
5.4.4 Information content of analytically equivalent sentences 533
5.4.5 The information value of a valid argument 539
5.4.5.1 The paradox of inference 539
Bibliography 541
Name Index 552
Subject Index 555