Feminist Ethics and Social and Political Philosophy: Theorizing the Non-Ideal (eBook)

Lisa Tessman is an Associate Professor of Philosophy and Women’s Studies at Binghamton University, where she directs the graduate program in Social, Political, Ethical and Legal Philosophy (SPEL). Her research, which takes a feminist approach, focuses on ethics with special attention to virtue ethics and eudiamonism, the ethics of liberatory political struggles, the place for normative ideals in non-ideal theorizing, and the concept of a moral dilemma. She has published a collection that she co-edited with Bat-Ami Bar On called _Jewish Locations: Traversing Racialized Landscapes_ (Rowman and Littlefield, 2001), a monograph called _Burdened Virtues: Virtue Ethics for Liberatory Struggles_ (Oxford University Press, 2005), and various articles and book chapters. She is currently working on a monograph that focuses on the dilemmatic character of moral life, particularly under conditions of oppression.

Acknowledgments 5
Contents 6
About the Contributors 8
Introduction 12
4.0 Feminist Ethics and Feminist Social and Political Philosophy 12
4.1 Theorizing the Non-Ideal 15
4.2 Preview of the Essays 17
4.3 Notes 24
References 25
Part I Feminist Theorizations of Ethics and Politics, and of the Ideal and Non-ideal 26
1 Normativity, Feminism, and Politics 27
1.1 27
1.2 30
1.3 32
1.4 35
1.5 38
Notes 39
References 44
2 Ethical Reasons and Political Commitments 48
2.1 Introduction 49
2.2 Political Commitment and Ethical Reasons 50
2.3 Political Commitment and Ideal Theory 53
2.3.1 Normative Priority 55
2.3.2 Fungibility 57
2.4 Justification 59
2.5 Conclusion 63
2.6 Notes 64
References 68
3 Feminist Eudaimonism: Eudaimonism as Non-Ideal Theory 69
3.1 Eudaimonism, Idealized and Non-Idealized 70
3.2 The Rejection of Eudaimonism 74
3.3 Eudaimonism as Non-Ideal Theory 12
3.4 Notes 15
References 25
4 LImagination au Pouvoir: Comparing John Rawlss Method of Ideal Theory with Iris Marion Youngs Method of Critical Theory 81
4.1 Rawlss Method of Ideal Theory 81
4.2 Youngs Method of Critical Theory 83
4.3 Some Advantages of Youngs Critical Method 84
4.4 The Limits of Method or Limagination au Pouvoir 86
4.5 Notes 87
References 87
Part II Critiquing Idealized Characterizations of Personhood 89
5 Conjoined Twins, Embodied Personhood, and Surgical Separation 90
5.1 Conjoined Twins 92
5.2 The Issue of Separation 93
5.3 The History of Metaphysical Assumptions About Conjoined Twins 95
5.4 Embodied Personhood in Singletons, Non-Conjoined Twins, and Conjoined Twins 97
5.5 Some Conclusions 100
5.6 Notes 103
References 104
6 The Ideology of the Normal: Desire, Ethics, and Kierkegaardian Critique 106
6.1 Introduction 106
6.2 Critical Theory and the Stages of Existence 113
6.3 Critical Theory and Spiritual Inwardness 116
6.4 Conclusion 118
6.5 Notes 121
References 124
7 The Challenge of Care to Idealizing Theories of Distributive Justice 126
7.1 Introduction: People We Meet and Egalitarian Theories of Distributive Justice 126
7.2 Care as a Form of Luck 128
7.3 Sources of Failed Care 131
7.4 Improving Care: Towards Equal Access and Better Quality 133
7.5 The Limits to Redistributing Care 135
7.6 Conclusions: The Ethics of Care Illuminates the Limits of Ideal Theories of Justice 137
7.7 Notes 138
References 140
8 The Ethics of Philosophizing: Ideal Theory and the Exclusion of People with Severe Cognitive Disabilities 141
8.1 Introduction 142
8.2 An Ethics of Care as a Naturalized Ethics 143
8.3 Problematic Inclusion and Effective Exclusion from the Moral Community 150
8.3.1 Singer's Arguments 152
8.3.2 Jeff McMahan's Arguments 154
8.4 The Ethics of Philosophizing and the Best Practices of Ethical Thinking 156
8.4.1 The Practice of Epistemic Responsibility: Know the Subject that you are Using to Make a Philosophical Point 156
8.4.2 Epistemic Modesty: Know What You Don't Know 158
8.4.3 Humility: Resist the Arrogant Imposition of Your Own Values 159
8.4.4 Accountability: Attend to the Consequences of Your Philosophizing 159
8.5 Concluding Remarks: Ethical Best Practices 161
8.6 Notes 163
References 165
Part III Remaking the Moral and Political Subject 167
9 The Vulnerable Self: Enabling the Recognition of Racial Inequality 168
9.1 Introduction 168
9.2 A Matter of Perspective 169
9.2.1 Traditional (Dysfunctional) White Cognizers and Racial Reparations 171
9.2.2 Traditional (Dysfunctional) White Cognizers and Hurricane Katrina 172
9.3 The Vulnerable Self 173
9.3.1 Black Vulnerability 174
9.3.2 Challenges to White Vulnerability 176
9.3.3 White Vulnerability 178
9.4 Vulnerability: Enabling Understanding Across Difference 179
9.5 Conditioning and Cultivating Vulnerability 180
9.6 Conclusion 181
9.7 Notes 181
References 182
10 Anger, Virtue, and Oppression 184
10.1 Douglass Anger: Majestic in His Wrath 185
10.2 Recent Feminist Defenses of the Value of Anger 186
10.3 Appropriate Anger as a Virtue of Character 188
10.3.1 Aristotle and Anger 189
10.3.2 Tessman's Account of the Virtue of Appropriate Anger 192
10.4 Appropriate Anger as Non-instrumentally Valuable 195
10.5 Conclusion 199
10.6 Notes 199
References 202
11 Practicing Imperfect Forgiveness 203
11.1 The Value(s) of Forgiveness 203
11.2 What Does (or Should) Forgiveness Mean? 205
11.3 Gendered Forgiveness 209
11.4 Imperfect Forgiveness 213
11.5 Ambivalent Forgiveness 215
11.6 Conclusions 218
11.7 Notes 218
References 220
12 Feminist Political Solidarity 223
12.1 Sisterhood 224
12.2 Political Solidarity 226
12.3 The Cause or Goal of Feminist Political Solidarity 228
12.4 The Relation Between Participants in Feminist Political Solidarity 230
12.5 Beyond the Feminist Political Solidarity Group 234
12.6 Conclusion 236
References 237
Part IV Contextualizing in Actualities 239
13 Resisting Organizational Power 240
13.1 Non-idealized Approaches to Ethics and Power 241
13.2 Resisting Organizational Power 242
13.3 Women as Whistleblowers and Resisters of Organizational Power 245
13.4 Moral Agency and Resisting Organizational Power 249
13.5 Notes 252
References 253
14 Women and Violence: A Theory of Judgment 254
14.1 Reassessing the Historicity of Our Conceptions of Violence against Women 255
14.2 Feminist Contributions to the Transformations of Our Moral Perceptions 258
14.3 Recovering Stories to Find Disclosive Examples of Violence Against Women 260
14.4 Notes 265
References 267
15 Narrative Structures, Narratives of Abuse, and Human Rights 269
15.1 The Amsterdam/Bruner Account of Narrative 270
15.2 Narrative Regimentation, Exclusion, and Denial 272
15.3 Hayden Whites Account of Narrative and Closure 274
15.4 Whites Model and Victims Stories 275
15.5 Varieties of Moral Closure 277
15.6 Moral Closure without Moral Resolution 279
15.7 Notes 282
References 284
16 Women, Corporate Globalization, and Global Justice 286
16.1 Justice as Freedom: Libertarian/Neo-Liberal Capitalist Democracy 287
16.2 Justice as Equality: Social and Welfare State Democracy 287
16.3 The Appearance/Reality Critique of Capitalist Justice 289
16.3.1 Appearance of Civil Equality/Reality of Inequality 289
16.3.2 Internal Contradictions of Capitalist Globalization: Growing Economic Inequalities and Injustice for Labor and the Poor 290
16.4 Internal vs. External Critique: Justice as Solidarity 291
16.5 The Social Justice of Marginalized Others: The Exampleof Gender 295
16.6 Conclusion 297
16.7 Notes 298
References 299
Index 301