Preference Change (eBook)

Preface 6
Contents 8
Contributors 10
Chapter 1 Preference Change: An Introduction 13
1.1 Why Investigate Preference Change? 13
1.2 The Formal Preference Notion as the Basis of Models of Preference Change 19
1.3 Modelling Categories of Preference Change 23
1.4 Conclusion 34
References 34
Chapter 2 Three Analyses of Sour Grapes 39
2.1 What is Sour Grapes? 39
2.2 Three Analyses 45
2.3 Getting Your Teeth into Sour Grapes 57
References 67
Chapter 3 For Better or for Worse: Dynamic Logics of Preference 69
3.1 Logical Dynamics of Agency 69
3.2 Modal Logic of Betterness 71
3.3 Defining Global Propositional Preference 74
3.4 Dynamics of Evaluation Change 76
3.5 A Basic Dynamic Preference Logic 77
3.6 Alternative: Constraint-Based Preference 81
3.7 Further Aspects of Preference: Ceteris Paribus Logic 83
3.8 Entanglement: Preference, Knowledge, and Belief 86
3.9 Multi-agent Interaction and Group Preference 90
3.10 Conclusions and Further Issues 93
References 94
Chapter 4 Preference, Priorities and Belief 97
4.1 Motivation 97
4.2 From Priorities to Preference 99
4.3 Order 103
4.4 A Representation Theorem 104
4.5 Preference and Belief 106
4.6 Preference Changes 110
4.7 Extension to the Many Agent Case 114
4.8 Conclusions and Future Work 118
References 118
Chapter 5 Why the Received Models of Considering Preference Change Must Fail 120
5.1 Why Preference Change is a Philosophical Topic 121
5.2 Local and Global Decision Models 123
5.3 The Critical Examples 126
References 131
Chapter 6 Exploitable Preference Changes 133
6.1 Preference Changes in General 133
6.2 Exploitable Preference Changes 134
6.3 Violations of Independence 136
6.4 Myopia 138
6.5 The Sophisticated Approach to Exploitable Preference Changes 138
6.6 Implications for the Foundations of Decision Theory 139
6.7 Rabinowicz’s Argument 140
6.8 The Resolute Approach to Exploitable Preference Changes 141
6.9 Against Resoluteness: The Argument from Backward Induction 142
6.10 A Reply to This Objection 143
6.11 Two Final Thoughts 145
References 147
Chapter 7 Recursive Self-prediction in Self-control and Its Failure 148
7.1 Introduction 148
7.2 Hyperbolic Discounting Poses a Problem in Adaptiveness 149
7.3 Hyperbolic Discounting Creates Motivation for Developing Higher Mental Functions 151
7.4 Recursive Self-prediction Provides a Mechanism forWill 153
7.5 Recursive Self-prediction Accounts for Sudden Appetites and Emotions 156
7.6 Beliefs May Arise Through Recursive Self-prediction 160
7.7 Conclusions 164
References 165
Chapter 8 From Belief Revision to Preference Change 168
8.1 Introduction 168
8.2 Preferences, Values, Norms, Choices, and Beliefs 169
8.3 The Representation of Preferences 173
8.4 Integrity Constraints 177
8.5 The Representation of Change 182
8.6 Priority-Setting 187
8.7 Conclusion 191
References 191
Chapter 9 Preference Utilitarianism byWay of Preference Change? 194
9.1 The Argument and the Gap 195
9.2 Preference Revision 201
9.3 Questions 204
9.4 Simultaneous Extrapolation 208
9.5 Vendlerian Twist 211
References 214
Chapter 10 The Ethics of Nudge 216
10.1 The Paradigm Cases 216
10.2 Social Advertisement 217
10.3 Rationality and Autonomy 218
10.4 What Type of Agency Does Nudge Aim to Correct? 219
10.5 Preference Change 221
10.6 Does Nudge Build Moral Character? 223
10.7 Who Is Nudging? 224
10.8 Transparency 225
10.9 The Moral Permissibility of Nudge 226
References 227
Chapter 11 Preference Kinematics 229
11.1 Introduction 229
11.2 Representing Preference Change 231
11.3 Generalised Conditioning 236
11.4 Desire-Driven Change 238
11.5 Belief-Driven Change 242
11.6 Preference Loss and Preference Gain 248
11.7 Appendix 249
References 250
Chapter 12 Population-Dependent Costs of Detecting Trustworthiness: An Indirect Evolutionary Analysis 251
12.1 Introduction 251
12.2 The Model 253
12.3 Rational Play as Depending on the Population Composition 256
12.4 The Evolution of the Population Composition 258
12.5 Extensions 262
12.6 Putting Things into Habitual Perspective 265
References 266
Index 268