Allocation, Information and Markets

Efficient allocation, S.Reiter; adverse selection, C.Wilson; asymmetric information, A.Postlewaite; auctions, V.L.Smith; bidding, R.Wilson; the coase theorem, R.D.Cooter; decentralization, E.Malivaud; economic organization and transaction costs, S.NM.S.Cheung; exchange, R.Wilson; experimental methods in economics, V.L.Smith; externalities, J.J.Laffont; fraud, E.Karni; hidden actions, moral hazard and contract theory, R.Guesnerie; implicit contracts, C.Azariadis; incentive compatibility, J.O.Ledyard; incentive contracts, E.P.Lazear; incomplete contracts, O.Hart; incomplete markets, C.Wilson; market failure, J.O.Ledyard; mechanism design, R.B.Myerson; moral hazard, Y.Kotowitz; natural selection and evolution, S.G.Winter; organization theory, T.Marschak; perfectly and imperfectly competitive markets, J.Roberts; principal and agent, J.E.Stiglitz; public goods, A.Sandmo; revelation of preferences, J.J.Laffont; search theory, P.Diamond; signalling J.G.Riley; teams, R.Radner.