The False Promise of Superiority

James H. Lebovic is Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at The George Washington University. He has published widely on defense policy, deterrence strategy, arms control, military budgets and procurement, foreign aid, democracy and human rights, international organizations, international conflict and cooperation, and military intervention. He previously authored six books including Planning to Fail: The US War in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan (Oxford, 2019), Flawed Logics: Strategic Nuclear Arms Control from Truman to Obama (2013), The Limits of US Military Capability: Lessons from Vietnam and Iraq (2010), and Deterring International Terrorism and Rogue States: US National Security Policy after 9/11 ( 2007). From 2015-2017, he chaired the International Security Studies Section of the International Studies Association.

Concepts and Arguments

Chapter 1: The United States and Nuclear Deterrence after the Cold War

SECTION I: Assessing Nuclear Capability: The History and Implications of Alleged Nuclear Advantages
Chapter 2: The Cold War Nuclear Force Balance: The Challenge and Promise of Asymmetry
Chapter 3: Nuclear "Superiority" after the Cold War

SECTION II: Coercive Tactics: Boosting Credibility to Signal a US Willingness to Act on the US "Nuclear Advantage"
Chapter 4: Commitment
Chapter 5: Risk Manipulation
Chapter 6: Resolve and Reputation

SECTION III: Case Studies
Chapter 7: When Tactics Consume Strategy: Decision Making in the Cuban Missile Crisis
Chapter 8: When Red Lines Consume Debate: Thwarting Iran's Nuclear Ambitions Conclusions
Chapter 9: The Case for Nuclear Superiority: Assessing What We Know (and Do Not Know) about Nuclear Deterrence

Notes
Index