PREFACE

FROM THE VERY DAY IT was fought the world-renowned Battle of the Plains has always been a subject of undying human interest; because it is one of those very few memorable landmarks which stand at the old cross-roads of history to guide us into some new great highway of the future. It is true that this battle was not by itself the cause of such momentous change ; and it is also true that there were bloodier fields, in three successive years, at Ticonderoga, Minden and Ste. Foy. But those were barren battles, and never helped to bring about any decisive change in national destiny. What makes Wolfe’s consummate victory immortal is, first, that it was directly based upon the British command of the sea, and hence both vitally important in itself and most far-reaching in its results ; next, that it was the culminating feat of arms in one of the greatest of imperial wars ; and, finally, that it will serve to mark for ever three of the mightiest epochs of modern times—the death of Greater France, the coming of age of Greater Britain, and the birth of the United States. And as it was thus at the very heart of things in the hour of triple crisis, it may be truly called the most pregnant single event in all America since Columbus discovered the New World. So many books have been written on the subject that a new one needs some very good reason indeed to justify its existence at all. Yet, strange as it may seem, there are two valid reasons of such importance and strength that either of them alone would furnish an ample justification fora new work, while both of them together make the appearance of such a work quite imperative.

For the main justifying reason is that all the necessary sources of original information have only now been brought together for the very first time. This may seem a preposterous assertion, in face of the hundreds of books which have been written already ; but anyone who will take the trouble can verify it for himself.

The great worker in this line of research is Mr. A. G. Doughty, of Quebec, whose six published quarto volumes by no means exhaust his supply of original unprinted documents. When all these shall have been edited the student will have a complete reference library to the whole subject in a single work. For Mr. Doughty not only intends to print word for word every single original that has not already appeared in this way, but also intends to compile a complete index to all original sources whatever, so that every question can be followed up to the end at a moment’s notice.

As the subject has long been one of rather heated controversy, where conjecture was bound to play a prominent part in the absence of complete proof, an effort will be made to settle the many vexed questions by publishing an explanatory list of all the authorities known, classified as follows :—A—Originals previously published verbatim ; B—Originals previously published incorrectly or in extracts only ; C—Originals now being published verbatim for the first time; and, D—Originals still unpublished. Besides this, a special list will be compiled showing exactly from what originals and copies—perfect or not—previous writers have drawn their information. It is worth noting that even Townshend’s dispatch after the battle has never been correctly quoted, that even the Literary and Historical Society of Quebec has published imperfect copies of many of the most important documents, and that even the official copy of Bougainville’s letters made for the Canadian Archives at Ottawa was found to contain over fifteen hundred mistakes when it was compared with the originals in France ! The only way out of such a wilderness of error is to print everything word for word ; and, in all cases of disputed readings, give photographic facsimiles, as Mr. Doughty has done already in the case of Townshend’s dispatch and other documents. It is hoped that by this means the whole history of the great Quebec campaign of 1759 will be securely based upon nothing else but unchallengeable facts for all time to come.

The most important effect of this decisive evidence will be to put all partizan points of view out of focus immediately. Very few phases of history have been such happy hunting grounds for party strife ; and more ink has been shed on paper than ever blood was on the Plains of Abraham. There are British versions, French versions, American versions, and French-Canadian versions ; all with lights and shadows suitably distributed in accordance with racial, political, religious, family and personal prejudice. But the documents of necessity invalidate them all ; because the whole truth, in its usual way, distributes the praise and blame with a fairly even hand all round. Generally speaking, the soldiers and sailors on both sides come out of the ordeal very well indeed. There is very little for any of them— French, Canadian, British or American—to be ashamed of, all circumstances considered. And Pitt, Saunders, Wolfe and Montcalm are all proved worthy of even higher renown than they have had hitherto.

But the full truth leaves very little comfort for the partizan in race, religion or politics. The shame of France is well matched by that of Canada, where there was quite as much rascality among Colonial upstarts as among any of the corrupt officials that came out from the Motherland. The general run of American public men were no better in the eighteenth century than they have been in the nineteenth. And there is a purely British crime which can blacken out even their dark methods—the bought-up vote in the House of Commons which ratified the most shameful treaty of peace that England ever made. Religious animosities were as well to the front as usual, reminding one forcibly how many people there are who “ only worship God for spite.” But party politics stand out as by far the worst feature in the true appearance of the times. And the famous definition of dirt, as matter in the wrong place, was never more admirably exemplified than by those intermeddling politicians, who, like their successors at the present day, are always out of place in naval and military affairs—the party politician being mere dirt in the machinery of war.

Though Mr. Doughty’s collections are not yet absolutely complete, still, when all his published and unpublished documents are added to what was known before, it can be easily seen that the whole subject has approached finality so closely, that what may be accurately called a full, true and particular account of the Siege, Battle and Capitulation may now be given for the first time, straight from original authorities. It is such an account as this which is attempted in Chapters VII, VIII and IX of the present work ; for they have all been written entirely from the documents, without paying the slightest attention to any intermediate text whatever.

It is hoped that the present Notes and Bibliography will be found a sufficient general guide to all the original authorities of any importance. More detailed information cannot be given here, since the itemized bibliography, numbered references, and complete alphabetical index to every known source will certainly require a supplementary volume quite as large as The Fight for Canada itself. This supplementary volume will probably appear as the final one of Mr. Doughty’s series.

Those who may like to satisfy themselves that the story of the Fall of Quebec never has been, nor ever could have been, told in full detail before, can do so even now, if they will take any well-known book— Parkman’s, for instance—and compare it with the documents now first brought to light. For nothing is easier than to prove that the best of accepted authorities have erred greatly both in details and general deductions. They could not, of course, do otherwise, with the very imperfect materials at their disposal. And, in such a case as that of Parkman, one is rather struck by what is done so well than by what had to be done so badly from lack of means. Parkman’s reputation, indeed, should be actually heightened by the new discoveries ; for he shows a real power of historical divination, in having found the true point towards which the evidence tended, in several places where his incomplete documents did not contain the point itself.

All the same, his account of the Battle proves to be quite untrustworthy. It is so hazy about the crucial question of Wolfe’s initiative in planning the victory that the reader cannot tell where Wolfe’s scheme began and that of the Brigadiers ended. It is inclined to be entirely wrong about Stobo. It fails to explain the movements of the regiment of Guienne before the day of the battle, though they were of such importance that they made all the difference between victory and defeat. And it gives the tactical details in such blurred outline that it is quite impossible to properly appreciate the military situation at all. Moreover, it gives the story of Gray’s Elegy, which may well be true, but is not yet proved ; and it finds a place in the text for the spurious sentimental letter which Montcalm is always supposed to have written to Townshend after the battle, though it ignores the real one which he dictated to his aide-de-camp. Picking holes in Parkman’s noble book is distasteful work. But it must be clearly pointed out that he can no longer be accepted as a standard authority on the Quebec campaign.

The same is true of all the other works—general, local, and special—which are usually referred to for authentic information. Many of them are admirable attempts to piece...