Nuclear Weapons Counterproliferation

Jack Garvey is Professor of Law at the University of San Francisco School of Law, where he is also Chairman of the International Programs Department. Professor Garvey holds degrees at the University of Chicago, Harvard College, Oxford University, and Harvard Law School. Professor Garvey served as law clerk for Judge Hubert L. Will of the U.S. Federal District Court in Chicago and also as legislative assistant and speechwriter for Senator George McGovern, with responsibility for foreign policy positioning of the McGovern campaign for the Presidency of the United States. Professor Garvey practiced international law in San Francisco with the firm of Graham and James.

I. Introduction ; A. The Need for a New Counterproliferation Foundation ; B. The Old Grand Bargain Breakdown ; i. The Goal of Nuclear Disarmament ; ii. The Flawed Nexus of Nuclear Disarmament and ; Nuclear Counterproliferation ; C. Legitimacy; The Challenge of Asymmetric Possession of Nuclear Weapons ; II. Futility of Nuclear Risk Management in a Purely Consensual Regime ; A. Nuclear Terrorism ; B. State-to-State Nuclear Weapons Risk ; C. Risk Reduction by Consent ; III. Security Council Mandate of Universal Standards ; A. 'Global Legislation' by the United Nations Security Council ; i. The Security Council as Global Legislator ; ii. The Legal Debate ; iii. The Legal Debate Enlightened by Political Realism ; iv. Counterproliferation as Best Prospect for Security Council Legislation ; B. Counterproliferation Beyond Current 'Legislation' ; C.Universal Standards ; i. Nuclear Security as an Independent International Interest ; ii. No Classification of States ; iii. International Administration of Universal Standards ; IV. Elements of an Effective Counterproliferation Architecture ; A. Expanding Deterrence; An International Nuclear Forensics Data Bank ; i. Contemporary Nuclear Forensics Capability ; ii. Expanded Deterrence ; iii. The Legal and Institutional Empowerment of Nuclear Forensics ; B. The Internationalization of Counterproliferation Intelligence ; i. The Incongruity of National Intelligence Resources and Transnational Nuclear Risk ; ii. The Imperative for International Institutionalization of Intelligence ; iii. Feasibility ; C. Export-Import Control ; i. The Club that Cannot Counter-Proliferate ; ii. Institutionalization of Export-Import Controls under Security Council Mandate ; D. Internationalization of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle ; E. Interdiction of Nuclear Weapons Related Transport; The Proliferation Security Initiative ; i. Counterproliferation Designed to be Least Legal; 'An Activity, Not an Organization' ; ii. Interface of the Proliferation Security Initiative and International Law ; a. Coastal State Jurisdiction ; b. High Seas Jurisdiction ; c. Self-Defense ; iii. Institutionalization of the Proliferation Security Initiative under Security Council Mandate; Legitimacy and Effectiveness ; V. Compliance ; VI. Political Will ; VII. Conclusion