System Assurance (eBook)

Front Cover 1
System AssuranceBeyond DetectingVulnerabilities 4
Copyright 5
Dedication 6
Contents 8
Foreword 14
Preface 16
Chapter 1: Why hackers know more about our systems 22
1.1. Operating In Cyberspace Involves Risks 22
1.2. Why Hackers Are Repeatedly Successful 24
1.3. What are the challenges in defending cybersystems? 25
1.4. Where Do We Go From Here? 34
1.5. Who Should Read This Book? 42
Bibliography 42
Chapter 2: Confidence as a product 44
2.1. Are You Confident That There Is No Black Cat In The Dark Room? 44
2.2. The Nature of Assurance 52
2.3. Overview of the assurance process 64
Bibliography 67
Chapter 3: How to build confidence 70
3.1. Assurance in the System Life Cycle 70
3.2. Activities of System Assurance Process 73
Bibliography 101
Chapter 4: Knowledge of system as an element of cybersecurity argument 102
4.1. What is System? 102
4.2. Boundaries of the System 103
4.3. Resolution of the system description 105
4.4. Conceptual Commitment for System Descriptions 106
4.5. System Architecture 108
4.6. Example of an Architecture Framework 111
4.7. Elements of a System 114
4.8. System Knowledge Involves Multiple Viewpoints 116
4.9. Concept of Operations (CONOP) 119
4.10. Network Configuration 119
4.11. System Life Cycle and Assurance 121
Bibliography 130
Chapter 5: Knowledge of risk as an element of cybersecurity argument 132
5.1. Introduction 132
5.2. Basic Cybersecurity Elements 135
5.3. Common Vocabulary for threat identification 140
5.4. Systematic threat identification 160
5.5. Assurance Strategies 162
5.6. Assurance of the threat identification 166
Bibliography 167
Chapter 6: Knowledge of vulnerabilities as an element of cybersecurity argument 168
6.1. Vulnerability as a unit of Knowledge 168
6.2. Vulnerability databases 177
6.3. Vulnerability life cycle 184
6.4. NIST Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP) Ecosystem 186
Bibliography 191
Chapter 7: Vulnerability patterns as a new assurance content 192
7.1. Beyond Current SCAP Ecosystem 192
7.2. Vendor-neutral vulnerability patterns 195
7.3. Software Fault Patterns 196
7.4. Example Software Fault Pattern 207
Bibliography 210
Chapter 8: OMG software assurance ecosystem 212
8.1. Introduction 212
8.2. OMG assurance ecosystem: toward collaborative cybersecurity 214
Bibliography 221
Chapter 9: Common fact model for assurance content 222
9.1. Assurance Content 222
9.2. The Objectives 224
9.3. Design Criteria for Information Exchange Protocols 225
9.4. Trade-offs 226
9.5. Information Exchange Protocols 227
9.6. The Nuts and Bolts of Fact Models 229
9.7. The Representation of Facts 241
9.8. The Common Schema 247
9.9. System Assurance Facts 248
Bibliography 252
Chapter 10: Linguistic models 254
10.1. Fact Models and Linguistic Models 254
10.2. Background 256
10.3. Overview of SBVR 257
10.4. How to Use SBVR 258
10.5. SBVR Vocabulary for Describing Elementary Meanings 262
10.6. SBVR Vocabulary for Describing Representations 266
10.7. SBVR Vocabulary for Describing Extensions 268
10.8. Reference schemes 268
10.9. SBVR Semantic Formulations 269
Bibliography 273
Chapter 11: Standard protocol for exchanging system facts 274
11.1. Background 274
11.2. Organization of the KDM Vocabulary 275
11.3. The Process of Discovering System Facts 278
11.4. Discovering the Baseline System Facts 281
11.5. Performing Architecture Analysis 313
Bibliography 321
Chapter 12: Case study 322
12.1. Introduction 322
12.2. Background 323
12.3. Concepts of Operations 323
12.4. Business Vocabulary and Security Policy for Clicks2Bricks in SBVR 329
12.5. Building the Integrated System Model 340
12.6. Mapping Cybersecurity Facts to System Facts 348
12.7. Assurance Case 351
Bibliography 357
Index 358