Die Haftung der Directors und Officers als Verhaltenssteuerung im amerikanischen Recht. (eBook)

»Liability as Incentive. U.S. Director and Officer Liability as a Model for Germany?« U.S. director and officer liability - an intolerable threat? This verdict too often prevents a closer analysis. But is it a myth? How does the specter of liability impact leadership and oversight at U.S. companies? And how could the U.S. experience inform, e.g., experiments with the business judgment rule, class actions and corporate criminal liability in Germany? The author, a New York corporate lawyer, offers surprising findings ranging from corporate to criminal law that German corporate governance might do well to heed.

S. Kathrin Schwesinger practices law in the New York office of White & Case LLP, where she advises both private equity clients and public companies in a broad range of industries on M&A and corporate governance matters. In 2000, she left Germany for a high school year abroad on the U.S. east coast, where she has lived ever since. She earned her B.A. at Middlebury College and her J.D. at Columbia Law School before launching into her career as a corporate lawyer in 2009 at a large international law firm in New York. Inspired by the Financial Crisis that marked the start of her career, her doctoral dissertation (University of Bayreuth) examines how personal liability can incentivize directors and officers to improve corporate governance.