Banking Regulation and World Trade Law

Lazaros E Panourgias LLB (Athens), LLM (Georgetown), MA (Fletcher), Ph D (King's College, London) is an associate at Herbert Smith LLP (Financial Institutions Group) in London. A member of the Bar in Athens and New York, he has previously been affiliated with the British Institute of International and Comparative Law and worked as legal adviser at the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and at the Harvard Law School Program on International Financial Systems. Dr Panourgias regularly advises financial institutions on financial services issues and is publishing and lecturing on the European and international financial architecture.

I. Introduction 1. The concept of 'prudential' 1.1. The concept of 'prudential' in the GATS and the EU 1.2. The concept of 'prudential' in the literature 1.3. The problem 2. Relevant Policy rationales 2.1. Banking regulation - rationale 2.2. The conflict between banking regulation and trade liberalization II. Trade Liberalization and Banking Regulation: The GATS and The EU 1. Liberalization of cross-border banking 1.1. Foreign direct investment (FDI) and International cooperation 1.2. FDI in banking 2. Trade liberalization and Banking regulation 2.1. Regional liberalization - European Union (EU) 2.2. Multilateral liberalization - General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) 3. GATS: Trade and Financial stability 3.1. Branch 3.2. Subsidiary 3.3. Non-financial entity 4. Trade and Financial stability - review of the EU and GATS institutional foundations: Lessons for the GATS 4.1. Trade and financial stability output 4.2. Trade and Financial stability - review of the EU and GATS institutional foundations 4.3. Trade and financial stability - regional integration 5. Conclusions III. The Case for Prudential Supervision at the International Level and Related Reforms 1. GATS Reform 1.1. Definition of the prudential carve-out - Development of the trade-off devices 1.2. Incorporation of the Basel standards 2. Prudential institution building at the international level 2.1. Decentralization model 2.2. Medium-term institutional arrangements 2.3. Prudential institution building at the international level - Long-term institutional arrangements 3. Conclusions IV. EC Internal Banking Market and Prudential Supervision 1. Banking supervision: the decentralization model 1.1. Decentralization 1.2. Cooperation 1.3. European Central Bank (ECB) 1.4. Reform 2. Monetary policy and Bank supervision 2.1. Price stability 2.2. Default prudential supervision of central banks 2.3. Monetary policy and bank supervision 2.4. ECB and prudential supervision 2.5. ECB and Foreign exchange policy 3. Lender of Last Resort 3.1. Accountability 4. The EC internal banking market and lessons for regional integration 5. Conclusions V. Conclusions - Toward International Institution Buiilding 1. GATS 1.1. Balancing of trade and banking regulation 1.2. Trade and financial stability output 1.3. Reliance on adjudication 1.4. GATS vis-a-vis EU: macro-aspects 1.5. Reform 2. Prudential institution building at the international level 2.1. Alternatives 2.2. Informal vis-a-vis Formal norm making 2.3. Forum 3. EC Internal banking market 3.1. The case for bank supervision at the Community level 3.2. The EU macro- design 3.3. Prudential supervision at the community level and accountability 4. EC Internal banking market and prudential institution building at the international level