Free Will, Responsibility, and Crime

Ken M. Levy is the Holt B. Harrison Professor of Law at the Paul M. Hebert Law Center of Louisiana State University. He has written chapters for anthologies published by Oxford, Routledge, and Sage, and he has published many articles in both philosophy journals and law reviews.

Ch. 1. Incompatibilism Versus Compatibilism

Introduction






Incompatibilism



Indeterminism



Compatibilists’ First Objection to Incompatibilism



Metaphysical Libertarianism



Three Possible Locations for Indeterminism



Metaphysical Libertarianism’s Underlying Theory of the Self as Pure Substance



Compatibilists’ Renewed Randomness Objection



Two Problems with Metaphysical Libertarianism



Compatibilism and the Harmony Condition



Frankfurt’s Identification Theory



Incompatibilists: Identification Is Insufficient for Free Will



Traditional Compatibilism and the Ability to Do Otherwise



Rationality Compatibilism



Compatibilists Versus Metaphysical Libertarians



Compatibilists Versus Free Will Skeptics

Conclusion

Ch. 2. New Compatibilism Versus the Ought-Implies-Can Principle

Introduction






Five Definitions of Free Will



Moral Responsibility



Frankfurt’s Argument Against the Principle of Alternative Possibilities



The Maxim Argument



The Anti-Maxim Position



Objections and Replies



Why Frankfurt’s Conclusion Defeats the Maxim

Conclusion

Ch. 3. Moral Responsibility Does Not Require the Power to Do Otherwise, But It Does Require at Least One Alternative Possibility

Introduction






Three Objections to Frankfurt’s Argument Against PAP



David Hunt’s Blockage Argument



Hunt’s Neural Wall



Why Hunt’s Blockage Argument Fails: The Dilemma Argument Against Blockage



Implications for Incompatibilism

Conclusion

Ch. 4. The Puzzle of Responsibility

Introduction






The Responsibility Axiom and Two Kinds of Blameless Wrongdoing



The Blameless Wrongdoer Argument



A Working Conception of Responsibility



The Sympathy Argument



Just Criminal Punishment Does Not Necessarily Require Moral Responsibility

Conclusion

Ch. 5. Contrary to Responsibility Skepticism, Metaphysical Libertarianism Is Metaphysically Possible

Introduction






Responsibility Skepticism



The Responsibility Skeptic’s Objection to Robert Kane’s Defense of Metaphysical Libertarianism



Supplementing Kane’s Metaphysical Libertarianism with Susan Wolf’s Rationalist Theory of Responsibility



The Randomness Objection



One Last Defense of Metaphysical Libertarianism Over Responsibility Skepticism



Agent Causation

Conclusion

Ch. 6. The Dark Side of Metaphysical Libertarianism

Introduction






The Self-Made-Man Postulate



Success Is (Almost?) Entirely a Matter of Good Luck



Constitutive Luck and Responsibility Skepticism



Situational Luck



Failure Is (Almost?) Entirely a Matter of Bad Luck

Conclusion

Ch. 7. Criminal Responsibility Does Not Require Moral Responsibility: Psychopaths

Introduction






Psychopathy Defined
A. A Working Definition of Psychopathy

B. Psychological Community’s Definition

C. Possible Problems with the PCL-R

D. Differences between Psychopathy and Antisocial Personality Disorder




Three Consequentialist Reasons for Criminally Punishing Psychopaths



Three Arguments that Psychopaths Are Not Morally Responsible for Their Criminal Behavior
A. First Argument that Psychopaths Are Not Morally Responsible for Their Criminal Behavior: Normative Incompetence

B. Second Argument that Psychopaths Are Not Morally Responsible for Their Criminal Behavior: Inability To Do Otherwise

C. Third Argument that Psychopaths Are Not Morally Responsible for Their Criminal Behavior: No Self-Control




The Insanity Defense
A. Assumptions Underlying the Insanity Defense

B. Different Versions of the Insanity Defense




Four Arguments that Psychopaths Are Insane
A. First Argument that Psychopaths Are Insane

B. Second Argument that Psychopaths Are Insane

C. Third Argument that Psychopaths Are Insane

D. Fourth Argument that Psychopaths Are Insane




Why the Criminal Justice System Regards Psychopaths as Criminally Responsible



Why Psychopaths Are Criminally Responsible Even Though They Are Not Morally Responsible

A. Why Criminal Responsibility Does Not Require Moral Responsibility

B. Why Moral or Emotional Understanding of the Law Is Not Necessary for Criminal Responsibility

C. Psychopaths Have Sufficient Control over Their Behavior

Conclusion

Ch. 8. Criminal Responsibility Does Not Require Moral Responsibility: Situationism

Introduction






The Excuses
A. Stephen Morse's Dualist Theory of the Excuses

B. A Monist Theory of the Excuses




Situationism and Moral Responsibility
A. Our Nearly Universal Capacity for Cruelty

B. The Dispositionism Paradox

C. Situationism and Norm-Compliance

D. Stanley Milgram's Shock Experiment

E. Arguments for Recognizing Situationism as a Moral Excuse




Situationism and Criminal Responsibility



The Insanity Defense: Two Final Objections

Conclusion

Ch. 9. Addiction, Indoctrination, and Responsibility

Introduction






Addiction



The "Addiction Negates Responsibility" Argument



Addiction Versus Weakness of Will



The Disease theory Is Actually Consistent with Responsibility for Addiction



Indoctrination



Doxastic Control



Greedy, Addict, Mr. Insane, and the Dangers of Responsibility Skepticism

Conclusion