Handbook of Legal Reasoning and Argumentation (eBook)

Giorgio Bongiovanni is Professor of Philosophy of Law at the University of Bologna Law School (Italy). He has published widely in constitutional theory, legal theory, metaethics and normative ethics, the theory of legal interpretation, the foundations of practical reason, the history of legal theory and philosophy, and the history and philosophy of politics. His works include, among others, a monographic volume on legal theory and constitutionalism (Laterza, 2005), and the editorship (with G. Sartor and C. Valentini) of the volume Reasonableness and Law (Springer, 2009). He also edited two books, respectively, on moral objectivism (B. Mondadori, 2007) and (with G. Gozzi) on the philosophy of international law (Il Mulino, 2006). He is associate editor of Ratio Juris: An International Journal of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law (Wiley-Blackwell). GeraldJ. Postema is Cary C. Boshamer Professor of Philosophy and Professor of Law at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (USA). He has published extensively in legal and political philosophy and ethics. He wrote, among others, Bentham and the Common Law Tradition (Clarendon 1986/1989) and edited Racism and the Law (Kluwer 1997); Rationality, Conventions, and the Law (Kluwer 1998); Jeremy Bentham: Moral, Political, and Legal Philosophy (Ashgate 2002) and Philosophy and the Law of Torts (CUP 2001). He is associate editor of the multi-volume work A Treatise of Legal Philosophy and General Jurisprudence (Springer). Former Guggenheim and Rockefeller fellow, and fellow of the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Studies and the National Humanities Center, he was editor of Cambridge Studies in Philosophy and Law and special issues editor of Law and Philosophy. Antonino Rotolo is Associate Professor of Philosophy of Law at the University of Bologna Law School (Italy). He published two monographic volumes about reasoning by analogy in the law (Clueb, 2001) and multi-modal logics for modeling the interaction between agents and normative systems (Gedit, 2002). He has also extensively written on formal methods for practical and legal reasoning, logics for artificial intelligence, artificial intelligence and law, and philosophical logic. He served as a reviewer for many international journals and as a member of the programme committee of international conferences and workshops. He is assistant editor of Ratio Juris: An International Journal of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law (Wiley-Blackwell) and A Treatise of Legal Philosophy and General Jurisprudence (Springer). Giovanni Sartor is Marie-Curie Professor of Legal Informatics and Legal Theory at the European University Institute of Florence and Professor of Computer and Law at the University of Bologna (Italy), after obtaining a PhD at the European University Institute (Florence), working at the Court of Justice of the European Union (Luxembourg), being a researcher at the Italian National Council of Research (ITTIG, Florence), and holding the chair in Jurisprudence at Queen’s University of Belfast (where he now is honorary professor). He is author of ten books (among which, Legal Reasoning: A Cognitive Approach to the Law, Springer, 2005 and Artificial Intelligence in Law, Tano, 1993) and has published widely in legal philosophy and legal theory, legal informatics (artificial intelligence and law), computational logic, legislation technique, and computer law. He is co-editor of the journal Artificial Intelligence and Law (Springer). Douglas Walton holds the Assumption Chair in Argumentation Studies and is Distinguished Research Fellow of the Centre for Research in Reasoning, Argumentation and Rhetoric (CRRAR) at the University of Windsor, Canada. He is the author of over thirty-five books in the areas of argumentation, logic and artificial intelligence. They include, most recently, Witness Testimony Evidence (CUP, 2008), Dialog Theory for Critical Argumentation (J. Benjamins, 2007), Media Argumentation (CUP, 2007), and Fundamentals of Critical Argumentation (CUP, 2006). He is co-editor of Critical Argumentation book series for Cambridge University Press, and serves on the editorial boards of the Argumentation Library book series for Springer. He is on the editorial boards of the journals Argumentation and Advocacy, Artificial Intelligence and Law, Informal Logic, Philosophy & Rhetoric and Revista Iberoamericana de Argumentación.

Contents 5
Contributors 7
Introduction 9
Basic Concepts for Legal Reasoning 24
Reasons (and Reasons in Philosophy of Law) 25
1 Premise 25
2 The Different Classes of Reasons: Normative, Motivating, Explanatory 26
2.1 Normative Reasons 28
2.2 Motivating Reasons 33
2.3 Explanatory Reasons 35
3 The Ontology of Reasons 37
4 Epistemic and Practical Reasons 41
5 The Modality (and Strength) of Reasons 43
5.1 Conflict and Weighing Between First-Order Reasons 44
5.2 First-Order Reasons and Second-Order (Exclusionary) Reasons 47
6 Reasons in (Philosophy of) Law 49
7 Concluding Remarks 53
References 53
Reasons in Moral Philosophy 56
1 What Is a Moral Reason? 56
2 Explanatory and Normative Reasons 57
3 The Issue of Agential Authority 58
4 Subjective and Objective Reasons 59
5 Personal and Impersonal Reasons: Integrity and Authenticity 60
6 Drawing the Boundaries of the Moral Domain 61
7 Moral Reasons and Moral Reasoning 62
8 Moral Reasons in Conflict 63
9 Moral Reasons and Coordination 64
10 Moral Reasons and Compliance 65
References 66
Legal Reasoning and Argumentation 68
1 Forms of Reasoning by Applying Rules to Cases 69
2 Case-Based Reasoning from Analogy 74
3 Reasoning and Argument 78
4 Reasoning by Drawing Inferences from Sources 82
5 Defeasible Logic 87
6 Reasoning, Argument, and Proof 89
7 Conclusions 94
References 94
Norms in Action: A Logical Perspective 97
1 Introduction 97
2 A Logic for Reasoning About Choices, Actions, and Time 102
3 Formalization of Responsibility and Influence 108
3.1 Responsibility 108
3.2 Influence 109
3.3 The Relationship Between Influence and Responsibility 112
4 Deontic Extension 113
5 Conclusion 118
References 119
Of Norms 122
1 Terminology and Overview 122
2 Normativity 123
2.1 Ought-to-Be and Ought-to-Do 123
2.2 Influencing and Guiding Behavior 124
2.3 Guidance by Norms: The Second-Person Point of View 126
2.4 Norms and Facts 127
3 Rules as Soft Constraints on Possible Worlds 127
3.1 Directions of Fit 128
3.2 Possible Worlds 130
3.3 Constraints 131
3.4 Rules as Soft Constraints 133
4 Kinds of Facts 134
4.1 Objective Facts 134
4.2 Brute Social Facts 135
4.3 Social Rules 136
4.4 Rule-Based Facts 137
4.5 Creation and Derogation 138
4.6 Factual and Descriptive Counterparts of Rules 139
4.7 Norm-Propositions 140
4.8 “Entailed” Norms 141
5 Deontic Facts 142
5.1 Deontic Facts and Motivation 142
5.2 Duties and Obligations 144
5.3 Being Obligated and Owing to Do Something 145
5.4 Permissions 146
5.5 The Anatomy of Ought-to-Do 148
6 Of Norms and Other Rules 150
6.1 Rules as Individuals in the Logical Sense 150
6.2 Dynamic Rules 151
6.3 Fact-to-Fact Rules 152
6.4 Counts-as Rules 152
6.5 Norms 153
6.6 Competence-, Power-, and Other Status-Conferring Rules 154
7 Summary 155
References 156
Values 158
1 Euthyphro Dilemma and Other Questions About Value 158
2 Aims and Desiderata for a Theory of Value 164
3 Some Substantive Questions About Value 166
4 Theories of Value 168
5 Value Disagreement 170
6 Pluralism and Incommensurability 173
7 Values and Rational Choice 178
8 Persons and Values 181
9 Values and Emotions 182
10 Valuing 184
References 186
The Goals of Norms 191
1 Goals–Norms: A Multiple Relation 193
2 Teleologies of Mind: Goals, Functions, and Pseudogoals 194
2.1 What Are Goals? 194
2.2 The Relations Between Psychological Goals and Behavior Functions 195
2.3 Goals Versus Pseudogoals 197
2.4 Subjective Kinds of Goals 198
3 Features of the Goal of an N 201
3.1 Impersonal 201
3.2 Avoidance 201
3.3 Meta-goals 202
3.4 Origin and Base of Norms: Norms Come from the Social Goals to Be Adopted 203
4 The Relationship Between the Mental and External Goals of Ns 204
4.1 Norm Functions and Goals 204
4.2 Subgoals 206
4.3 The Subject and N’s Aim 206
5 Concluding Remarks 207
References 208
Authority 209
1 Two Kinds of Authority: Epistemic and Practical 209
2 Power, de Facto Authority, and Legitimate Authority 210
3 Practical Authority as Personal 211
4 Practical Authority and Its Reason-Giving Capacity 215
5 Practical Authority and Its Capacity to Bind Subjects 217
6 The Kind of Reasons to Which Legitimate Directives Give Rise 219
7 The Justification of Practical Authority 227
References 234
The Authority of Law 236
1 Human Action and Authority: Tracing the Correct Relationship 238
2 Intentional Action Under the Guise of the Good 241
2.1 Aristotle’s Distinction Between Actuality and Potentiality 248
3 Law and Energeia: How Do Citizens Comply with Legal Rules? 251
References 256
Kinds of Reasoning and the Law 258
Deductive and Deontic Reasoning 259
1 Introduction 259
2 Deductive Reasoning 260
2.1 Deductive Reasoning—Logical Consequence as Deducibility 261
2.2 Deductive Reasoning—Logical Consequence as Entailment 266
3 Deontic Reasoning 267
3.1 Introduction 267
3.2 Obligations and Permissions: Basics 268
3.3 Facultativeness 269
3.4 Deontic Logic: Axiomatics and Semantics 272
3.5 Directed Obligations 277
4 Deontic Reasoning—Some Glimpses Beyond 280
4.1 Normative Systems 280
4.2 Normative Dynamics 285
References 287
Inductive, Abductive and Probabilistic Reasoning 291
1 Introduction 291
2 Tales of Woe and Reasoning 296
2.1 Putting Induction and Abduction into Context 298
2.2 Induction and Abduction in Law 305
3 A Primer in Probability Theory in Law 310
3.1 Probabilistic Conceptions of Evidential Value 312
3.2 The Language of Probability 315
4 Conclusion 325
References 326
Defeasibility in Law 330
1 The Idea of Defeasibility 330
2 Defeasibility in Reasoning and Nonmonotonic Inference 331
3 Conclusive and Defeasible Arguments 333
4 Linked Arguments and Convergent Argument Structures 335
5 Attacks Against Arguments: Rebutting and Undercutting 338
6 Rebutting and Undercutting in the Legal Domain 340
7 Levels of Abstraction of Arguments 343
8 Reinstatement 344
9 Dynamic Priorities 348
10 Patterns of Defeasible Reasoning 350
11 Legal Systems as Argumentation Bases 353
12 The Rationale for Defeasibility 356
13 Defeasible Reasoning and Probability 357
14 Defeasibility in the Law 359
15 Overcoming Legal Defeasibility? 361
16 The Emergence of the Idea of Defeasibility in Law and Ethics 364
17 The Idea of Defeasibility in Logic and AI 367
18 Defeasibility in Research on AI and Law 368
19 Defeasibility in Legal Theory 369
20 Conclusion 374
References 375
Analogical Arguments 380
1 The Many Faces of Analogy 380
2 The Architecture of Analogical Arguments 383
3 The Problem Situation 385
4 Prima Facie Similarity 387
5 Relevant Similarity 391
5.1 Relevant Similarity in Legal Analogical Arguments 391
5.2 Theory-Based Analogy 393
5.3 Factor-Based Analogy 396
6 Solution 398
References 399
Choosing Ends and Choosing Means: Teleological Reasoning in Law 401
1 Introduction 401
2 The Structure of Consequentialist Reasoning 403
2.1 The Structure of Evaluation 404
2.2 Rational Choice 405
2.3 Concluding Comments 414
3 Teleology and Instrumentalism 415
4 Choosing Ends 417
4.1 The Legislative Determination of Legal Ends 418
4.2 Interpretation and the Determination of Legal Ends 419
5 Choosing Means 420
5.1 Identifying Options 421
5.2 Choosing the Best Option 422
6 Concluding Remarks 424
References 425
Interactive Decision-Making and Morality 427
1 Introduction 427
2 Basic Information About Game Theory 428
2.1 Tasks and Branches of Game Theory 428
2.2 The Concept of a Game 428
2.3 The Assumptions of Classical Game Theory 429
2.4 Solution Concepts of Noncooperative Game Theory 430
2.5 Evolutionary Game Theory 432
3 Game Theory as a Tool for Better Understanding a Function of Morality 435
4 Game Theory as a Tool for Determining the Content of Moral Norms 439
5 Game Theory as a Tool for Criticizing Certain Moral Conceptions 440
6 Game Theory as a Tool for Analyzing the Problem of the Validity of Moral Norms 441
7 Game Theory as a Tool for Analyzing the Possibility of Deriving Morality from Instrumental Rationality 442
8 Game Theory as a Tool for Analyzing Moral Decision-Making 448
9 Game Theory as a Tool for Analyzing the Nature of Moral Dispositions 450
10 Game Theory as a Tool for Analyzing the Functions of Moral Emotions 453
11 Game Theory as a Tool for Analyzing the Cultural Evolution of Moral Norms 454
12 Conclusions 456
References 457
Special Kinds of Legal Reasoning 459
Evidential Reasoning 460
1 Setting the Stage 461
1.1 Eyewitness Testimony 461
1.2 DNA Evidence 462
1.3 Central Questions 463
2 Three Normative Frameworks 464
2.1 Arguments 464
2.2 Probabilities 465
2.3 Scenarios 466
3 Conflicting Evidence 467
3.1 Arguments 467
3.2 Scenarios 469
3.3 Probabilities 471
4 Evidential Value 473
4.1 Probability 473
4.2 Arguments 475
4.3 Scenarios 477
5 Coherently Interpreting the Evidence 479
5.1 Scenarios 479
5.2 Arguments 481
5.3 Probability 484
6 Reasoning and Decision Making 490
6.1 Probability 491
6.2 Arguments 492
6.3 Scenarios 493
7 Summary and Conclusion 495
7.1 Conflicting Evidence 495
7.2 Evidential Value 495
7.3 Coherently Interpreting the Evidence 496
7.4 Reasoning and Decision Making 496
8 Further Readings 496
8.1 Setting the Stage 497
8.2 Three Normative Frameworks 497
8.3 Conflicting Evidence 498
8.4 Evidential Value 498
8.5 Coherently Interpreting the Evidence 499
8.6 Reasoning and Decision Making 499
References 500
Interpretive Arguments and the Application of the Law 507
1 The Charm of Interpretation 507
2 General Scepticism About Legal Rules 511
3 The Communication Theory of Law 512
3.1 The Communication Theory of Legal Interpretation 514
4 Challenges to the Communication Theory 520
4.1 An Alternative Route for the Contribution Objection 522
5 Complex CT 524
6 Conclusion 526
References 527
Statutory Interpretation as Argumentation 530
1 Introduction 530
2 Interpretive Arguments 532
2.1 The Existing Types of Interpretive Arguments 532
2.2 Classifying Interpretive Arguments 535
3 Translating Interpretive Arguments into Schemes 537
3.1 Assumptions and Common Template 537
3.2 Positive Interpretive Schemes 538
3.3 Negative Interpretive Schemes 540
4 Attacking, Questioning, and Defending Interpretive Arguments 543
5 The Education Grants Example 546
6 Fitting Interpretive Schemes to Cases 552
7 Formalizing Interpretive Arguments—General Structure 558
8 Interpretive Arguments—A Formalization 562
9 Preference Arguments over Interpretive Arguments 564
10 From Best Interpretations to Individual Claims 565
11 Conclusions 568
References 569
Varieties of Vagueness in the Law 572
1 Varieties of Vagueness 572
2 Vagueness in the Legal Context 578
2.1 Ordinary Vagueness 579
2.2 Transparent Vagueness 582
2.3 Extravagant Vagueness 585
2.4 Ambiguity and Polysemy 587
2.5 Conversational Vagueness 589
References 591
Balancing, Proportionality and Constitutional Rights 592
1 Introduction 592
2 Rights, Balancing, Proportionality 593
3 Theories of the Connection Between Rights and Proportionality 594
3.1 Interest Theory and Balancing 594
3.2 Rights as Principles: Robert Alexy’s Theory 596
3.3 Rights and Limitations: Barak’s Analysis 598
3.4 Kai Möller: The Global Model of Constitutional Rights 599
4 Proportionality and Rights: The Critical Theses 601
4.1 Proportionality as a Teleological Approach: Rights as Fungible Goods 602
4.2 Proportionality and “Positive” and “Horizontal” Rights 604
5 Proportionality and Rights Adjudication 605
6 Proportionalism in Review 607
6.1 Proportionality Balancing and Means-Ends Proportionality 608
6.2 Proportionality Between Ad Hoc and Definitional Balancing 613
7 Proportionalism of Review 615
8 Alternative Approaches 618
References 620
A Quantitative Approach to Proportionality 624
1 Introduction 624
2 Quantitative Reasoning Without (Symbolically Expressed) Numbers 625
3 Basic Concepts 628
4 Impacts on Single Values 631
5 Pareto-Superiority 633
6 Comparative Evaluations Without Pareto-Superiority 634
7 Assessing Compliance with Value Norms 638
8 Teleological Reasoning and the Choice of Rules 642
9 Consistency in Balancing 644
10 Conclusions 645
References 646
Coherence and Systematization in Law 648
1 Introduction 648
2 Theories of Normative Coherence 649
2.1 Principle-Based Theories 650
2.2 Case-Based Theories 651
2.3 Constraint-Satisfaction Theories 651
3 Objections to Legal Coherentism 652
3.1 The Vagueness Problem 652
3.2 What Is Coherence-Driven Inference? 653
3.3 The Circularity Objection 655
3.4 Coherence Versus Authority 656
3.5 Coherence and Legal Conservatism 657
3.6 The Alternative Coherent Systems Objection 659
3.7 The Problems of Holistic Coherentism 661
3.8 Value Pluralism, Conflict, and Coherence 662
3.9 Coherence and Truth in Law 663
4 The Coherence Bias: A Plea for Responsibilist Coherentism 666
5 The Value of Coherence 670
5.1 The Argument from Antifoundationalism 671
5.2 Coherence and Emotion 671
5.3 The Argument from Psychological Plausibility 672
5.4 The Argument from the Dynamics of Justification 672
5.5 The Epistemic Value of Coherence 673
5.6 The Practical Value of Coherence 673
5.7 The Argument from the Social Function of Coherence 674
5.8 The Argument from Conflict Resolution 675
5.9 The Constitutive Value of Coherence 676
6 Conclusions 676
References 678
Precedent and Legal Analogy 684
1 Introduction 684
2 Reasoning from Precedent 687
2.1 Nature of Precedential Constraint 687
2.2 How Much Precedential Constraint Is Enough? 689
2.3 Precedential Constraint and Characterization 689
3 Argument from Legal Analogy 691
4 Arguments from Hypotheticals, a Kind of Legal Analogy 694
5 Roles of Differences, Similarities, and Rules in Precedent and Legal Analogy 695
6 Arguments in Practice for Following Precedent or Legal Analogy 700
6.1 Arguments for Following/Departing from Precedent 701
6.2 Arguments from Legal Analogies or Hypotheticals 702
6.3 Examples 703
6.4 Comparing Jurisprudential and Descriptive Accounts 707
7 Argument Schema for Legal Analogy 709
7.1 Argument Schemes for Case Analogies and Hypotheticals 710
7.2 Examples 714
7.3 Toward Computer Implementation 717
8 Special Argument Schemes for Statutes or Constitutions 717
9 Conclusions 720
References 720
Economic Logic and Legal Logic 722
1 Introduction 722
2 What Is Economic Logic? 724
2.1 Introduction 724
2.2 The Logic of (Some) Economic Explanation 725
2.3 The Logic of Economic Evaluation: Welfare Economics 727
3 Economic Logic as a Social Process Rather Than a Reasoning Process 734
3.1 The Power of Private Ordering 734
3.2 Blind Justice: The Social Processes of Legal Development 736
3.3 “Efficiency” on Collegial Courts 738
3.4 Legislative and Other Processes 738
4 Situated Legal Reasoning 739
5 The Logic of Legislation 740
6 The Logic of Administrative Agencies 741
6.1 The Theory of Cost-Benefit Analysis 742
6.2 Cost-Effectiveness 751
7 The Logic of Adjudication 752
8 Concluding Remarks 753
References 754
Index of Names 757
Index of Subjects 764