Defeasibility in Philosophy

Preface
Claudia Blöser, Mikael Janvid, Hannes Ole Matthiessen & Marcus Willaschek: Introduction
Michael Williams: Knowledge, Ascriptivism and Defeasible Concepts
Klemens Kappel: Knowledge, Defeasibility, and the Gettier Problem
Mikael Janvid: The Challenges of Traveling without Itinerary: The Overriding Case
Hannes Ole Matthiessen: Entitlement and Public Accessibility of Epistemic Status
Marcus Willaschek: Strawsonian Epistemology. What Epistemologists Can Learn from “Freedom and Resentment”
Claudia Blöser: The Defeasible Structure of Ascriptions of Responsibility
R. Jay Wallace: Comment on Claudia Blöser “The Defeasible Structure of Ascriptions of Responsibility”
Claudia Blöser: Reply to Wallace
Katarzyna Paprzycka: Can a Spasm Cause an Action? An Argument for Responsibilist Theories of Action
Michael Quante: Autonomous by Default. Assessing “Non-Alienation” in John Christman’s Conception of Personal Autonomy
Frederick Schauer: On the Open Texture of Law
Michel de Araujo Kurth: Selected Thematic Bibliography of Work on Defeasibility in Philosophy and Related Disciplines