Preface

Since the first edition of this text, we have seen a shift in the philosophy of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and how the industry is approaching aviation security. Shortly after 9/11, the traveling public was treated to a one-size-fits-all approach to security. All individuals were perceived to have the same level of risk, regardless of past history, age, behaviors, or other indicators. Within the past two years, the TSA has shifted the focus to risk-based security (RBS). RBS is based on the fundamental belief that the vast majority of individuals present no risk to the aviation system, and therefore, different levels of scrutiny should be incorporated into the process. The TSA has also significantly increased its intelligence collection and dissemination capabilities, and airport and airline operators continue to develop technologies and processes to protect aviation from the ever-evolving threat.

This book came about as a response to the changes brought about because of 9/11 and the lack of a comprehensive aviation security resource that practitioners, new and old, could look to. It is written by a lifetime aviation security practitioner and pilot (Price) and an academician and pilot (Forrest) to bring both practical strategies and comprehensive and well-thought-out explanations to airport, airline, and government aviation security personnel. We recognize that one cannot embark on such an endeavor, particularly within the fast-moving field of aviation security, without taking the risk that certain information will be out of date by the time the book reaches publication. To that end, we encourage you to visit the companion website at http://www.leadingedgestrategies.com for updates and additional information on changes that have taken place in the ever-evolving aviation security industry.

A challenge to writing about airport security is doing it without providing critical information to your adversaries. However, we believe the potential benefits of sharing information and knowledge related to airport security with industry members outweighs this risk. We also think it would be a disservice not to help inform and educate industry about basic strategies for protecting its infrastructure and, more important, the traveling public. For these reasons, we decided that the goal for this text is to serve as a resource for those interested in gaining a better understanding of airport security and applying practical strategies to improve aviation security processes.

The basics of airport security—the practical strategies—are not difficult to comprehend. Indeed, it is probable that your adversaries are already familiar with most of the common airport and airline security strategies. This dilemma is similar to challenges faced by police agencies. For example, police departments might hesitate to share with the public information that could deter theft. In this example, police agencies may fear that by releasing this information, burglars will better understand what defenses they need to overcome to commit a robbery. On the other hand, information shared by the police may help the public learn better ways to secure their property and potentially lower the risk of a robbery. We recognize that even with these strategies, criminals continue to seek ways to overcome various forms of security. That is why it is important for security experts to share new or improved methods for implementing security strategies. Planning and implementing airport and airline security procedures are constantly evolving, requiring continual long-term evaluation and implementation.

Even with the most current knowledge and security procedures, airports and airlines will remain threatened by criminal or terrorist activities. Perpetrators will consistently seek new paths to overcome security methods. We refer to this as pursuing a strategy of least resistance that the criminal or terrorist will exploit to accomplish the goals. This is an important premise for those concerned with airport and airline security. In this text, a history of air terrorism and related lessons learned will demonstrate that most attacks on aviation were and continue to be simple strategies developed by perpetrators to overcome established security methods with the least amount of effort.

In addition to the effect security procedures have on criminals or terrorists, the value of the perpetrator’s goal or target will also affect where and how the perpetrator will strike. Aviation is a high-value target. It is the economic lifeblood of global commerce; global societies now depend on aviation to conduct business. Business travelers constitute a significant portion of the air-traveling public. Since the 9/11 downturn, vacationers have returned to the skies as a primary mode for traveling to resort destinations, and there is strong demand for same-day or next-day delivery of high-value cargo. The reliability, safety, and security of air transportation are critical to global economies.

Industry professionals and others, such as the traveling public and the media, would prefer a single blanket-security strategy or “silver bullet” addressing all aspects related to planning and implementing aviation-related security programs—especially airport security. The reality of aviation or airport security is that it is a highly dynamic and complex system of layers containing policies, strategies, tools, and processes. Each layer is designed to prevent, deter, or enable response to a particular attack or set of attacks. Providing layers of security is a well-established security strategy. In his book America the Vulnerable, Stephen Flynn (2004) described layered security as the constant application and evolution of multiple security measures designed to provide high levels of deterrence. Flynn also recommended that security measures should balance the probability of criminal activity in relation to the value of the target. In this regard, the more valuable the target, the more need for increased layers of security. The TSA commonly refers to these layers as “concentric rings of security.”

Airport and aircraft security managers must understand that a single layer of security will not be 100% effective in blocking criminal or terrorist activity. However, through proper planning and implementation, multiple layers of security initiatives may provide a probability of nearly 100% effectiveness against these threats. Therefore, we believe that each layer of security, performed to its fullest level of effectiveness and combined with other layers of security, will result in the highest level of deterrence obtainable.

A major goal in aviation or airport security should be that security agents in each layer should strive for maximum effectiveness in their area of responsibility. Essential to embracing this goal is an understanding by all personnel that attacks will probably occur regardless of how many layers of deterrence are in place and how effective those layers are. If the target or goal is sufficiently valuable, the criminal or terrorist1 will continue to evaluate or attempt new strategies of least resistance to achieve the goals.

Despite numerous security improvements implemented globally after the 9/11 attacks in the United States, criminals and terrorists continue to disrupt or destroy facets of the global aviation system. Terrorists view aviation as too valuable of a target to ignore. This is a grave realization when one considers that many in the industry argue that aviation security processes remain faulty, even when considering post-9/11 security-related initiatives.

Accepting the premise that attacks will continue to occur regardless of what we do is usually unacceptable. We do not argue that there should be acceptable losses and that we should continue to tolerate these losses. Rather, we believe losses will continue to occur regardless of the security system. As security advocates, we should design and implement practical and effective security measures to help mitigate or minimize these losses. These efforts are analogous to safety in commercial aviation. Although occasional aircraft losses occur (as a result of pilot, maintenance, or manufacturing errors, as well as other causes), the industry strives to reach a zero loss rate, while simultaneously acknowledging that the realization of this goal is unlikely.

Another precarious assumption made by some aviation security practitioners is to consider aviation security as being restricted to addressing acts of terrorism and therefore only focusing security efforts on preventing terrorist acts. The aviation security system must also deal with crimes against aviation and those using aviation to facilitate other forms of crime, such as drug trafficking, human smuggling (illegal alien and human slave trafficking), and the transportation of stolen property. Airports and airlines are businesses, sometimes large corporations, and experience crimes similar to those affecting nonaviation companies, such as employee theft, workplace violence, and cyber-threats. Airports and airlines are entities with a large general population passing through their facilities and onto aircraft every day. In this environment, there are numerous opportunities for criminals.

Many government agencies have offered various definitions for terrorism. However, law enforcement agencies and the U.S. District Attorney’s Office determine whether a particular act is a form of terrorism. For example, the attempted bombing of American Airlines Flight 63 by Richard Reid (a.k.a. the shoe bomber) was considered an act of terrorism. In contrast, the shooting by a single perpetrator of three individuals waiting in line at the El Al ticket...