The Institutional Structure of Antitrust Enforcement

Daniel A. Crane is a law professor at the University of Michigan, where he teaches contracts, antitrust, and antitrust and intellectual property. His scholarship has focused primarily on antitrust and economic regulation, particularly the institutional structure of antitrust enforcement, predatory pricing, bundling, and the antitrust implications of various patent practices. His work has appeared in the University of Chicago Law Review, the Texas Law Review, California Law Review, the Michigan Law Review, the Cornell Law Review, and the Minnesota Law Review, among other journals. He is the co-editor (with Eleanor Fox) of the Antitrust Stories volume of Foundation Press's Law Stories series.

Acknowledgments ; Introduction ; Part I - Origins and Development of U.S. Antitrust Institutions ; Chapter One: Antifederalism and Corporate Regulation ; Chapter Two: The Curious Case of Dual Federal Enforcement ; Chapter Three: Private Enforcement: Growth and Backlash ; Chapter Four: Shifting Towards Technocracy ; Part II - Optimizing Institutional Performance ; Chapter Five: Adjudication, Regulation, and Administration ; Chapter Six. The Much-Maligned Antitrust Jury ; Chapter Seven: Improving Public Enforcement ; Chapter Eight: State Enforcement and Federal Preemption ; Chapter Nine: Rethinking Private Enforcement ; Part III - Comparative and International Perspectives ; Chapter Ten: How and Why is Europe Different? ; Chapter Eleven: Emerging Antitrust Institutions Around the World ; Chapter Twelve: Toward International Antitrust Institutions? ; Index