The Unfit Brain and the Limits of Moral Bioenhancement (eBook)

In light of the potential novel applications of neurotechnologies in psychiatry and the current debate on moral bioenhancement, this book outlines the reasons why more conceptual work is needed to inform the scientific and medical community, and society at large, about the implications of moral bioenhancement before a possible, highly hypothetical at this point, broad acceptance, and potential implementation in areas such as psychiatry (e.g., treatment of psychopathy), or as a measure to prevent crime in society. The author does not negate the possibility of altering or manipulating moral behavior through technological means. Rather he argues that the scope of interventions is limited because the various options available to 'enhance morality' improve, or simply manipulate, some elements of moral behavior and not the moral agent per se in the various elements constitutive of moral agency. The concept of Identity Integrity is suggested as a potential framework for a responsible use of neurotechnologies in psychiatry to avoid human beings becoming orderers and orderables of technological manipulations.

Dr. Fabrice Jotterand (PhD, Rice University) is Professor of Bioethics and Medical Humanities and serves as Director of the Graduate Program in Bioethics at the Medical College of Wisconsin, USA. He is also the Director of the Philosophies of Medical Education Transformation Laboratory (P-METaL) at the Kern Institute. He holds an appointment as Senior Researcher at the Institute for Biomedical Ethics at the University of Basel, Switzerland.

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In light of the potential novel applications of neurotechnologies in psychiatry and the current debate on moral bioenhancement, this book outlines the reasons why more conceptual work is needed to inform the scientific and medical community, and society at large, about the implications of moral bioenhancement before a possible, highly hypothetical at this point, broad acceptance, and potential implementation in areas such as psychiatry (e.g., treatment of psychopathy), or as a measure to prevent crime in society. The author does not negate the possibility of altering or manipulating moral behavior through technological means. Rather he argues that the scope of interventions is limited because the various options available to "e;enhance morality"e; improve, or simply manipulate, some elements of moral behavior and not the moral agent per se in the various elements constitutive of moral agency. The concept of Identity Integrity is suggested as a potential framework for a responsible use of neurotechnologies in psychiatry to avoid human beings becoming orderers and orderables of technological manipulations.