Weak States at Global Climate Negotiations

Providing new empirical evidence to support the theory, the author provides an explanation for the power of weak states in international climate negotiations. It is argued that assumptions on their coordinated salience for climate issues are insufficent and the author pushes the leaders of strong countries to concede power to weaker states.

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This Element provides an explanation for the power of weak states in international politics, focusing on the case of international climate negotiations at the United Nations. The author points to the pitfalls of assuming that weak countries elicit power from their coordinated salience for climate issues. Contrastingly, it is argued that weak states' influence at global climate negotiations depends on the moral authority provided by strong states. The author maintains that weak states' authority is contingent on international vulnerability, which intersects broader domestic discussions of global justice, and pushes the leaders of strong countries to concede power to weak countries. New empirical evidence is shown in support of the theory.