Knowledge and Reference in Empirical Science

Jody Azzouni is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Tufts University. He is the author of Metaphysical Myths, Mathematical Practice: The Ontology and Epistemology of the Exact Sciences.

General introduction Part I Procedural foundationalism 1 Introduction to Part I 2 Program and scope 3 Reductionism, confirmation holism, theoretical deductivism 4 Some observations on reductionism and the "autonomy" of the special sciences 5 Some comments on the philosophical implications of the use of idealizations in science 6 Gross regularities 7 Procedures and perceptual procedures 8 Shedding perceptual procedures 9 Conclusion to Part I Part II Two-tiered coherentism 1 Introduction to Part II 2 Evidential centrality 3 Ob-similar extensions and ob*-similar extensions 4 Ob-similarity, observational regularities, reasons for incommensurability 5 Kuhnian considerations and the accumulation of knowledge 6 Perceptual impermeability and biotechnical incommensurability 7 Methodological observations about epistemology, scepticism and truth Part III Permuting reference 1 Introduction to Part III 2 Formal considerations 3 Quine’s version 4 Field’s version 5 Putnam’s version 6 The ontological status of causality 7 Some puzzles about reference 8 Conclusion to Part III Part IV The transcendence of reference 1 Introduction to Part IV 2 Troubles for naive naturalism 3 The elusivity of reference 4 Causality and reference: an analysis 5 Transcending procedures 6 Transcendence and its discontents