2 Processing and Packaging That Protects the Food Supply Against Intentional Contamination

Scott A. Morris

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, Illinois

2.1 Introduction

Too often, the first reaction to a social problem is to attempt to find a technical solution, when technology cannot overcome social problems, only their means and circumstances. Although there are some processing and packaging steps that can be taken to indicate intentional contamination of food, it is not possible to add a simple, inexpensive component to existing systems to prevent a determined attack: real solutions are always imperfect, often more complex and usually more difficult.

Quite apart from malicious human efforts, nature has been attempting to contaminate food products since the first drying and salting of grains, meats and vegetables provided for a longer-duration food supply, and most food processing operations have a culture of quality that is intrinsically designed to work against these threats. Many of the efforts in large-scale food contamination have been directed at detection of outbreaks of food poisoning in the population and then remediation after an outbreak occurs. The food industry, which is usually quite careful about quality and safety, already has coding and recall management practices in place. These have historically worked very well after problems are detected, but assume that the producer is acting in good faith; that the inspection, notification and recall systems operate as they are supposed to; and that the product itself is not counterfeit.

Packaging, which is intrinsically designed to protect the product against many natural and man-made hazards, may protect against pilferage or low-level postprocessing contamination of products, but the most that can be achieved for many products at any practical cost and production level is an indication of tampering. Additionally, the requirements for global outsourcing of manufactured products, ingredients and components; global markets for finished goods, the persistent push to minimize the costs of ingredients and packaging systems; ceaseless just-in-time logistics systems that have replaced warehouses; and perpetual demands to maximize productivity impede many types of proactive contamination prevention.

As a result of these and other factors that are discussed in this chapter, there is no magic gadget that can be added to the food processing packaging and distribution system to make it perfectly safe against intentional contamination. What can be done is to assess and manage risks responsibly and appropriately, implement detection steps and improvements in technology where needed to make contamination difficult at all points in the food system, and to ensure that a response system that is capable of remediating problems on a timely basis is in place. This would represent a substantial improvement on the current system.

2.2 Processing

Intentional contamination or destruction of the food supply, usually through “agroterrorism” (malicious disruption at the crop level) has been a historic strategy for the disruption of populations and a long-standing fear during wartime. In a world increasingly occupied with asymmetric warfare on many different levels, the threat of a subtle toxin or custom-tailored organism pervading the food system is an increasingly viable threat. These agents may be introduced at some point in the manufacturing and distribution process, between harvesting the raw commodity and consuming the finished product, in order to reach a much larger percentage of the population with less chance of detection than with simple package tampering.

Food processing systems are designed to produce a product that is safe and stable within its distribution environment. That environment might range from long-term shelf-stable foods such as cans, jars and Meals, Ready to Eat (MRE) rations for the military to shorter-duration products such as dairy products, bagged salads and refrigerated “fresh” pasta. Historically, processing has involved either altering the food to make it inhospitable to spoilage organisms with processes such as drying or pickling, or applying thermal sterilization (and moderate toxin denaturation in some cases) followed by containment in a hermetically sealed container that prevents recontamination. Newer preservation methods have involved controlling the temperature throughout the distribution cycle to retard growth, and alternative methods of sterilization and containment have been developed, but the principle remains essentially the same.

The implementation of Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) requirements for food processing plants has provided tools to find and manage vulnerabilities to naturally occurring hazards. HACCP can also provide optimal points for assaying for contaminants or inspection for disrupted seals or counterfeit goods, if analytical tools are available that can detect the agent used. Increased registration and security requirements for food processing plants have reduced access to the production facilities and the use of operational risk management (ORM) strategies taken from the aerospace industry (which faces critical dangers as a matter of course) have provided tools to help develop situationally appropriate safeguards [1]. Balancing this are high employee turnover rates and the difficulty of documenting workers, the broad range of ingredients from multiple sources that may be shipped without tamper indication or verification systems, as well as reliance on Certificates of Analysis for ingredient safety rather than verifiable in-house testing. Many of these factors leave the system open to attack.

On a larger scale, processed food production is run on a “Just-in-Time” paradigm that distributes product as quickly as possible and makes “catching” contaminated products before sale very difficult if there is any delay between detection of contamination or illnesses and the issuance of a recall and warnings. This delay may allow a contaminated product to be distributed and consumed by a broad segment of the population, turning a containable incident into a debacle. An example of this is discussed subsequently.

2.2.1 Counterfeit Products and Ingredients

Counterfeit products in the United States precede the revolutionary war; one of the complaints Britain had against its colonies was that British containers were being refilled and resold with a variety of products of dubious quality. Indeed there is evidence that colonists imported empty bottles from Britain for the sole purpose of counterfeiting or mimicking British products [2]. Since then, most counterfeit products have been concentrated around objects of small physical size, difficulty of verification and very high value which maximizes the return/risk benefit for the counterfeiter. Counterfeit designer watches are much more lucrative that counterfeit potato chips and counterfeit pills are very easy to make and immensely profitable. Because of this, governmental anticounterfeiting efforts in the food, drug and cosmetic milieu have been prominently focused on the pharmaceutical industry due to the immediate harm done to the consumer, although the cosmetics industry faces a booming expansion in counterfeit, copycat and “parasite” goods, that are often severely contaminated (and often attract buyers who are not willing to pay for the “real thing” but are unaware of the risks) [3, 4].

Counterfeiting of drugs in the United States has become an item of considerable concern since diluted and nonsterile Procrit® and Epogen®, were held responsible for deaths and illnesses in 2002 and Lipitor® tablets in 2003 were found to be counterfeit [5–7]. This has been addressed by increased requirements for verification and distribution traceability, something that the pharmaceutical industry had avoided on a cost basis for some time but is finally coming into practice with bar codes and other technical additions in Europe and elsewhere [8].

Counterfeiting (or product swapping) of foods items has long been a problem with luxury items such as high-value spirits, wines and foods. Counterfeiting of more general foods is less likely unless there is a combination of high financial or tactical value and ease of manufacturing counterfeits [9]. One of the food categories that shows an ongoing problem with counterfeiting is seafood, of which approximately 80% is imported into the US. Because seafood is difficult to identify after processing, it has been misrepresented for years and can be deliberately mislabeled as a high-value species to increase profitability. This fraudulent mislabeling carries the risk of illness or death from both intrinsically toxic species, and species that have absorbed dietary toxins. In 2007, a seafood importer was found to have mislabeled seafood containing puffer fish (which carry tetrodotoxin, a potent neurotoxin with no antidote) as monkfish [10]. Subsequent congressional inquiries highlighted the low rate and poor coordination of safety or security inspection in seafood imports [11].

2.3 Packaging

Packaging plays three general primary functions in modern consumer usage; protection, utilization and communication. While the protection function is often thought of as protecting a product against damage or contamination, in the case of a particularly dangerous material (nuclear fuel rods, for instance) the primary purpose is just the reverse—protection of the general environment against the product itself. Beyond that, the most fundamental function of nearly any type of food packaging is to protect the product against postprocessing...