The Contents of Visual Experience

Susanna Siegel is Edgar Pierce Professor of Philosophy at Harvard University.

Introduction: Seeing John Malkovich ; The Content View ; Why does it matter whether the Rich Content View is true? ; How can we decide whether the Rich Content View is true? ; Part I: Contents ; Chapter 1: Experiences ; 1.1 States of seeing and phenomenal states ; 1.2 Visual perceptual experiences ; Chapter 2: The Content View ; 2.1 Contents as accuracy conditions ; 2.2 The Argument from Accuracy ; 2.3 A flaw in the Argument from Accuracy ; 2.4 The Argument from Appearing ; 2.5 Two objections from 'looks', 'appears' and their cognates ; 2.6 The significance of the Content View ; Chapter 3: How Can We Discover the Contents of Experience? ; 3.1 Introspection ; 3.2 Naturalistic theories of content ; 3.3 The method of phenomenal contrast ; Part II: Properties ; Chapter 4: Kinds ; 4.1 The examples ; 4.2 The premises ; 4.3 Content externalism ; Chapter 5: Causation ; 5.1 The Causal Thesis ; 5.2 Michotte's results ; 5.3 Unity in experience ; 5.4 Non-causal contents ; 5.5 Raw feels ; 5.6 Non-sensory experiences ; Part III: Objects ; Chapter 6: The Role of Objects in the Contents of Experience ; 6.1 Strong and Weak Veridicality ; 6.2 The contents of states of seeing ; 6.3 The contents of phenomenal states ; 6.4 Phenomenal states: Internalism vs. Pure Disjunctivism ; 6.5 Why Internalism? ; Chapter 7: Subject and Object in the Contents of Experience ; 7.1 Subject-independence and Perspectival Connectedness ; 7.2 The Good and the Odd ; 7.3 Complex contents ; 7.4 Objections and replies ; Chapter 8: The Strong Content View revisited