Complexity and Institutions: Markets, Norms and Corporations

MASAHIKO AOKI, Stanford University, USA. KENNETH BINMORE, University of London, UK.  SIMON DEAKIN, Cambridge University, UK. HERBERT GINTIS, Santa Fe Institute USA and Central European University, Hungary.

PART I: THEORY AND EMPIRICAL REALITY Theory and Reality in Economics: Insights from Three Allegories; M.Kandori PART II: COMPLEX ECONOMIC DYNAMICS: AGENT-BASED AND ANALYTICAL MODELS The Dynamics of Pure Market Exchange; H.Gintis Towards an Analytical Solution for Agent Based Models; an Application to a Credit Network Economy; C.Guilmi , M.Gallegati , S.Landini & J.Stiglitz The EURACE Macroeconomic Model and Simulator; S.Cincotti, M.Roberto & A.Teglio PART III: SOCIAL NORMS Aspects of Naturalising the Social Contract; B.Skyrms The Role of Salience in the Emergence and Reproduction of Norms; R.Sugden Fairness as an Equilibrium Selection Device; K.Binmore PART IV: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND ORGANISATION Shapley-Value Parables of Corporations as Evolutive Systems of Associational Cognition; M.Aoki An End to Consensus? The Selective Impact of Corporate Law Reform on Financial Development; S.Deakin , P.Sarkar & A.Singh On the Plasticity of the Corporate Form; K.Pistor Government Banks and Growth: Theory and Evidence; S.Andianova , P.Demetriades & A.Shortland