Belief Revision meets Philosophy of Science (eBook)

Editor's Introduction 6
Contents 18
Contributors 20
1 AGM Theory and Artificial Intelligence 22
1.1 Introduction 22
1.2 The Origins of the Theory of Rational Belief Revision 24
1.3 The State of Artificial Intelligence in the 1980s 29
1.3.1 The Knowledge Level 30
1.3.2 A Presentation of Belief Revision in AI 33
1.3.3 The Problem of Database Updating 34
1.3.4 The Presentation of AGM in AI 37
1.4 First Repercussions of AGM in Artificial Intelligence 39
1.5 AGM 20 Years Afterwards 52
1.5.1 Quantitative Analysis of AGM Impact 55
1.5.2 Qualitative Analysis of AGM Impact 55
1.6 Some Conclusions 59
References 61
2 Changing the Scientific Corpus 64
2.1 Introduction 64
2.2 The Corpus Model of Scientific Change 65
2.3 Alternatives to the Corpus Model 67
2.4 Major Differences That Need to Be Taken into Account 69
2.4.1 The Processes of Change Are Collective 69
2.4.2 The Data/Theory Division 70
2.4.3 A Partly Accumulative Process 70
2.4.4 Explanation-Management Rather Than Inconsistency-Management 70
2.4.5 The Irrelevance of Contraction 71
2.5 Incorporation or Retrieval 72
2.6 The Building-Blocks of a Retrieval Model 72
2.7 Construction of the Model: Three Alternatives 74
2.7.1 First Construction: Total Independence Between the Two Operations 75
2.7.2 Second Construction: Inference After Every Incorporation 75
2.7.3 Third Construction: Non-automatic but Retained Inferences 76
2.8 Further Developments 77
References 78
3 Idealizations, Intertheory Explanations and Conditionals 80
3.1 Lessons from Lakatos 80
3.2 Factual, Potential and Counterfactual Explanations 86
3.3 Conditionals in Intertheory Explanations 88
3.4 Conclusion 93
References 94
4 Abductive Belief Revision in Science 97
4.1 The Problem: Learning Within the Theory of Belief-Revision 97
4.1.1 AGM Belief Revision and Its Variants (Including Belief Base Revision) 97
4.1.2 The Problem of Learning Ability (or Epistemic Creativity) 100
4.1.3 Corrective Versus Creative, Input-Driven Versus Deliberate: Quo Vadis? 104
4.2 Two Ways of Incorporating Learning Ability into Input-Driven Belief Revision and an Alternative 106
4.2.1 Martin and Osherson: Joining Belief Revision with Formal Learning Theory 106
4.2.2 Pagnucco 1996: Abductive Belief Expansion and Revision in the AGM-Tradition 108
4.2.3 Levi's Deliberate Expansions and Olsson'Westlund's Research Agenda: Alternatives to Input-Driven Revision 110
4.3 Steps Towards a Theory of Abductive Belief Revision 112
4.3.1 Patterns of Abduction 112
4.3.2 Why Levi-Identity Fails For Abductive Belief Revision 112
4.3.3 Inductive Belief Expansion and Revision 116
4.3.4 Factual Abduction in AI 118
4.3.5 Theoretical Model Abduction in Science 120
References 123
5 A Structuralist Framework for the Logic of Theory Change 125
5.1 Introduction 125
5.1.1 The Purpose of This Essay 125
5.1.2 The Basic Features of Structuralism 127
5.2 Preliminary Discussion 131
5.2.1 Expansion 131
5.2.2 Contraction 132
5.3 Outlines of a Structuralistic Logic of Theory Change 136
5.3.1 The Formal Framework 136
5.3.2 Contraction: Two Dimensions of Minimal Change 141
5.3.3 Further Types of Theory Change? 148
5.4 Conclusion 153
References 155
6 Using Conceptual Spaces to Model the Dynamics of Empirical Theories 156
6.1 Introduction 156
6.2 A Brief Summary of the Structuralist View 157
6.3 Conceptual Spaces 160
6.4 Correspondence Between Structuralism and Conceptual Spaces 161
6.5 Structuralist Change Operations and Their Limitations 164
6.6 Four Types of Theory Change Within the Framework of Conceptual Spaces 166
6.6.1 Addition of Special Laws 166
6.6.2 Change of Metric/Scale 167
6.6.3 Change in Integrality or Separability of Dimensions 168
6.6.4 Addition and Deletion of Dimensions 168
6.6.5 Discussion 169
6.7 Conclusions 170
References 171
7 A Note on Theory Change and Belief Revision 173
7.1 Conceptual Closure 173
7.2 What's in a Law? 175
7.3 Historical Examples 176
7.4 Revolutions and Reductions 178
7.5 Application to Belief Revision Theory 179
8 Social Norms, Rational Choice and Belief Change 181
8.1 Introduction 181
8.2 Part I: New Foundations for Rational Choice 186
8.2.1 Technical Preliminaries 186
8.2.2 Choice Functions in Rational Choice 187
8.3 Part II: Social Norms and Rational Choice 192
8.3.1 Norm-Conditional Rationalizability 192
8.3.2 Norm-Conditional Choice Models 195
8.4 Part III: Belief Revision 200
8.4.1 Postulates for Belief Revision 200
8.4.2 Selection Functions in Belief Revision 202
8.4.3 Rott's Correspondence Results 202
8.4.4 Counterexamples 207
8.4.4.1 Example 207
8.4.4.2 Example 211
8.4.4.3 Example 214
8.5 Part IV: Norm-Inclusive Belief Revision 215
8.5.1 Postulates 216
8.5.2 Correspondence Theorems 218
8.6 Examples and Discussion 223
8.6.1 Example 224
8.6.2 Example 224
8.7 Conclusion and Future Work 225
References 228
9 Rational Belief Changes for Collective Agents 231
9.1 Introduction 231
9.2 The Belief Revision Model 232
9.3 Collective Agents 233
9.4 Collection Functions 234
9.5 Limits on the Collective Agents Belief Set 236
9.6 Specific Merging Functions and Families of Merging Functions 238
9.7 Discussion 241
References 242
10 The Best of All Possible Worlds: Where Interrogative Games Meet Research Agendas 243
10.1 Introduction 243
10.2 Two Views on Questions 247
10.2.1 An Epistemic Perspective on Questions 247
10.2.2 Interrogative Games 250
10.2.3 Abduction, Hypotheses and Belief Revision 253
10.3 Research Agendas, Expansion and Contraction 254
10.3.1 Formal Representation of Questions 254
10.3.2 Agenda Continuity Through Change 255
10.3.3 Updating Questions: Preliminaries 257
10.4 Updating Agendas as a Strategic Problem 260
10.4.1 Normal vs. Extensive Forms 260
10.4.2 Strategic Update of Questions 261
10.4.3 Extensive Update of Questions 263
10.5 Conclusion: From a Extensive Point of View 266
References 269
11 Functional vs. Relational Approaches to Belief Revision 271
11.1 Introduction 271
11.2 Are wFwRF and sRwRF Incoherent? 273
11.3 A functionalist-Relationalist Dilemma 278
11.4 Weak Functionalism and Dynamic Caution: A Preliminary Defense 282
11.5 Conclusion 285
References 285
12 Knowledge as True Belief 287
12.1 Sources of Knowledge and Knowing That 287
12.2 Knowledge and Belief 293
12.3 Acceptance as True and Plain Belief 297
12.4 Absolute Certainty, Fallibilism and Corrigibilism 302
12.5 Rationality and Commitment 306
12.6 Justifying Change in Doxastic Commitment and Doxastic Performance 308
12.7 Knowledge as True Belief 311
12.8 Is Knowing an Attitude? 314
12.9 Depositing Paychecks 317
References 319
13 Reasoning About Belief Revision 321
13.1 Introduction 321
13.2.1 The Syntax of bdi-stit Logic 324
13.2.1 The Syntax of bdi-stit Logic 324
13.2.2 The Semantics of bdi-stit Logic 325
13.3 Tableaux for bdi-stit Logic 326
13.3.1 Tableau Rules 327
13.3.2 Examples of Tableaux 330
13.3.3 Soundness and Completeness of the Tableau Calculus for bdi-stit Logic 332
13.4 Translation of AGM Postulates 338
13.4.1 Postulates for the Basic Changes of Belief Sets 339
13.4.1.1 Postulates for the Expansion of a Belief Set 339
13.4.1.2 Postulates for the Revision of a Belief Set 340
13.4.1.3 Postulates for the Contraction of a Belief Set 341
13.4.2 More Examples of Tableaux 342
13.5 Summary and Outlook 343
Appendix: A Tableau Proof of (tK*8) 344
References 345
14 Changing Minds About Climate Change: Belief Revision, Coherence, and Emotion 347
14.1 Scientific Belief Revision 347
14.2 Climate Change 348
14.3 Coherence and Revision 350
14.4 Simulating Belief Revision About Climate Change 352
14.5 Simulating Resistance to Belief Revision 355
14.6 Alternative Theories of Belief Revision 357
14.7 Conclusion 360
References 360
Appendix 361
15 Rationality in Flux -- Formal Representations of Methodological Change 364
15.1 Methodological States 364
15.2 Philosophical Theories of Methodological Change 365
15.3 Fixed Core Theories and Bootstrap Theories 366
15.4 Outline of a Bootstrap Theory of Methodological Change 367
15.5 The BDI-Model of Rational Agency 369
15.6 Models of Rational Methodological Change 371
15.7 Concluding Discussion 371
References 373
Index 374