EPSA Epistemology and Methodology of Science (eBook)

Introduction 8
1 Naturalism and the Scientific Status of the Social Sciences 10
1.1 Unity of Science, Yesterday and Today 10
1.2 Neo-naturalist Unification 13
1.3 The Forgotten Party: QFSS 15
1.4 A Return to Neurath? 19
References 20
2 Reconsidering Gilbert's Account of Social Norms 22
2.1 Introduction 22
2.2 Social Norms and Joint Commitments 22
2.3 Over-voluntarisation 24
2.4 A Different Type of Normativity 26
2.5 Overambitious Strategy 28
2.6 Circularity 30
References 31
3 Theories for Use: On the Bearing of Basic Science on Practical Problems 32
3.1 Science Policy and the Advancement of Technology 32
3.2 The Cascade Model Versus Emergentism 33
3.3 Local Models in Applied Research 35
3.4 Uses of Understanding in Applied Research 36
3.5 Uses of Understanding in the Development of Technology 38
3.6 Science Policy and Technological Benefits 40
References 41
4 Structural Realism as a Form of Humility 43
4.1 Introduction 43
4.2 Problems from the Past and an Ambiguous Solution 44
4.2.1 Past Troubles 44
4.2.2 On a ``Structural'' Ambiguity: Worrall vs Poincarè! 44
4.3 The Structural Meets the Humble 47
4.3.1 Multiple Realizability: Problem or Resource? 48
4.3.2 The First Path to Humility and the Structuralist Intuitions 49
4.3.3 The Structure Goes Kantian 51
4.4 Conclusions 52
References 52
5 Approaching the Truth via Belief Change in Propositional Languages 54
5.1 Post-Popperian Verisimilitude for Propositional Theories 55
5.1.1 Post-Popperian Theories of Verisimilitude 55
5.1.2 Applying PPV to Propositional Theories 57
5.2 AGM Belief Change for Propositional Theories 59
5.2.1 The AGM Theory of Belief Change 59
5.2.2 Applying AGM to Propositional Theories 61
5.3 Is AGM Belief Change a Road to Verisimilitude? 63
References 68
6 Can Graphical Causal Inference Be Extended to Nonlinear Settings? 70
6.1 Introduction 70
6.2 Nonparametric Tests for Conditional Independence 71
6.3 Monte Carlo Study 73
6.3.1 Simulation Design 73
6.4 Results 76
6.5 Concluding Remarks 78
References 79
7 Towards a Grammar of Bayesian Confirmation 80
7.1 Introduction 80
7.2 How to Price a Horse: Intuitions Concerning Distance 81
7.3 The Sharp Edges of Incremental Confirmation: Basic Properties 83
7.4 Some Derived Properties of Incremental Confirmation 85
7.5 Sorting Out the Grammar: from Basic to Structural Properties 88
7.5.1 The Ordinal Versus Quantitative Level 88
7.5.2 ``Laws'' of Likelihood 89
7.5.3 Confirmability and Disconfirmability 90
7.5.4 Confirmation and Complementary Hypotheses 92
7.6 Concluding Remarks: the Call for a Grammar 94
References 95
Appendix: Proofs of Theorems 96
8 Epistemic Accuracy and Subjective Probability 101
8.1 Introduction 101
8.2 Scoring Rules and Epistemic Accuracy 102
8.3 Towards a Metric of Beliefs 105
8.4 Conclusions 110
References 110
9 Interpretation in the Natural Sciences 112
9.1 The Standard Wisdom of Interpretation 113
9.2 Interpretations in Science 114
9.3 Two Forms of Interpretation 116
9.4 Interpretation and What-Questions 118
9.5 Interpretation as a Response to a Representational Question 120
9.6 Conclusion 122
References 122
10 Multiple Realizability and Mind-Body Identity 123
References 131
11 Why Should Philosophers of Science Pay Attention to the Commercialization of Academic Science? 132
11.1 Introduction 132
11.2 Science for Sale: The Road to Commercialization 133
11.3 Benefits and Costs of Commercialization 135
11.4 Discovery Versus Invention, Fact Versus Artifact 139
11.5 Concluding Remarks 140
References 141
12 Some Consequences of the Pragmatist Approach to Representation 142
12.1 Introduction 142
12.2 The Thesis of Indirect Representation 143
12.3 Models and Scientific Representation 145
12.4 Results-Drivenness in Modeling and Indirect Reasoning 148
12.5 Conclusion 150
References 151
13 The Gray Area for Incorruptible Scientific Research 152
13.1 Introduction 152
13.2 Merton's Norms Conceived as `Default-Norms' 153
13.2.1 Communism 154
13.2.1.1 Secrecy and Publicity 155
13.2.1.2 Timely Publication 155
13.2.2 Universalism 156
13.2.3 Organized Skepticism 157
13.3 Disinterestedness, and Its Challenges 158
13.3.1 Number of Publications 160
13.3.2 Number of Citations 161
13.3.3 Writing Research Proposals 162
13.3.4 Assessment of Research Proposals 163
13.3.5 Networks 164
13.4 Concluding Remarks 164
References 167
14 Epistemic Replacement Relativism Defended 168
14.1 Introduction 168
14.2 Replacement Relativism 168
14.3 Boghossian's Criticism of Incomplete-Theoretical Replacement Relativism 170
14.4 Replacement Relativism in Physics Versus Philosophy 170
14.5 The Relativist's Discovery and the Incompleteness of Propositions 171
14.6 Solving Boghossian's Problems 174
14.7 Conclusion 178
References 178
15 Models and Truth 179
15.1 Introduction 179
15.2 Models as Representations 180
15.3 Models and Truth 183
15.4 Idealization, Isolation, and Truth 185
15.5 The Locus and Stuff of Truth 186
15.6 A Brief Illustration 187
15.7 Conclusion 188
References 188
16 Theory Change, Truthlikeness, and Belief Revision 190
16.1 Scientific Change After 30 Years 190
16.2 Three Programmes 192
16.3 Scientific Theories 193
16.4 Truthlikeness 194
16.5 STR Versus TL 195
16.6 Belief Revision and TL 196
References 199
17 Mechanisms: Are Activities up to the Job? 201
17.1 MDC and External Validity 201
17.2 Activities and Actualization 202
17.3 Polygenic Effects and the Organization of Activities 203
17.4 Two Kinds of Polygeny 204
17.5 Consequences of Polygeny 2 205
17.6 The Argument from Perfectly Balancing Causal Contributors 206
17.7 The Argument from Different Actualizations 207
References 209
18 Why the Model-Theoretic View of Theories Does Not Adequately Depict the Methodology of Theory Application 210
18.1 Introduction 210
18.2 How the Model-Theoretic View Misconstrues Methodological Considerations 213
18.3 The Inadequacy of the Model-Theoretic View to Account for All the Facets of Abstraction 215
18.4 Conclusion 218
References 219
19 A Deflationary, Neo-Mertonian Critique of Academic Patenting 220
19.1 Introduction 220
19.2 Merton's Ethos of Science 221
19.3 Mertonian Values and Scientific Norms 222
19.4 Mertonian Values, Scientific Norms, and the Patenting of Academic Research 224
19.5 Concluding Observations 228
References 229
20 `I Want to Look Like a Lady, Not Like a Factory Worker' Rose Rand, a Woman Philosopher of the Vienna Circle 231
20.1 Rand's Early Years in Vienna 233
20.2 The Intellectual Circles of Red Vienna: The Vienna Circle Versus the Institute for Psychology 235
20.3 Rand's Participation in the Vienna Circle 238
20.4 Why So Few Women in the Vienna Circle? 240
References 241
21 Natural Kind Theory as a Tool for Philosophers of Science 243
21.1 Introduction 243
21.2 The Alleged Uselessness of Natural Kind Theories 244
21.3 Two Views of the Problem of Natural Kinds 246
21.4 Why Are the Main Approaches to the Problem Deficient? 249
21.5 Conclusion: Toward Natural Kind Theory as a Tool for Philosophers of Science 250
References 251
22 Whence Ontological Structural Realism? 253
22.1 Introduction 253
22.2 What ESR Is (Not) 253
22.3 Metaphysical Underdetermination 255
22.3.1 The Argument 255
22.3.2 Resisting the Argument 258
22.3.2.1 Common Denominator: From Entities to Properties 258
22.3.2.2 The Impact of Quantum Statistics 259
22.3.2.3 Is Metaphysical Underdetermination Coherent? 260
22.4 Structuralism in Philosophy of Physics 261
22.5 Conclusion 262
References 262
23 Local, General and Universal Prediction Methods: A Game-Theoretical Approach to the Problem of Induction 264
23.1 The Problem of Induction: Local, General and Universal Prediction Methods 264
23.2 Prediction Games 267
23.3 Simple Meta-Induction, Take-the-Best, and Its Limitations 268
23.4 Weighted Average Meta-Induction 271
23.5 Applications to the Evolution of Cognition 273
References 274
24 Multiple Contraction Revisited 276
24.1 Introduction 276
24.2 The Problem of Multiple Contraction 278
24.3 Required Basics of Ranking Theory 280
24.4 A Ranking Theoretic Account of Multiple Contraction 282
References 285
25 Statistical Inference Without Frequentist Justifications 286
25.1 Frequentist Statistics and Frequentist Justifications 286
25.2 Against Frequentist Justifications 288
25.3 Artefactual Probabilities 290
25.4 Conclusion 293
References 294
26 Carnap and the Perils of Ramseyfication 295
26.1 Introduction 295
26.2 Carnap's Method of Ramseyfication 295
26.3 Carnap's ``Empirical Realism'' and his Explicationist Programme 296
26.4 The Problem with Ramseyfication 298
26.5 Psillos' Criticism 300
26.6 Demopoulos' Criticism 302
26.7 Conclusion 305
References 305
27 Naturalizing Meaning Through Epistemology:Some Critical Notes 307
27.1 Introduction 307
27.2 Discovery and Justification 308
27.3 Quine's Epistemology 312
27.4 Logic 313
27.5 Towards Semantic Naturalism? 315
References 316
28 What Games Do Scientists Play? Rationality and Objectivity in a Game-Theoretic Approach to the Social Construction of Scientific Knowledge 318
28.1 Introduction 318
28.2 The Elements of a Game-Theoretic Model of Science 319
28.3 The Epistemic Quality of Scientific Products 321
28.4 Epistemic Efficiency and Scientific Institutions 323
28.5 Conclusion 326
References 326
Index 328