Beyond Mimesis and Convention (eBook)

Preface 6
Contents 7
Contributors 8
About the Authors 9
Introduction 12
From Science to Art 13
From Art to Science 18
Problems and Prospects 23
References 24
Telling Instances 28
Representation 29
Representation As 30
Exemplification 32
Fiction 34
Epistemic Access 36
Problems Evaded 39
Objectivity 40
References 43
Models: Parables v Fables 45
How Fables and Parables Help Us Understand the Use of Models: A Short Survey of This Paper 45
The Problem of Unrealistic Assumptions, Round 1: Valid Arguments but False Premises 48
The Plan 48
Solution, Round 1: Galilean Thought Experiments 49
The Problem of Unrealistic Assumptions, Round 2: Overconstraint 50
Fables and Models, Their Morals and Lessons 51
Solution, Round 3: From Falsehood to Truth via Abstraction 53
The Problem of Unrealistic Assumptions, Round 3: Not Fables but Parables 55
Conclusion 56
References 56
Truth and Representation in Science: Two Inspirations from Art 58
Varieties of Truth in Art and Science 58
Preliminaries on Approximate Truth 60
Truth in the Context of Abstraction and Idealization 63
Denotation in Art, Reference in Science 65
Representations and Practice as Products and Production 70
References 74
Learning Through Fictional Narratives in Art and Science 76
I 78
II 81
III 86
IV 89
References 93
Models as Make-Believe 95
Representation in Modeling 95
The Problem of Scientific Representation 95
Misrepresentation 98
Does the Problem Exist? 99
Stipulation and Salt Shakers 102
Models as Make-Believe 104
Walton's Theory: Props and Games 104
Make-Believe and Model-Representation 106
Make-Believe and Stipulation 109
Make-Believe, Misrepresentation and Realism 110
Models and Works of Fiction 111
Models Without Actual Objects 112
The Variety of Models Without Actual Objects 112
Existing Accounts of Scientific Representation and Models Without Actual Objects 116
Models as Make-Believe and Models Without Actual Objects 118
Conclusion 119
References 120
Fiction and Scientific Representation 121
Introduction 121
Model-Systems and Fiction 124
Strictures on Structures 127
Model-Systems and Imagination 135
The Anatomy of Scientific Modeling 145
A First Stab at T-Representation 149
Re-reading the Newtonian Model of the SunEarth System 156
Conclusion 159
References 160
Fictional Entities, Theoretical Models and Figurative Truth 163
Preamble 163
Apparent Reference to Fictional Characters 164
Genuine vs. Figurative Reference 173
Scientific Models as Fictions 181
Concluding Afterthought: Carnapian Associations 187
References 190
Visual Practices Across the University 193
1 194
2 204
3 207
The Plaque Assay 207
Transmission Electron Microscopy 208
Gene Mapping 209
Electrophoresis 209
Immunogold Electron Microscopy 212
Other Kinds of Pictures 213
Conclusions 213
* 214
References 215
Experiment, Theory, Representation: Robert Hookes Material Models 217
Gross Similitudes 223
In Some Things Analogous to the One, and Somewhat to the Other, Though not Exactly the Same with Either 232
It Behove Them, Who Professe the Knowledge of Nature or Reason, Rightly to Apprehend the Severall Waies Whereby They may be Expressed 237
References 240
Lost in Space: Consciousness and Experiment in the Work of Irwin and Turrell 244
Entering the Black Box: Irwin, Turrell and the Anechoic Chamber 248
White Cube and Black Box: Exposing the Explanatory Gap in Modernism and Behaviorism 256
Conclusion 264
References 265
Art and Neuroscience 268
References 284
Index 285

"Models: Parables v Fables (S. 19-20)

Nancy Cartwright

How Fables and Parables Help Us Understand the Use of Models: A Short Survey of This Paper

Models of different kinds appear throughout the natural and social sciences serving a variety of different ends. This paper will discuss one particular kind of model whose purpose is opaque: the “highly idealized” model, prevalent in physics and economics but widely used elsewhere as well. Models of this kind study the behavior of stripped-down systems in unrealistic circumstances.

The models may study balls rolling down totally frictionless totally stable planes (Galileo 1914, 61–69), or laborers of only two kinds—old and young—concerned only with leisure and income (Pissarides 1992), or, as in Thomas Schelling’s famous model, black and white checkers moving according to artificial rules on a checkerboard, ending up in clumps of similar color (Cartwright 2009a, Schelling 2000). The objects and situations pictured in these models are very unlike real objects in the real world of interest to the sciences. Yet they are supposed to teach something, indeed something important, about that real world. How?

I am going to defend the use of descriptions of highly unrealistic situations to learn about real-life situations. That, I maintain, is just what Galileo did in his famous rolling-ball experiments. He honed his planes to make them as smooth as possible, and bolted them down, to learn about the effects of gravity acting on its own. Models I urge are often experiments in thought about what would happen in a real experiment like Galileo’s if only it could be conducted: What would happen were we able to create just the right artificial situation to see the feature under study acting all on its own, without any other causes interfering to mask its effect?

That however is not enough. Doing what Galileo did sounds a good thing. But Galileo’s results are still results about the behavior of balls rolling down totally frictionless planes. We don’t have any such planes and anyway what we really want to know is about canon balls and rocket ships. How do we get from a Galilean conclusion: “The pull of the earth induces an acceleration of 32 ft/sec/sec in balls rolling down totally frictionless totally stable planes”—to a result about cannonballs, teetering coffee cups or rocket ships?

I shall here repeat an earlier answer of mine, that these models are like fables, for instance like this fable that I shall discuss below: A marten eats the grouse; A fox throttles the marten; the tooth of the wolf, the fox. Moral: the weaker are always prey to the stronger. Like the characters in the fable, the objects in the model are highly special and do not in general resemble the ones we want to learn about. Just as I have never seen a frictionless plane or a worker interested only in leisure and income, I don’t think I have ever seen a marten, and seldom a wolf.

But the conclusion of the model, like the moral of the fable, can be drawn in a vocabulary abstract enough to describe the things we do want to learn about. For instance, we conclude from Galileo’s experiment, “The pull of the earth induces a downwards acceleration in massive objects of 32 ft/sec/sec”."