Games, Groups, and the Global Good (eBook)

Preface 5
Foreword 7
Contents 12
Contributors 14
Part I The Evolution of Cooperation at the Level of Individuals 16
Evolutionary Foundations of Cooperation and Group Cohesion 17
1 Introduction 17
2 Scope 19
3 Evolutionary Dynamics 20
4 Biological History 30
5 Historical Analogy 48
6 Historical Consequence 50
References 52
How to Evolve Cooperation 55
1 Introduction 55
2 Evolutionary Game Dynamics 57
3 Direct Reciprocity 58
4 Indirect Reciprocity 59
5 Kin Selection 60
6 Group Selection 62
7 Graph Selection 64
8 Conclusion 65
References 67
Beyond Enlightened Self-Interest: Social Norms, Other-Regarding Preferences, and Cooperative Behavior 71
1 Introduction 71
2 Folk Theorems and Evolutionary Dynamics 73
3 Dynamically Irrelevant Equilibria 76
4 Social Norms in the Public Goods Game 77
5 Directed Punishment 80
6 Altruistic Punishing in the Public Goods Game 81
7 The Evolutionary Emergence and Stability of Altruistic Punishment 82
8 Conclusion: The Missing Choreographer 87
References 90
Evolution, Cooperation, and Repeated Games 93
References 98
Public Good Games with Incentives: The Role of Reputation 99
1 A Philosophical Entente Cordiale 99
2 Public Goods and Private Incentives 100
3 The Mini-Trust Game 101
4 The Dynamics of Two-Role Games 102
5 Staying in the Saddle 103
6 Farewell to Trust 104
7 Ultimate Offers 105
8 Bifurcation Through Reputation 107
9 Public Goods with Punishment 108
10 Dynamics with Reputation 109
11 Revealing Errors 110
12 Public Goods with Rewards 111
13 Larger Groups 113
14 Discussion 114
References 116
Groups and Networks: Their Role in the Evolution of Cooperation 118
1 Groups and Networks 118
2 Partner Choice and Network Dynamics 119
3 Making Friends, Stag Hunt 120
4 Co-evolution of Structure and Strategy 122
5 Prisoner’s Dilemma 124
6 An Experiment 125
7 Beyond Reinforcement 126
References 126
Part II Cooperation and Group Formation 128
Evolution and Construction of Moral Systems 129
1 Introduction 129
2 WhatisaMoralSystem? 133
3 Major Components of Moral Systems 134
4 Constraints on Moral Systems 139
5 Architecture of Moral Systems 144
6 Construction Dynamics of Moral Systems 145
7 Summary 149
References 150
Games, Groups, Norms, and Societies 154
1 Introduction 154
2 Group Formation and Dynamics 156
3 Cooperation, from Bacteria to Bees 157
4 Animal Schooling and Swarming, and the Role of Leadership 159
5 Groups and Norms in Human Societies 160
6 Formalizing Rules and Codes of Conduct: The Evolution of Moral Systems 162
References 163
Evolutionary Theory and Cooperation in Everyday Life 165
1 Human Cooperation in Everyday Life 168
2 Toward the Integration of Academic Disciplines and a Positive Tradeoff Between Basic and Applied Research 176
References 177
The Error of God: Error Management Theory, Religion, and the Evolution of Cooperation 179
1 Error Management Theory (EMT) 180
2 Application to Religious Beliefs 181
3 Towards a more Formal Model 185
4 Predictions and Evidence 187
5 Conclusion 188
References 188
Moral Motivation 191
References 202
Explaining Religion: Notes Toward a Research Agenda 204
References 212
Part III Cooperation and Problems of the Commons 213
Building Trust to Solve Commons Dilemmas: Taking Small Steps to Test an Evolving Theory of Collective Action 214
1 A Theoretical Puzzle 216
2 The Challenges Ahead 218
3 The First Challenge 219
4 What areWe Learning about Norms and the Context of Social Dilemmas? 227
5 What is Next on the Agenda? 229
6 Conclusion 231
References 231
How Democracy Resolves Conflict in Difficult Games 236
1 Introduction 236
2 Resolution by Voting in a 2-Person PD 237
3 Resolution by Voting in an n-Person PD 240
4 Example of an n-Person PD 241
5 A Biblical Tale 243
6 Other Difficult Games 244
7 Conclusions 246
References 247
Two Strategic Issues in Apologizing 249
1 The Duty to ApologizeWithin a Normative System 251
2 Why are Apologies All-or-Nothing? 258
3 Game Theory as a Tool for the Analysis of Norms 261
Appendix 262
Condition for the Apologize-and-Restitute Equilibrium 262
The Robustness of Apologize-and-Restitute 262
References 262
Neither Self-interest Nor Self-sacrifice: The Fraternal Morality of Market Relationships 264
1 Trust as Gift Exchange 266
2 The Trust Game 269
3 Social-preference Explanations of Trust 270
4 Trustworthiness as a Character Virtue 277
5 Team Reasoning and Collective Intentions 279
6 The Fraternal Morality of Market Relationships 284
References 287