The Contents of Visual Experience

Susanna Siegel received her PhD in Philosophy at Cornell University in 2000. She was previously John L Loeb Associate Professor of the Humanities at Harvard University, and is currently Professor of Philosophy and an affiliate of the Program in Mind, Brain and Behavior at Harvard University.

INTRODUCTION: SEEING JOHN MALKOVICH; THE CONTENT VIEW; WHY DOES IT MATTER WHETHER THE RICH CONTENT VIEW IS TRUE?; HOW CAN WE DECIDE WHETHER THE RICH CONTENT VIEW IS TRUE?; PART I: CONTENTS; 1.1 STATES OF SEEING AND PHENOMENAL STATES; 1.2 VISUAL PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCES; 2.1 CONTENTS AS ACCURACY CONDITIONS; 2.2 THE ARGUMENT FROM ACCURACY; 2.3 A FLAW IN THE ARGUMENT FROM ACCURACY; 2.4 THE ARGUMENT FROM APPEARING; 2.5 TWO OBJECTIONS FROM 'LOOKS', 'APPEARS' AND THEIR COGNATES; 2.6 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CONTENT VIEW; 3.1 INTROSPECTION; 3.2 NATURALISTIC THEORIES OF CONTENT; 3.3 THE METHOD OF PHENOMENAL CONTRAST; PART II: PROPERTIES; 4.1 THE EXAMPLES; 4.2 THE PREMISES; 4.3 CONTENT EXTERNALISM; 5.1 THE CAUSAL THESIS; 5.2 MICHOTTE'S RESULTS; 5.3 UNITY IN EXPERIENCE; 5.4 NON-CAUSAL CONTENTS; 5.5 RAW FEELS; 5.6 NON-SENSORY EXPERIENCES; PART III: OBJECTS; CHAPTER 6: THE ROLE OF OBJECTS IN THE CONTENTS OF EXPERIENCE; 6.1 STRONG AND WEAK VERIDICALITY; 6.2 THE CONTENTS OF STATES OF SEEING; 6.3 THE CONTENTS OF PHENOMENAL STATES; 6.4 PHENOMENAL STATES: INTERNALISM VS. PURE DISJUNCTIVISM; 6.5 WHY INTERNALISM?; CHAPTER 7: SUBJECT AND OBJECT IN THE CONTENTS OF EXPERIENCE; 7.1 SUBJECT-INDEPENDENCE AND PERSPECTIVAL CONNECTEDNESS; 7.2 THE GOOD AND THE ODD; 7.3 COMPLEX CONTENTS; 7.4 OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES; CHAPTER 8: THE STRONG CONTENT VIEW REVISITED